MICRONESIA AND STRATEGIC TRUSTEESHIP: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS

By

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MICRONESIA AND STRATEGIC TRUSTEESHIP:
A CASE STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS

A Thesis

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of the

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by

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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. June 9, 1941

FORMAL EDUCATION AND RELATED HONORS

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1963: United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. B.S. degree graduating "with distinction."
1966: United States Naval Destroyer School, Newport, Rhode Island. Six month professional school, graduated second in a class of ninty.
1969: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. A.M. degree. Awarded the Robert B. Stewart Prize.
1970: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. M.A.L.D. degree.

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MILITARY DECORATIONS

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Combat Action Ribbon
National Defense Medal
Vietnam Service Medal with three campaign stars
Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Commendation (Gallantry Cross)
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

OTHER AWARDS AND HONORS

Spot promoted to Lieutenant three months early.
Deep selected to Lieutenant Commander one year early.
Achieved the designation "Qualified for Command of Destroyers" on November 13, 1969.
Selected as an "Outstanding Young Man of America" for 1970.
Nominated for the White House Fellows Program for 1971-1972.

PREFACE

Covering an ocean area of three million square miles, approximately the size of the continental United States, there are some 2,100 islands and islets in the Pacific Ocean which are presently administered by the United States under a United Nations Strategic Trusteeship Agreement.[1]

These islands and islets comprise three large groups: the Marianas (less Guam) to the north, the Carolines to the south, and the Marshalls to the east.[2] The total land area is only 687 square miles, about two-thirds the size of Rhode Island. Only two islands, Bebelthaup and Ponape, are larger than one hundred square miles.

The indigenous population is basically of Micronesian stock, one of the three main cultural and racial divisions of Pacific Oceania. However, there is "racial confusion" in the Trust Territory.[3] Variances in physical characteristics, customs and languages abound. While collectively called Micronesians, the peoples are locally called Marshallese,

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1. See Appendix A for a chronology of the major events concerning this thesis.

2. See Appendix B for maps showing these islands in relation to each other and to the Pacific basin.

3. Stephen H. Roberts, Population Problems of the Pacific (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1927), p. 15. The term "Micronesia" has recently come into use as a synonym for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This use should not be taken to imply that all the inhabitants of the Trust Territory are Micronesians (for example, some inhabitants are Polynesians) nor that the Trust Territory is coterminous with Micronesia (the inhabitants of the British-ruled Gilbert Islands are also Micronesians).

Palauans, Trukese, Yapese, Chamorros, Carolinians and so forth. Nine major languages and many variations of dialect are spoken. In November 1947, the peoples of the Carolines numbered 33,148, the Marshallese 9,718 and the Chamarros (less Guam) 5,431 for a total of only 48,297. Total population on June 30, 1968, was 94,469.

This thesis is a historical study of the decision-making process within the United States Government that led to the placing of these islands under a United Nations strategic trusteeship with the United States as the administering authority and to the selection of the governmental agency responsible for their administration.

From December 17, 1920, until the Second World War, the islands were governed by Japan as a League of Nations Class "C" Mandate. American forces captured them during the Second World War, and a decision had to be reached as to their postwar disposition. Because of the level of social, economic, and political development of the islanders, self-government or independence was not a feasible solution at the end of the war.

The various alternatives for the postwar status of the islands covered a wide spectrum. Many proposals, some feasible and some not, were made during the war for the administration of dependent territories. These proposals contained varying degrees of international supervision. Some proposals called for a powerful international organization directly administering various dependent areas. For example, President Roosevelt at one time thought in terms of a string of strategic bases encircling the globe under direct United Nations administration.

Other proposals called for the administration of dependent territories by an agency of the international organization or by a regional council. Some individuals advocated that the administration of all of the dependent territories of the colonial powers be placed under strong international supervision. Others felt that political realities dictated only territories taken from the enemy and former League of Nations mandates could be expected to come within international supervision.

All of the proposed ideas were studied, debated and refined within various governments. The final product, based largely on the United States draft proposal, was included in Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter (International Trusteeship System). Territories placed within this trusteeship system could be administered by one or more states or by the United Nations itself (Article 81). Additionally, strategic areas, which might include part or all of a trust territory, could be designated (Article 82). These strategic areas would come under the supervision of the Security Council, whereas regular trust territories would be under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council (Articles 83 and 85).

The former Japanese mandated islands could be placed under one of the alternatives mentioned above, or they could be annexed by the conquering power, i.e., the United States, or by another power. If annexed, the islands would then be governed as a dependent territory of the annexing power. The annexing power would have full sovereign rights in respect to the territory.

The only feasible alternatives for the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands proved to be either annexation or their placement under either a regular or strategic United Nations trusteeship. Some decision had to be reached; and the United States, as the conqueror of the islands and as the primary power of the victorious partners, had the responsibility to make it.

If the United States were to be the administering authority, whether under some form of international trusteeship or by right of annexation, then a governmental agency had to be selected to be responsible for the islands' administration. Thus, the entire question of the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands divides into two main rounds of decision-making.

First, the decision had to be reached whether the islands should be annexed or included in some form of trusteeship system. This round subdivides into two questions. The first question started in 1942 and concerned the drafting of the trusteeship provisions in the United Nations Charter. This question was not resolved until the San Francisco Conference in 1945. The other question was whether or not to actually include the islands within the trusteeship system which had been written into the United Nations Charter. This question also started in 1942 but was not resolved until October 1946.

This first round of decision-making was a clear case of conflicting concepts about the correct way to promote world peace and security. The "internationalists," whether President Roosevelt with his internationally administered bases

or Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and Harold Ickes with their advocacy of rapid independence for all dependent people under the aid of a powerful world organization, felt the only way to achieve world peace after the Second World War would be by great-power collaboration and the development of a strong international organization. They were strong Wilsonians and strong proponents of the League of Nations and the mandates system. They were anti-colonial and determined that the war would bring no territorial spoils. They desired to set an example for the rest of the world by gaining no territorial advantage as a result of the war and by placing the former Japanese mandated islands under some form of internationally supervised trusteeship.

The "pragmatists," consisting of some State Department officials as well as the military services and their civilian leaders, such as James V. Forrestal and Henry L. Stimson, had, on the other hand, quite a different concept of the means for promoting world peace and security. With American national security involved, they could not bring themselves to rely on an untested international organization. They were schooled in the thinking that Japan had fortified the Pacific Islands contrary to the mandate agreement, they had seen the failure of the League of Nations, and they could see the weakness of relying completely on such a fragile thing as great-power collaboration in the maintenance of international peace and security. They would be willing to give an international organization a chance but not at the cost of any impairment to American national security.

If the United States was expected to maintain international peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area after the war, the military services and their politically-appointed civilian leaders believed it should have the means with which to exercise its authority--namely, exclusive control of the strategically located islands. If an effective international organization should develop someday in the future and proved effective, then some American security responsibilities could be gradually shifted over to the shoulders of the organization. These "pragmatists" believed they were taking a realistic view of international politics. To them, the "internationalists" were idealists and dreamers.

The clash of the two concepts occurred most clearly over the question of the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands, although it permeated other contemporaneous issues. The final product of the conflict over the islands' disposition bore little resemblance to either side's original position. It could be said that the best possible compromise was reached at the time by meeting two almost irreconcilable points of view. Perhaps so, but as a long-range solution, it has proved unfortunate, as the question of the future political status of these islands is once again in contention. The ultimate disposition of the islands was, in fact, only delayed.

By its very nature, trusteeship is a provisional arrangement. However, according to the thinking in 1942-1947, it would endure for an indefinite period, particularly in the case of a former Class "C" mandate. When any estimate was given of the time required for the Micronesians to become

prepared for self-government, the phrase "not in the foreseeable future" was utilized. It is not unremarkable that the matter of permanent status was delayed at that time in the case of a former Class "C" mandate. What is remarkable is that the due date for terminating the Trusteeship should have developed so rapidly.

In the meantime, mainly as a result of the conflict between the "pragmatists" and the "internationalists" over the disposition of these particular islands, the trusteeship system embodied in the United Nations Charter is weak in respect to international supervision of trust territories. On the other hand, the United States did not annex the islands. If it had, American security would have been clearly established in the islands and their development more strictly inside the American orbit.

On the credit side, two almost irreconcilable points of view on an issue requiring a decision were considered, debated and finally brought to a compromise that proved satisfactory for almost twenty-five years.

The second main phase of decision-making on the question of the postwar disposition of the conquered Japanese mandated islands concerned the selection of the governmental agency to be responsible for their administration. This policy debate started within each agency during December 1944 but did not reach the inter-agency level until late in 1945. It was a controversial question immediately following the war. The Interior Department, Navy Department, and the War Department were all interested in administering the islands. This policy debate was settled in Interior's favor in 1951, although

the question was reopened in 1953 when some of the islands were returned to naval administration and again in 1962 when those islands were once more placed under Interior administration.

The problem of the disposition of the islands formerly mandated to Japan helped to develop an awareness of the need for better coordination between the State Department and the military agencies. Other issues, many of which were more important than the issue of the disposition of the islands, competed for the attention of the officials and also helped to create the awareness of the need for better inter-agency coordination.

The problem of the disposition of the islands was under active and controversial consideration during the period which saw the development, from necessity, of the basic groundwork and principles underlying current politico-military relations. For example, the first permanent inter-departmental machinery, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), using an agenda and secretariat support, was created during this time. This committee was established to consider many inter-departmental policy issues, the question of the islands' disposition being among them. It proved so successful that the National Security Council, created in 1947, was modeled after it. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, for coordination within the military establishment, was organized during this time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff played a leading role in the discussions concerning the disposition of the former Japanese mandated

islands.

The field of American politico-military relations has never been adequately defined or differentiated from that of civil-military relations. The terms "politico-military" and "civil-military" are seen as synonymous and used interchangeably by many scholars. Precise definitions have rarely been given for these terms.

American politico-military relations involve the handling of problems which have both military and political aspects. American politico-military relations can be defined as the intra-governmental, intra-agency as well as inter-agency, coordination of policies which contain both military and political aspects.

This field was not adequately recognized in terms of United States Government organization and policy making prior to the Second World War. While some ad hoc coordination took place between the State Department and the military establishment, the widely held conception was that "military policy" and "foreign policy" were separate, isolated entities. Only with the pressures and issues, both political and technological, faced during and since the war has it been adequately recognized that many issues have both military and foreign policy implications. The assumption is now accepted that military aspects and consequences of foreign policy options should be considered along with the political, economic and other aspects, domestic and foreign, in the formulation of any foreign policy. The reverse is also recognized, i.e., foreign policy aspects and consequences should be considered

along with the other aspects in the formulation of any military policy. In fact, since so many problems are presently a melding of of political and military considerations, the terms "military policy" and "foreign policy" are now difficult to isolate and define precisely.

Differentiated from this field of politico-military relations is the broader one of civil-military relations. The field of civil-military relations concerns the total relationship between the civil and military segments of a society. Constitutional, legislative, cultural, sociological, and other factors enter into the picture. In recent decades, ideas in this regard have changed markedly as millions of American civilians have entered the military services at all levels for short periods to meet emergencies.

The question next arises as to how these fields relate to the large field of bureaucratic politics, defined here as the area of politics concerning the manner in which the government bureaucracy is organized and functions in making decisions on policy issues. All three fields overlap. The mutual relationships can be visually described as follows:



Utilizing these conceptions, some order can be brought to a diverse area of study. This thesis falls within the smaller circle of American politico-military relations. Other works, such as those by Morris Janowitz and Marcus

Cunliffe, fall solely within the civil-military field with little attention paid to the politico-military aspects of civil-military relations. By these definitions the works of Samuel P. Huntington, Walter Millis and Harold Stein would be categorized within the smaller circle of politico-military relations. The various works of these authors are listed in the bibliography.

Dr. Robert B. Stewart, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, has been of great assistance as the Author's adviser and thesis director. Dr. Robert R. Robbins, of the Political Science Department and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, provided the suggestion for this topic and has also been of great assistance. Most of the original research was done at the U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Naval History Division, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.; and a special word of appreciation must be given to the unsung staff of that office for their professional assistance.

The opportunity to spend two weeks during the summer of 1970 actually working in the field of politico-military relations was given to the Author by the Director of the Politico-Military Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This work experience provided the Author with access to the files of that Division, which is the Navy's office for dealing with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia). This work experience also provided the Author an opportunity to get the "feel and flavor" of bureaucratic politics in general, and this field

of politico-military relations in particular.

While the Author has had access to classified materials, he has used in this thesis only materials that are unclassified or those specifically declassified for the purpose. This avoids the necessity of official clearance of this research product. Many State Department documents were officially closed to researchers and many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents remain classified. However, materials covering the same subject were sometimes found in other sources such as the personal papers of various individuals. The analysis presented by this thesis would not be changed by the contents of the documents that remain classified.

Because of the Author's security clearance, it was possible to do research in the classified files and then arrange with the proper authorities to have photocopies or notes of selected documents declassified. Unfortunately, the procedure followed is that the original documents are returned to the files with no notation made on them that their contents have been declassified. Any future researcher of the topic would need to meet similar conditions and follow similar procedures. Since these recently declassified documents are believed to be of special interest and relevance to the study of this subject, and since they are not generally available, they have been included as extensive appendices.

Finally, it must be said that any views and opinions expressed in this thesis are the Author's own and can in no way be attributed to the United States Government or to any of its aggencies.

I am a firm believer in the old adage, "it's a man's world." When a man decides to write a book, everyone in the family falls in line. The children tiptoe through the house and an understanding wife muffles the phone and fends off all relatives and friends who may disturb his brilliant train of thought. He can take long solitary walks while he "thinks things out," and is blessed with someone who will bring him an occasional cup of hot coffee accompanied by a few tender words of encouragement.

Anonymous

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Both the Trukese and the Paulauans impressed me as a happy but bewildered people. They do not look upon us with enthusiasm, but only as the successors to the Spaniards, Germans, and Japanese -- all of whom have ruled over them in the last 50 years.

Mike Mansfield
Representative from
Montana, reporting on
an investigation trip,
February 3, 1947

The Trust Territory has been specifically designated as a 'strategic trusteeship' by the United Nations. The administration of the area was undertaken by the United States, after careful consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because strategic and security control of the area is considered vital to the defense of the United States of America. I feel that it is only upon the basis of defense of the United States, that the considerable cost of the administration of islands so far from the United States, can be charged to the American people. It is my opinion that the strategic and security responsibility for the Pacific Far Eastern areas is an indivisible whole since the installations established and planned in these areas form an integrated system whose purpose is to facilitate the common mission of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,... These were the strategic considerations which required that the islands of the Trust Territory be placed under the exclusive control of the United States. It is, therefore, apparant that the primary interest of the United States in the area is military security.

Francis P. Matthews
Secretary of the Navy
June 20, 1951

CHAPTER ONE

INITIAL PLANNING

1942-1944

The decision-making process that led to the United States Government submitting the Japanese mandated islands to a United Nations strategic trusteeship began in 1942. The years 1942-1944 can be described as a period of departmental juggling for position on the question of the postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. The various positions were developed and put forward, factional lines were tentatively formed on the issue, potential allies were sought, and the opposing positions were attacked.

President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were in agreement on two areas concerning dependent areas. First, they were determined that the United States would seek no territorial advantage or aggrandizement from the war because, in part, of their desire to set an example for the rest of the world, particularly the Soviet Union.[1] Second, they believed that after the war, nationalism and anti-colonialism would be major forces and that all dependent peoples who were ready for the responsibility of independence and who wanted it should be aided in achieving their aim. In this regard, they felt that the old mandate system was unsatisfactory for developing the people since "the nation which is given the mandate soon comes to believe that

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1. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York: Macmillian Co., 1948), Vol. 2, pp. 1466-1467.

it carries sovereignty with it."[2]

Even before the United States entered the war, the principle of non-aggrandizement was proclaimed. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued, in August 1941, the Atlantic Charter which began, "first, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."[3] On January 1 and 2, 1942, the United Nations Declaration, which subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, was signed by representatives of twenty-six nations, including the United States.

The British were rushed into both of these declarations without sufficient time to study them. The President presented Prime Minister Churchill with the requests without prior, lower-level consultations; and the declarations were marked by "haste and informality."[4] In fact, there is no signed copy of the Atlantic Charter in the British Archives; and Roosevelt told Churchill at Yalta that the Prime Minister's signature on Roosevelt's copy was in Roosevelt's handwriting.[5]

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2. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R. His Personal Letters 1928-1945 (2 vols., New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), Vol. 2, pp. 1371-1372, letter to Jan Christiaan Smuts, Victoria, South Africa, dated November 24, 1942. See also: Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1478, 1484 and 1496.

3. Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations (4th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 624.

4. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), p. 430.

5. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 6: Triumph and Tragedy (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948-1953), p. 392.

As for the United Nations Declaration, the War Cabinet cabled Churchill on December 31, 1941, asking "why the urgency was 'so great as to oblige us to accept a declaration with these defects.'"[6] Mr. Churchill's reply, that the President desired immediate approval and that the Russian Ambassador couldn't agree to any changes without receiving new instructions from Moscow [he evidently had had more warning than Churchill], did not reach London until January 2, 1942, the day of the signing.[7] It soon became evident that a sharp difference of interpretation existed between Churchill and Roosevelt over the principles enunciated in the declarations. Their differences were particularly over those principles covering civil rights and self-government. Roosevelt considered the principles to have universal application, while Churchill told Parliament that the Atlantic Charter in no way affected British policy in the British possessions such as India and Burma.[8] In fact, the proddings of Roosevelt over India during Churchill's visit to Washington after Pearl Harbor raised Churchill's anger so much that he "reacted so strongly and at such length that he [Roosevelt] never raised it again verbally."[9] The question of India, and colonialism

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6. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 432.

7. Ibid., p. 433.

8. Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Political Science Quarterly, LXX (March, 1955), p. 6.

9. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 4: The Hinge of Fate, p. 209. Also: James F. Green, letter and interview, September 8, 1970.

in general, was to continue as a sore point in official discussions between the British and the Americans.

Historian Gaddis Smith has emphasized the point that throughout most of the war, until the closing months of the war when Russian intentions in Europe were recognized as the greater threat to permanent peace, President Roosevelt and his advisers worried less about the possibility of conflict with Russia than about the continued existence of western, particularly British, imperialism. The President, Gaddis Smith states, "believed that a refusal by the imperial powers to grant independence to colonial peoples was far more likely to produce a third world war than anything Russia might do. Thus, he embarked on a crusade against imperialism in the Allied camp."[10] Gaddis Smith has also described another war-related motive for the strong anti-imperialist attitude held by the President and many of his advisers, as follows:

> After Pearl Harbor, as the Japanese wave of conquest swept over Southeast Asia and threatened India, anti-imperialism became a military necessity as well as an ideal for the United States. 'Asia for the Asians,' said Japan in an effort to exploit the hatred of dependent peoples for their European masters. At the same time Nazi propaganda was telling the Arab peoples that German victory would bring them genuine independence. In Washington it seemed that the Allies could lose the war if the colonial peoples believed these arguments and cooperated with the Axis. From the American point of view, the Allies had no choice: it was imperative to promise independence for all colonies. Considering imperialism morally wrong, economically wasteful, and a breeding ground for war,

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10. Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 81.

> Americans also believed that independence would mean a happy, stable, and prosperous postwar world. American tradition, morality, military necessity, and future interest all converged.[11]

Harold Macmillan, Under-Secretary of the British Colonial Office from February to December, 1942, has commented on President Roosevelt's anti-imperialist attitude and his resultant actions from the British point of view:

> The British Empire was a bugbear to him [President Roosevelt]. Without any precise knowledge, he would lay down the law about Indian and Colonial affairs; and the liquidation of the British Empire was, whether consciously or unconsciously, one of his aims....the President was no friend of the British Empire. Nor did he understand the clearly defined and steadily pursued procedures by which we had long planned to bestow, by gradual means, first political education and then political independence upon those races for whom we held responsibility. In almost every joint declaration of policy, the Cabinet had to watch, and if possible eliminate, some dangerous phrases.[12]

The anti-imperialist attitude of President Roosevelt and many of his advisers not only exacerbated relations with the British and other colonial powers, but also played a critical role in the debate within the American Government over the postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. This anti-imperialist attitude manifested itself in a strong "no territorial aggrandizement" position in respect to American war aims.

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11. Ibid., p. 82.

12. Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 158-159.

State Department officers began to think of postwar policies in regard to dependent territories early in 1942. Soon after Pearl Harbor, the President established within the State Department an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy under Secretary of State Cordell Hull, as chairman, and Sumner Welles, as vice-chairman. This committee included a number of senior officers of the State Department and, because of President Roosevelt's and Secretary Hull's determination to avoid Wilson's mistakes, Congressional leaders from both parties.[13] Additionally, several non-governmental personages were included. Among them were Norman H. Davis, president of the Council of Foreign Relations; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs; Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University; Benjamin V. Cohen, general counsel, National Power Policy Committee; and Anne O'Hara McCormick, of the editorial staff of The New York Times.

This committee worked out the framework for studies of the various postwar problems by July 1942. Its Subcommittee on Political Problems under Sumner Welles appointed in June 1942 its own Special Subcommittee on International Organization, which was also headed by Welles, to work in conjunction with the State Department's Division of Special Research under Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs, in developing plans for international trusteeship for dependent areas and for a general international organization.

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13. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 74.

Dr. Pasvolsky was Chief of the "Research Staff," the officer personnel of the Division of Special Research and its succeeding (after January 1943) Divisions of Political Studies and Economic Studies. He was "incredibly ingenious" and the mastermind of most of the postwar planning.[14] He was a strong supporter of the placing of all mandated territories under a new form of international trusteeship.

Dr. Pasvolsky's right-hand man was Harley A. Notter, who headed the Division of Political Studies. He was "a Wilsonian at heart and a strong advocate of the trusteeship system."[15] Under him, Durward V. Sandifer and Benjamin Gerig worked on planning for an international organization. Benjamin Gerig had been one of the two Americans in the League Secretariat serving with the Mandate Commission. Included in the State Department planners on the issue of trusteeships were Ralph J. Bunche and James F. Green. Mr. Bunche had specialized in colonial affairs in the Government Department at Howard University and was strongly in favor of the right of self-determination.[16] Mr. Green had specialized in the British Commonwealth and Empire for four years in the Foreign Policy Association and was anti-colonial, though not anti-British in outlook.

In January 1944, the Division of Political Studies was replaced by the Office of Special Political Affairs; and the Division of Economic Studies was abolished. James C. Dunn headed the Office of Special Political Affairs; and Dr. Pasvolsky,

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14. James F. Green, letter and interview, September 8, 1970.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

still in overall charge, became Executive Director of a new Committee on Post-War Programs.

These State Department officers concerned with dependent areas and the trusteeship issue held in common a belief in the right of self-determination. As Mr. Green has phrased it:

> To the British, we were no doubt a bunch of do-gooders who had never run a colony.... Most of the initial drafting and re-drafting of position papters, trusteeship agreements, memoranda, speeches, and the like was thus done by a group of anti-colonialists.... Thus it can be assumed, I think, that 'the officers directly concerned' in State were all more or less strongly opposed to annexation of the Pacific islands. Through Secretary Hull, Charles Taussig, Charles Taft, and other top officials, they were able to press the no-annexation position at every point.[17]

By November 1942, a radical plan had been formulated within the State Department to include all dependent territories under a powerful International Trusteeship Agency exercising its supervisory and administrative functions through regional councils.[18] The regional concept reflected Sumner Welles' own ideas.[19] The Japanese mandated islands, as a dependent territory, would be included within this system. This plan also reflected the ideas of Professor

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17. Ibid.

18. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 109-110 and George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System: A Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations (Geneva: Droz, 1964), p. 23.

19. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 383-384.

Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman of the Government Department at Harvard University.[20]

Secretary Hull restricted the concept to only those dependent territories taken from the Axis and the mandates of the League of Nations, including the Japanese mandated islands, because of "obvious reasons of political feasibility."[21] Therefore, the dependent territories belonging to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Portugal and Belgium would not be included. The President approved the tentative plans as restricted by Secretary Hull.

President Roosevelt was an "anti-colonialist" and believed in the political development of dependent peoples. However, he saw the trusteeship concept, itself, more in terms of providing for international peace and security than in terms of promoting self-government or independence.[22] He believed that internationally administered "trusteeships" would avoid the necessity for annexation of any strategic points, deny these points to potential aggressors, avoid rival territorial claims, and enable the international organization to police the world.[23]

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20. Arthur N. Holcombe, Dependent Areas in the Post-War World (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 94-97.

21. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1638.

22. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, pp. 25-26 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1304-1305, 1996.

23. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1595-1600; also, John C. Campbell and others, The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 42.

President Roosevelt had even gone further than applying the trusteeship system only to mandates and Axis territory. He had proposed to the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in June 1942 a form of trusteeship for the island holdings and other colonial possessions of the "weak nations."[24] In this, he specifically referred to Indo-China, Siam, the Malay States and the Dutch East Indies.

Meanwhile, the military services had also started to think about the postwar problems. They went through a period of rapid organizational change, both to prosecute the war and to plan for the postwar problems.

To provide an American side to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (an Anglo-American committee to direct Anglo-American strategy), the old Army-Navy Joint Board was replaced by a new organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in February 1942. The main difference between the old Joint Board and the new Joint Chiefs of Staff was the "closed staff" system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, had the services of its own staff. Another difference was the full representation of the Army Air Corps. The members were General George C. Marshall (Army), General Henry H. Arnold (Army Air Corps), and Admiral Ernest J. King (Navy). Additionally, it had a Chairman, Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Operations and former Ambassador to the French government at Vichy. The President appointed Admiral Leahy on July 20, 1942, as the Chief of Staff to the

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24. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 572.

Commander in Chief and thought of him more as a personal assistant than Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy became a close politico-military adviser to the President and usually, but not always, kept the Chiefs of Staff informed of the political happenings.[25]

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff "just came into being like Topsy -- it 'just growed,'" its wartime influence can hardly be exaggerated.[26] Professor Huntington states that, next to the President, the Joint Chiefs were the "single most important force in the overall conduct of the war, the level and the scope of their activities far transcending those of a purely professional body."[27] They had been chosen, in part, because they possessed the "sense of statesmanship that enabled them to consider the political as well as purely military aspects of the global situation."[28]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly gained the President's confidence and

> extended their activities and interests far beyond the normal military confines and into the areas of diplomacy, politics, and economics. From the initial great decision to defeat Germany first to the last complex series of decisions on the

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25. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 300.

26. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Speech at the National War College by Admiral Ernest J. King, April 29, 1947. Declassified 1970, King Papers.

27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 318.

28. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 169.

> end of the war with Japan, the major strategic and policy issues of the war were resolved by the President, the Chiefs, and Harry Hopkins. The absence of a formal charter for the JCS facilitated the expansion of its functions since it was impossible for any rival agency to argue that it was exceeding its authority. Tied in close to the President, the interests and power of the Chiefs tended to expand and become coextensive with his.29

A committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), was established in November 1942 to advise the Joint Chiefs on matters relating to military and strategic policy, postwar military policy, Army and Navy coordination problems, and liaison with the State Department. The members of this committee were delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and served as advisers to the American delegation at the San Francisco Conference for the drafting of the United Nations Charter. They played a large part in formulating the Joint Chiefs of Staff position on the postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. The members throughout the war were: Lieut. General S. D. Embick, USA (Ret.), Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN (Ret.), and Major General M. S. Fairchild, USAAC.

As the war progressed, the lower-ranking military staffs also became involved in political matters. For the Army, the Operations Division of the General Staff (OPD) became

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29. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 323. The JCS did not have any charter or other formal definition of functions until the National Security Act of 1947. One was drawn up in 1943, but the President did not approve it. See also: RADM Julius Augustus Furer, U.S.N. (Ret.), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 663-664.

"enmeshed" in matters other than military operations out of necessity.[30] This Division was General Marshall's "Command Post" throughout the war. It contained no less than four Rhodes Scholars. It provided the Army's contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department.

The Navy Department's Occupied Areas Section (OP-50E) became the Military Government Section of the Central Division (OP-13-2) under Captain L. S. Sabin on August 1, 1944. Other Navy offices became involved in political matters, but these sections were the ones that dealt with dependent areas and plans for military government of the Japanese mandated islands.

These Naval offices reported to the Chief of Naval Operations via Vice Admiral Russell Willson (who was also on the JSSC) in his capacity as Vice-Chief of Naval Operations or via Rear Admiral R. S. Edwards, originally Chief of Staff to Admiral King and, after October 1, 1944, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Edwards' responsibilities after October 1, 1944, in Admiral King's words, were "to attend to matters of military policy for me, whether derived from the business of the Navy Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department or the several war boards, including postwar matters, demobilization, organization, etc."[31] This broad conception of the duties of Admiral Edwards exemplifies the degree to which the uniformed services expanded their field of activity during the war.

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30. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 324.

31. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N. and Walter M. Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record (New York: Norton, 1952), pp. 573-574.

The American military services, in Professor Huntington's analysis, did not "reach out after power -- Marshall was no Ludendorff. Instead, power was unavoidably thrust upon them. They were given no choice but to accept it, and with it, the implicit conditions upon which it was granted."[32] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in particular, were thrust into the decision-making arena by President Roosevelt and not by any particular desire of their own.

After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt relied almost exclusively on his close advisers, Byrnes, Rosenman, Hopkins, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for war-time and military decisions. The policy coordination machinery that existed prior to the war, i.e., the Standing Liaison Committee, the Three Secretaries' (State, War, Navy) meetings, and the War Council, "withered on the vine."[33] The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy were excluded from matters of grand strategy by the President and did not even, with a few exceptions, attend the war-time allied conferences. The Service Secretaries were not on the routine distribution list for Joint Chiefs of Staff papers and were essentially limited by the President to administrative functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered only to the President.[34]

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32. Ibid., p. 316.

33. Ibid., p. 320. See also: Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 6.

34. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 462. Editor comment on article: Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives For the Occupation of Germany, The Washington Controversy," pp. 313-464.

Of course, there were many other reasons for the expanded role of the military services other than President Roosevelt's personal proclivities. The mere fact that between 1941 and 1945 the size of the American military services increased from about one million to fifteen million men and women in uniform had a critical role in altering the power balance between the military and civilian components of the Government.

The sheer job of administering this huge military establishment and directing the procurement of vast amounts of war machinery worth hundreds of billions of dollars radically altered the whole nature of civil-military relations.

Emotionally, the entire nation was concentrating on the war effort. The prestige of the military uniformed leaders was never higher. The goal of all branches and agencies of the Government was to support the military services in the prosecution of the war. Congress played a minor role in wartime diplomacy and strategy. No opposition to President Roosevelt developed within Congress to compare with the Committee on the Conduct of the War that confronted President Wilson. There was a large measure of public debate over the Vichy policy and the acceptance of Darlan in North Africa; but Congress played "no significant part in this prolonged and quite public debate."[35] The Truman Committee was the only real effort of Congress to "oversee" the war. Even there, the Committee accepted the huge funding of the secret "Manhattan" project without knowing its purpose.

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35. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 16. See also: Huntington, The Soldier and The State, pp. 324-335.

Another reason for the shift in the relative increase in power of the military services was the contraction of the State Department's field of activity as a result of internal conditions. The State Department

> played a minor role in the direction of the war for political, personal, and organizational reasons. Ideologically, the State Department was peculiarly ill-equipped to deal with the problems of either the war or the immediate postwar periods.... During the war, the State Department continued to believe that its function was diplomacy and that diplomacy was distinct from force. As a result, it devoted itself to relations with neutrals and minor allies and to the development of plans for the United Nations organization. The bitter antagonism between Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles also weakened the Department.[36]

The belief that diplomacy was distinct from force had been implicitly stated by Secretary Hull on November 27, 1941, the day after the "ultimatum" note had been sent to Japan. On that occasion, Secretary Hull had informed Secretary of War Stimson: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox -- the Army and the Navy."[37]

Throughout the war, the conception changed in regard to the role that the military services should play in the determination of governmental policies. It changed because of the expansion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into areas of political

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36. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 321. See also: Albion and Connery, Forrestal and the Navy, pp. 163-164, and Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State, pp. 94-96.

37. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 389.

significance for the reasons stated above. It also changed because the fact that diplomacy was not distinct from force came to be realized; first, by the military services and later, toward the end of 1944, by the State Department.

The fact that many problems and issues had overlapping and intertwining military and foreign policy aspects became clearly recognized and acknowledged. The old concept of "military policy" and "foreign policy" being separate, isolated entities fell by the wayside. As always, there was confusion among the various definitions, or lack of definitions, in regard to foreign policy, military policy, national security policy, and national policy. No attempt will be made here to define these terms. The main point is the concept developed during the war that foreign and military policies are interwoven and, therefore, must be coordinated in order for each to be effective. Political aspects of military policy must be considered in order to produce effective military policy and vice versa.

The awareness developed that both military and foreign policies--as well as domestic policies (which are also interwoven with military and foreign policies)--are designed, or should be, to carry out the national policies.

Admiral King described his conception of the national policies in a speech that he delivered on December 6, 1946. This speech outlines the national policies (they might be defined as the national security policies) perceived during the time that the issue of the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands was under consideration.

It is interesting to note that the national policies that he outlined are still valid today, although a few more have probably been added with the increased commitments made to other nations since 1946. Admiral King stated:

> It is to be remembered that the Navy does not formulate national policies; the business of the Navy is to support national policies. Under our democratic form of government, national policies are, in fact, the expression of the will of the people, as formulated in the Congress and effectuated by the President. The basic purpose for maintaining United States armed forces is to provide for our security and to uphold and advance our national foreign policies.
>
> The major national foreign policies, from which our military policies derive, appear to be, as nearly as we can now determine: (a) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the United States, its territories, possessions, leased areas, and trustee territories. (b) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty or political independence of other American states, and regional collaboration with them in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere.(c) Maintenance of the territorial integrity, security and the political independence of the Philippine Islands. (d) Participation in, and full support of, the United Nations. (e) Enforcement, in collaboration with our Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated enemy states. (f) Maintenance of the United States in the best possible relative position with respect to potential enemy powers, ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States at home.
>
> These policies in the aggregate are directed toward the maintenance of world peace, under conditions which insure the security, well-being and advancement of our country - and so of the entire world.
>
> The tasks of the Navy, both in war and peace, stem from the national policies. My overriding concern is that the United

> States will have, and henceforth, a Navy competent to carry out these tasks.[38]

Professor Huntington strongly criticizes the "politicalization" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He feels that their concentration on political objectives led them to forsake their primary role as military advisers to the government. Thus, an effective civil-military relationship broke down. He cites the example of their shifting from a pre-war position of recommending the attainment of a balance-of-power system to the concept of the solidarity of the three great powers. However, according to Professor Huntington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not completely abandon the military viewpoint in their thinking. In this respect, he states their desire to "acquire full ownership of the Japanese mandated islands was a typically military approach which brought them into sharp conflict with civilian agencies of the government."[39] Additionally, lower-ranking officers, both within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and without, retained the traditional military viewpoints. They urged the "desirability of formulating postwar goals before the conflict ended, maintaining strong forces after victory, and directing policy toward the achievement of a world-wide balance of power."[40]

In light of the expanding role of the uniformed services

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38. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, King Papers, Speech to Aircraft Club, Detroit, Michigan, December 6, 1946.

39. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 334.

40. Ibid., 335.

and the new conceptions of the military's role in the formulation of governmental policies, it was inevitable that military officers would soon become interested in the postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands.

The first recorded mention of their interest in the postwar disposition of the Pacific Island Mandate is a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated September 15, 1942, and signed by Admiral Leahy. It was addressed to Mr. Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Security Problems of the State Department's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. In it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the necessity of depriving Japan of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands (the Mandate).[41]

A few months later the President, himself, directed the military services to initiate several studies on postwar security forces, Pacific island problems, postwar commercial air routes, and postwar naval and air base requirements.[42] These questions necessarily had foreign policy implications. As Professor Huntington has pointed out, the military services were not only encouraged but "thrust" into dealing with questions having political implications.

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41. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1944 (7 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Vol. 5, p. 1201 footnote.

42. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Naval Aide to President, memorandum to Admiral Leahy, December 28, 1942; Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, June 30, 1943; Report of Investigation by Special Mission of Certain Pacific Islands (RADM Richard E. Byrd mission), 5 vols., all declassified 1969, CNO (SC) A14-7EF files.

On March 27, 1943, the Navy Department's high-level General Board headed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who later became a Senator and carried his conclusions to the Senate, reported to the Secretary of the Navy:

> It is scarcely conceivable that the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of the present war will permit her to remain established in <u>any</u> capacity in the Pacific islands mandated to her after the last war. Her flagrant and deliberate violations of the provisions of Article 4 of the mandate [no fortifications] would seem definitely to require that an administration other than Japanese be established. For reasons of our own security, and because we are likely to be committed to the protection of the Philippines after they have become independent, the United States is vitally interested in the form which a readjustment in control of these islands may take.... Guam belongs to us and again will be administered by us when it has been wrested from enemy hands. The island is one of the Marianas and, as has been demonstrated in the past, is potentially menaced by the other islands of that group unless the same power controls them all. It follows naturally that the United States should control the entire Marianas group.... Because of their geographical position with relation to the Marianas, the Philippines and Hawaii, the same military principle applies in the case of all the islands mandated to Japan; the control of the whole properly belongs to the United States .... None of the islands in question possesses natural features of value from other than the military standpoint. Both from the economic and the political standpoints they are a liability to the nation charged with their control and administration. The transfer to the United States of any or all of those islands with all that is implied therein cannot constitute territorial aggrandizement. Japan has frankly referred to them as "unsinkable aircraft carriers" and their severance from her control will be part of her disarmament.... In connection with future sovereignty over the Japanese islands discussed above, the General Board recommends that planning for postwar conditions provide for the United States possesion of: (a) All of the former German islands mandated to

> Japan by the League of Nations, i.e. the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas (except Guam).[43]

President Roosevelt referred to international trusteeship and, in particular, the Pacific islands during his March 1943 conference with British Foreign Secretary Eden. The President went beyond the State Department's trusteeship plan by suggesting that Indo-China and Korea be placed under trusteeship. He then indicated that the Japanese mandated islands should be internationalized.[44] Hull writes that Eden "indicated he was favorably impressed with this proposal."[45] However, Harry Hopkins, who was present at the meeting, wrote that in keeping with British dislike for internationalization of colonial areas, Eden said it would be better to turn the islands over to the United States, "preferably in outright ownership."[46]

Eden cabled home his notes on his most formal conference with the President which was held on March 27, 1943. He reported:

> in the Far East the policy is to be 'Japan for the Japanese.' Manchuria and Formosa would be returned to China and southern Sakhalin to Russia. The Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific would pass under the trusteeship of the United Nations.... The French Marquesas and Tuamotu Islands would

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43. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, General Board, Post-war sovereignty over certain islands in the North Pacific, Report No. 450, Serial No. 240, March 27, 1943, Declassified June 22, 1969, General Board files.

44. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1596 and Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 715-716.

45. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, 1596.

46. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 716.

> pass to the United Nations, for use respectively as stages on the northern and southern air routes across the Pacific from Caribbean area to Australia and New Zealand. Korea and French Indo-China would pass under international trusteeship; for the former the trustees might be the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.... [The President] suggested in passing that places like Dakar and Bizerta were of the greatest importance for the defense respectively of the United States and Mediterranean. His idea was that the United States should act as policeman for the United Nations at Dakar and Great Britain at Bizerta.[47]

President Roosevelt gave his approval a few weeks after Eden's visit to a State Department draft proposal for a policy statement on dependent peoples which was to be presented for discussion at the Quebec Conference with the British in August. One of the major points of the draft was that peoples liberated from Japanese rule and unprepared for autonomy should be placed under some form of international trusteeship representing the United Nations.[48] The draft proposal also included the goal of independent national status for all colonies.

The President was clearly interested in postwar security matters. In April 1943, Admiral King reported to the Secretary of the Navy the President's interest in these matters. Since the King report, classified until now, clearly demonstrates the President's interest in these matters, his method of administration, and his close personal contact with the military services, it is worthy of being quoted at length:

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47. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 438.

48. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 471-472 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235.

> Yesterday while at luncheon with the President, he brought up the subject of postwar security force and expressed certain views in regard thereto - chiefly that he inclined to "regional" responsibilities on the part of the great powers, the "regions" correspond generally to the current "theaters of strategic responsibility" in which the United States is responsible for the conduct of the war effort in the Pacific Theater (generally east of the Longitude of Singapore).
>
> He made mention of the number of agencies, committees, etc., that are now occupying themselves with postwar problems and said that he wanted the views of the military high command in regard to postwar security set-up. I reminded him that, at his direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were having the Joint Strategic Survey Committee look into this matter and that, at your direction, the General Board was conducting a similar study.
>
> The President said that, upon his return to Washington, he would like to talk with the Chairman of the General Board along these lines, which matter I leave in your hands. He further said that he wished to talk with one of the members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on this subject, which desire I will duly convey to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[49]

When the State Department's draft of a policy statement on dependent peoples was presented to the British at the Quebec Conference in August 1943, it was ill received. Foreign Secretary Eden took special exception to the word "independence."[50] Prime Minister Churchill "made no comment on it,"[51] a rare occurrence for him.

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49. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy from Admiral King, April 13, 1943, declassified 1969, CNO (SC) A14-7/EF files.

50. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 254 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1238.

51. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 440.

The President next instructed Secretary Hull to bring the proposal up at the Foreign Ministers' conference at Moscow in October. At a briefing on October 5, 1943, the President once again set forth his position, emphasizing the idea of an international trusteeship system for non-self-governing peoples, such as Indo-China and Korea, as well as for certain other places in order to provide the United Nations an internationalized string of bases encircling the globe. In this latter category, he mentioned the Pacific mandated islands, Hong Kong, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, Ascension Island, Dakar, and a point in Liberia.[52] Even Secretary Hull had to admit that Roosevelt wanted to apply the trusteeship idea "widely to all sorts of situations."[53]

Military opposition to Roosevelt's ideas on trusteeship quickly arose. Admiral Leahy, who was probably closer to Roosevelt than anyone else except Harry Hopkins, firmly disagreed with the President on this issue. In his memoirs, he states:

> One of Roosevelt's pet ideas, which he had discussed with me on many occasions, was a plan for a series of strategic bases all over the world to be controlled by the United Nations. I could never agree with him on this proposal and always felt that any bases considered essential for the security of our own country should be under the sovereignty of the United States.
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> His argument, particularly in regard to strategic areas in the Japanese mandated groups which we had captured at a high cost in American lives, was that the United States

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52. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1305 and 1596.

53. Ibid., p. 1305.

> did not wish to acquire any territorial gains as a result of the war. That was a fixed principle with him. Roosevelt believed that we would get the same protection if the mandated territory was under the United Nations. I thought he was wrong then, and have not changed my mind as these notes are being compiled.[54]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy Department strongly felt that permanent and exclusive control over the islands by the United States was a military necessity for national security and international peace in the postwar world. The proposed international organization was untested with no guarantee that it would be able to maintain international peace and security, whereas traditional sovereignty would be clear-cut, with rights and duties universally accepted. Since the islands would not be an economic asset, there could be no question of "imperialism;" and the welfare of the islanders, few in number, would be adequately guaranteed by American sovereignty. Furthermore, if the islands were to become a trust territory run by the international organization, who would "watch the watchers?" Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? If the organization were to later break down, the status of the islands would be in doubt producing an unstable situation.

These islands were intended by the President and the State Department to be included in the trusteeship; and, therefore, for that reason alone, the military began demanding changes in the trusteeship plan itself while still fighting for annexation of the islands.

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54. Fleet Admiral William Leahy, U.S.N., I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 314.

At the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference of October 1943, Hull circulated the United States' proposed plan for trusteeship, still in general terms; but the topic was not placed on the agenda.[55] Secretary Hull wrote that "we had definite ideas with respect to the future of the British colonial empire on which we differed with the British."[56] He claimed that the United States Government had the right to discuss matters concerning the British Empire since failure to make provisions for the ultimate self-government of the possessions could produce possible future conflicts involving the United States; and that the "right of self-determination" declarations applied, not only to the occupied countries of Europe, but to peoples everywhere.[57] Eden remarked that he was not prepared to discuss the American proposed text, and Molotov only said that he would study it.[58]

At this same time, the American military services were conducting the studies of postwar air bases in which the United States would have an interest. In October, the President told the Navy to expedite these studies. In response, Admiral King wrote to Admiral Willson (JSSC) and to Admiral Hepburn (General Board) "to neglect considerations of sovereignty and to premise the study solely on geographical -

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55. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 197-198.

56. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1477-1478.

57. Ibid., p. 1478.

58. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 440.

strategic considerations."[59]

While enroute to the allied conferences at Cairo and Tehran, the President elaborated on his conception of the postwar disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. During a meeting of the President, Harry Hopkins and the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Leahy, Marshall, King and Arnold) aboard the U.S.S. IOWA on November 19, 1943, the proposed agenda for the Tehran Conference was discussed. When item 2c(3), "military and naval bases for mutual assistance," was reached, the President said

> it was contemplated that the Mandated Islands would be under the composite sovereignty of the United Nations. The Chinese want Formosa and the Bonins. The military bases required in the Mandated Islands would be occupied by the United States. There might be an over-all civilian control of the entire group and civilian control of the smaller islands. Certainly we would not want to occupy the smaller islands in the Mandates.[60]

This is the first mention of President Roosevelt's contemplating American occupancy of the military bases in the islands. Unfortunately, this statement is the only mention of the mandated islands in the minutes of the meeting. Evidently, the President neither elaborated on his statement, nor did the other participants at the meeting address the subject. The President left unanswered the question of the

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59. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Admiral King to Admiral Hepburn and Vice Admiral Willson, October 21, 1943, Declassified, 1970, King papers.

60. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Minutes of President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 19, 1943, p. 258.

degree of control that he contemplated the United Nations would have over the military bases. Also, he did not indicate his thoughts in regard to the degree of control of the United Nations over the islands, less the military bases. In light of the President's last sentence, it would appear that he contemplated direct "civilian control" by the international organization rather than by an agency of the United States Government.

In March 1943, the President had told Eden that these islands should be "internationalized." In October, just a month before the meeting on the IOWA, President Roosevelt had talked in terms of the islands becoming part of an internationalized string of bases encircling the globe. Now in November, the President indicated that, while the islands would be under the composite sovereignty of and evidently administered by the United Nations, the military bases located in the mandated islands would be occupied by the United States. Perhaps the President's comment on November 19, 1943, indicated a shift in his thinking on the subject. More likely, he was merely elaborating on his earlier comments.

Only four days later, on November 23, the President approved the policy that "the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the 'Blue Area' described as 'Required for the direct defense of the United States ...'"[61] Thus, there is

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61. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1945 (5 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 94. Referred to in Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1945.

a discrepancy between the President's comment on the 19th and his approval of a policy paper on the 23rd. He had earlier stated that "certainly we would not want to occupy the smaller islands in the Mandates." Now, the policy was that all of the mandated islands were required for the direct defense of the United States.

This ambiguity was not resolved by the President's actions only a week later, on November 29, at the Tehran Conference. At the afternoon meeting on that date, the President favorably mentioned the concept of international trusteeship as Hull had outlined it at Moscow in October.[62] As earlier stated, this proposal included the point that "peoples liberated from Japanese rule and unprepared for autonomy should be placed under some form of international trusteeship representing the United Nations."

Admiral Leahy was still trying to convince the President not to apply the trusteeship concept to the mandated islands. In his memoirs, based on his notes at the time, Admiral Leahy made the following comment on the Tehran Conference:

> The problem of trusteeships came up during the United Nations discussion. Roosevelt was convinced that his proposed world organization could exercise the necessary sovereignty over such areas as the mandated Japanese islands which Tokyo had exploited so fully while ostensibly these islands still were under the control of the League of Nations. In our conversations, I had argued vigorously that the United States, for its own future security, should

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62. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 197-198.

> keep and exercise sovereignty over any of the Japanese mandated islands that we captured.[63]

It, therefore, appears that Admiral Leahy was not satisfied with the President's indicating that the United States would occupy the military bases or that all of the islands would be considered as required for the direct defense of the United States. The Admiral was concerned about the idea of the United Nations having "composite sovereignty" over the islands. The Admiral desired full United States sovereignty over the mandated islands.

The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, must have disturbed Admiral Leahy. The Declaration stated that the United States, United Kingdom, and China "covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914...."[64] With this public statement, the policy was officially announced that the mandated islands would be taken from Japan; but the old formula of "no territorial aggrandizement" was reaffirmed.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, was as deeply concerned over the question of the postwar sovereignty of the mandated islands as was Admiral Leahy. Admiral King's concern was demonstrated in the "Central Pacific Islands" incident. In January 1944, Admiral Nimitz in Honolulu referred

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63. Leahy, I Was There, p. 210.

64. U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 232, (December 4, 1943), Cairo Declaration, p. 393.

in one of his directives concerning the establishment of civil-government in occupied islands to "the British Resident Commissioners of Central Pacific Islands to be occupied." This wording, in an American directive, was intended to refer to the Gilbert Islands and other Central Pacific Islands that Britain owned prior to the war. Admiral King noticed this wording and sent a quick message to Nimitz with a follow-up letter telling Nimitz that the wording could be construed to include the Japanese mandated islands; and, therefore, the directive should be changed to avoid the possibility of giving any nation, other than the United States, any basis for obtaining sovereignty or other territorial rights in the mandated islands.[65]

At the same time, January 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of State that "no action should be taken which directly or indirectly would prejudice the ultimate disposition of these islands."[66] Some writers have mentioned that this recommendation to the Secretary of State was a result of British activity in the islands. However, the recently declassified communications from King to Nimitz show that the recommendation was clearly a result of Admiral Nimitz' directive and intended as a precautionary measure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were obviously concerned with protecting their preferred solution.

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65. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, CinCUS and CNO letter to CinCPAC and CinCPOA, serial 00178, January 18, 1944, Declassified June 20, 1969, CNO files.

66. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1944, Vol. 5, p. 1266. Referred to in Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1944.

Early in 1944, the State Department's committees produced a revised plan for trusteeship which would include dependent areas voluntarily placed under the system as well as the mandates and former enemy territory. The new plan called for the system to operate under the international organization's General Assembly rather than through regional councils. Actual supervisory authority would be exercised by a subsidiary Trusteeship Commission. Of major importance, it contained a provision giving the international organization's Executive Council authority over any trust territories where fortifications were to be established under the application of international security measures.[67] This was the beginning of the subsequent strategic-areas concept in the United Nations Charter. Historian George Thullen believes that this provision reflected "the tendency towards increased realism regarding the necessity of mechanisms to ensure international security and, in particular, Roosevelt's determination to place all strategic bases under United Nations control since it was an abandonment of the former principle of nonmilitarization of mandated areas."[68]

On March 9, 1944, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox publicly spoke out in favor of annexing the mandated islands when he stated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "those mandated islands have become Japanese territory and as we

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67. Ruth Russell and Jeanette Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, October, 1958), pp. 341-343.

68. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, p. 32.

capture them they are ours."[69] He went on to explain that the islands were not of much use, except for military purposes; and that no one in the Government opposed his view that such of them as were necessary as bases should be allotted to the United States.

Where Secretary Knox got the impression that no one in the Government opposed his view is hard to imagine. His statement contridicted the "no territorial aggrandizement" policy enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration. His statement indicates a lack of knowledge of the work and goals of the State Department officers concerned with formulating a trusteeship system. Unfortunately, Knox always relied on his "newspaperman's memory" and never dictated notes of conferences. His official and private papers have been checked, but they contain no mention of the mandated islands. His statement probably is just indicative of his being left out of strategic and postwar planning discussions. Admiral King's papers seem to indicate there was little personal contact or friendship between Knox and himself. Admiral King did not keep Knox as well informed of Joint Chiefs of Staff activities as did General Marshall for Secretary of War Stimson.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to stress their position that the United States should annex the mandated islands. They wanted full American sovereignty over the

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69. U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H.R. 4254 [Extension of Lend-Lease Act], March 1-9, 1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, Statement of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, March 9, 1944, p. 191.

entire area. On March 11, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote to the Secretary of State detailing their firm position on the disposition of the mandated islands:

> As evidenced in the present war, the Japanese Mandated Islands bear a vital relation to the defense of the United States. Their assured possession and control by the United States are essential to our security. Together they constitute a single military entity, no element of which can be left to even the partial control of another nation without hazard to our control of that entity .... The Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under the sole sovereignty of the United States. Their conquest is being effected by the forces of the United States and there appears to be no valid reason why their future status should be the subject of discussion with any other nation.[70]

In April 1944, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, a member of the State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, was in London with Under Secretary Stettinius. Dr. Bowman informed the British Foreign Office that the State Department still wanted a joint Anglo-American declaration concerning trusteeship. He stated that the State Department's idea was now to emphasize the promotion of material well-being and self-government rather than political independence. This was evidently felt by the State Department to be a concession to the British feelings about the British Empire. Dr. Bowman also stated that the State Department envisaged international machinery of a "supervisory and not merely a consultative character."[71] Dr. Bowman went on to state that American public

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70. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1944, Vol. 5, p. 1201. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, March 11, 1944.

71. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 440.

opinion would expect something to be said on the subject of a trusteeship system for dependent areas in connection with the proposed United Nations.

The British Foreign Office gave no response to Dr. Bowman's presentation. In fact, the British officials were less than charitable in ascribing the following motives to the State Department's pressure for a joint Anglo-American declaration on trusteeship:

> The Foreign Office thought that the Americans wished for a statement in order to justify their own plans to annex certain Japanese islands in the Pacific, and because the President wanted in his election campaign to avoid any risk of being called a champion of imperialism.[72]

Of interest in respect to that last surmise, a Gallup Poll published on May 23, 1944, gave a boost to the advocates of American control of the islands. It indicated that 69 percent of the American public desired to "keep" Micronesia as well as the islands owned or controlled by Britain and Australia that the United States had captured.[73] This question of American public opinion on the issue will be further explored later in this chapter.

In June 1944, a respected naval officer, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, U.S.N. (Ret.), was asked by the Navy to give his analysis of the postwar Far Eastern situation. One of the points he discussed was the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. He recognized that the issue of trusteeship (he

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72. Ibid.

73. Huntington Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4 (July 1944), p. 642.

called it "mandate") versus outright possession of the Pacific islands would arise. He stated that it would be argued that outright possession violates the Atlantic Charter and might lead to a scramble on the part of other nations for other areas. His recommendation was that the United States would require a naval and air base in the Marshalls as well as in the Carolines; plus, an air base in the Pelews and Bonins. Since the islands had little commercial value and their maintenance would be a continuous source of expense, the decision "whether to accept a mandate in lieu of outright possession should depend on whether the former would impose any restrictions on our right to fortify them and to build the naval and air bases deemed necessary in our plan of defense in the Pacific. If so we should insist on outright possession."[74]

This analysis was reached independently of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Yarnell's memorandum was not circulated outside the Navy; and, therefore, his prestige was not added to the Navy's cause. His comments, however, on the postwar disposition of the islands must have reinforced the determination of the naval officers concerned with this problem to maintain their advocacy of unlimited American control over the islands.

The State Department officers in postwar planning still intended that the islands be placed under the trusteeship

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74. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum on Post-war Far Eastern Situation by ADM. H. E. Yarnell, U.S.N. (Ret.), June 16, 1944, declassified 1970, CNO (SC) A14-7/EF files.

system; and the latest form of the plan, dated June 22, 1944, was submitted to the State Department's high-level Postwar Programs Committee which, under Hull as chairman and Under Secretary of State Stettinius as vice-chairman, reviewed proposals before they were submitted to the President.

The next day, June 23, 1944, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major George V. Strong (Senior Army Member of the Joint Postwar Committee), saw Joseph C. Grew, Director of the State Department Office of Far Eastern Affairs. General Strong expressed the Joint Chiefs of Staff's concern over the Australian and New Zealand Agreement of January 21, 1944, in which those two nations had declared that no disposition of Pacific islands should be made without their consent. General Strong then repeated the Joint Chiefs' position on the disposition of the islands as stated in January and March of 1944. Mr. Grew reported General Strong's comments to the Secretary of State.[75] There is no indication in the record of Mr. Grew's feelings on the matter, his reply to the General, or any reaction by the Secretary of State in response to General Strong's comments.

The military officers gained a strong supporter in this matter when James V. Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy. He saw the State Department's June 22, 1944, trusteeship plan and was shocked. He talked to Stettinius about it on July 7, 1944, asking "if this was a serious document and if he understood that the President was committed to it (I [Forrestal]

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75. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations 1944, Vol. 5, p. 1266. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1944.

added that it seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar arrangements that there should be no debate as to who ran the Mandated Islands...)."[76]

This reaction by Secretary Forrestal was, indeed, the beginning of additional support for the advocates of unlimited control over the mandated islands. It also demonstrates the appalling lack of coordination between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

Even prior to Secretary Forrestal's talk with Stettinius on July 7, 1944, the State Department began to feel the influence of those advocating retention of the mandated islands. In addition to the presentations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, several Senators were also speaking out for annexation of the islands. Former President Hoover supported retention of Pacific bases in a speech to the Republican national convention in June 1944.[77]

Probably because of the above-mentioned pressures, the trusteeship plan was radically revised by the State Department planners between June 22 and July 6, 1944. The State Department planners desired that the mandated islands be included in the trusteeship system. They, therefore, downgraded the supervisory powers of the Trusteeship Council in an attempt to make the trusteeship system acceptable to the advocates of full American control over the islands. Additionally, as described above, the British Government had been resisting

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76. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 8.

77. The New York Times, June 28, 1944, and September 24, 1946.

the concept of a strong international trusteeship system. Indeed, the British at this point were against any declaration committing them to the establishment of any form of international trusteeship system.

The new plan, dated July 6, 1944, downgraded the powers of the Trusteeship Council to merely examining reports from the administering authorities, conducting periodic inspections, and considering petitions. Under the older plans, the stress had been on direct international administration with the Trusteeship Council having power to recommend and revise trusteeship charter terms, to designate or replace administering authorities, and to terminate trust status. These points were eliminated in the new plan. Another gain for the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that the new plan emphasized the active role that the trust territories were to play in providing for the maintenance of international peace and security.[78]

The President, himself, was finally influenced by the consistent opposition of the Joint Chiefs to international administration of the islands. In reply to a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending annexation, he pointed out on July 10, 1944, that the United States was seeking no additional territory but then stated, "I am working on the idea that the United Nations will ask the United States to

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78. Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter, pp. 344-345 and Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, Appendix 39, p. 606.

act as Trustee for the Japanese Mandated Islands. With this will go the civil authority ... and also the military authority to protect them; i.e. fortifications, etc. It does not necessarily involve a decision on permanent sovereignty."[79]

The President's statement to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a shift from his earlier position that the United States would not occupy all of the mandated islands. The President also approved the new State Department trusteeship plan on July 15, 1944. His approval represented a shift from his earlier conviction that the old mandate system had been too weak and that the mandatory authorities, therefore, soon came to believe that the mandate carried sovereignty with it. The new trusteeship plan, the President's indication that the United States would be named as the Trustee for all of the mandated islands, and the President's decision to approve the new trusteeship plan, all represented a movement by the "internationalists" toward a compromise with the advocates of unlimited American control of the islands.

Even with this movement by the "internationalists" toward a compromise position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War and Navy (now Stimson and Forrestal) still felt uneasy over the situation. Their position for unlimited American control over the strategic islands had not waivered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were soon to take a step in direct confrontation with the State Department in order to protect their position. This step was the blocking of any discussion

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79. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 387.

of the trusteeship plan at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

The President had left Washington on July 15 (the same day he approved the trusteeship plan) for a conference in Honolulu with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. While he was gone, the American Delegation for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference met on July 18 preparatory to the conference. The conference at Dumbarton Oaks was to be held in two stages--one with the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the other with the United States, United Kingdom, and China--to develop positions for an eventual United Nations conference.

The American Delegation was composed of Under Secretary Stettinius, Grew (then Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Bowman, Cohen, Dunn, Hackworth, Hiss, Hornbeck, Pasvolsky, Notter, Admiral Willson, Admiral Train, General Embick and General Strong, among others. Mr. G. H. Hackworth was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, later a Judge in the International Court of Justice. Mr. James F. Green, a former State Department officer, refers to Hackworth as follows: "a man of great common sense as well as legal learning, he was, I believe, the single most influential officer in State. I do not recall that he took any specific position on trusteeship matters in these various discussions, but I feel sure that Hull would not have made a move in this field, or in any other, without consulting Hackworth."[80] Alger Hiss worked closely with Leo Pasvolsky on security issues but

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80. James F. Green, letter and interview, September 8, 1970.

played no direct role on the trusteeship issue.[81] The other major delegates have already been mentioned.

At this meeting, the members representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Admirals Willson and Train, with Generals Embick and Strong--achieved a "coup" when they "by specific and insistent request" obtained the decision to omit the section on trusteeship from the draft of "Tentative Proposals" to be submitted by the United States to the other nations at the conference and from the scope of matters to be raised by the United States at the conference.[82] In other words, the question of a future trusteeship system was not to be raised by the United States at this conference. Secretary Hull described this as a "great disappointment for it

> had been a project conceived and elaborated in the State Department by my associates and me and enthusiastically concurred in by the President.... The Joint Chiefs felt that a discussion of the trusteeship system would inevitably embrace concrete questions of who should be trustee over what territories, and that dissension might therefore arise among the Allies.
>
> Furthermore, they were anxious to keep the whole matter open pending a determination within our own Government of a definite policy with regard to the subsequent disposal of some of the Japanese islands in the Pacific, including those held by Japan under mandate. It was their view that complete control of these islands by the United States for military purposes was necessary to our national security, and they felt that this could perhaps best be achieved through outright annexation rather than through a trusteeship system.

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81. Ibid.

82. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 295 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1706-1707.

> My associates and I, on the other hand, were convinced that the security objective of the United States control of the islands for military purposes, could be fully secured through a system of trusteeship.... While we agreed to the omission of this subject from the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, we did not intend to let the project die and hoped to bring it up again at the general meeting of the United Nations.[83]

These views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were later officially conveyed to the Secretary of State in a letter dated August 3, 1944, from General Marshall.[84] The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that:

> From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements, particularly as they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan.[85]

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, held between August and October, 1944, trusteeship was not discussed except for an informal expression of interest by each of the foreign governments in a future consideration of the issue after a private exchange of papers.[86]

For two weeks after the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the State Department worked on a draft letter addressed to

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83. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1706-1707.

84. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 295 and U. S. State Department, Foreign Relations 1944, Vol. 1, p. 700.

85. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27 files; SWNCC 27 dated January 19, 1945, and February 15, 1945; and SWNCC 27-1, dated February 26, 1945; Declassified, March 1970. See: Appendix B.

86. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 375.

General Marshall for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It proposed that the portion of the "Tentative Proposals" concerning trusteeship that had been withheld from the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks should now be sent to the other three major powers for inter-governmental exchanges of views prior to the general United Nations conference. An ad hoc committee was established to consider the problem as a whole and the draft letter in particular.[87]

Rather than delivering the draft letter, the State Department decided to invite Admiral Willson and General Strong of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to informal discussions on the issue. Such a discussion was held on November 8th with Acting Secretary of State Stettinius, Hackworth, Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Edwin C. Wilson (Office of Special Political Affairs) participating. No meeting ground could be reached, and consideration of the problem was inconclusive.[88]

On November 15, 1944, Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky saw the President who told them that the principle of international trusteeship should be firmly established with adequate machinery for this purpose.[89] He also directed the State Department, "in consultation with the military and naval

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87. This ad hoc committee was comprised at the "policy level" of Pasvolsky and Dunn and at the "working level" of Henry S. Villard of the Near Eastern Office, Robert B. Stewart of the European Office, Harley A. Notter of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Benjamin Gerig, Donald C. Blaisdell, James F. Green, and Ralph J. Bunche from the various divisions of the latter Office, and C. Easton Rothwell, the Executive Secretary of the Post-War Programs Committee. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 387.

88. Ibid., pp. 374-376.

89. Ibid., p. 377.

authorities, to redouble their efforts in examining the trusteeship proposals further.[90]

Two major organizational changes were made in December 1944 that had immense influence on the formulation of a policy on this issue. The first was a critical change in the field of politico-military coordination that was sorely needed.

Various inter-departmental committees had been established since the start of the war, such as the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for problems relating to civil government in occupied areas and the Working Security Committee, to formulate instructions to Ambassador Winant on the European Advisory Council. These, and other liaison machinery, had gradually evolved to provide collaboration on various issues.[91]

The Service Secretaries, however, were still out of touch with the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the postwar planning of the State Department. Liaison between the State Department and the Offices of the Secretaries of War and Navy was purely on a low-level, ad hoc basis.

There was no permanent machinery in existence to provide continuing overall liaison between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the State Department. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee had proved to be restricted in its scope by its parent committee, the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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90. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, p. 34.

91. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 99, 220-225, 349-350, 368. Military officers were also often consulted by the various State Department committees and subcommittees on an ad hoc basis.

The Working Security Committee was not satisfactory as an inter-departmental liaison device since it had no high rank in the hierarchy. The members were ill-informed on what had been agreed to on higher levels. Obstacles were placed before it by other agencies of similar rank.[92]

The State Department did deal with the high-level Joint Chiefs of Staff; but, here again, liaison was on an ad hoc basis with no overall direction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body were isolated from the War and Navy Departments. As stated earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff answered only to the President and did not even distribute their papers to the Service Secretaries.

Secretary Stimson wrote Secretary Hull a complaint letter on the lack of inter-departmental liaison in early November 1944; and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal saw Under Secretary of State Stettinius about the situation. From this meeting developed the idea of reviving the Secretaries' meetings and, also, providing a working-level committee for continuous staff work.

In response, Mr. Stettinius wrote Stimson and Forrestal on November 9, 1944, proposing the establishment of a committee composed of representatives of State, War, and Navy and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake studies regarding problems in the Far East "similar to those which have come before the

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92. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 462. Editor comment on article: Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives For the Occupation of Germany, The Washington Controversy," pp. 313-464.

European Advisory Committee in respect to the enemy states in Europe."[93] Studies contemplated were the surrender terms for Japan, the military administration of civil affairs in the Far East and "such questions as may arise in connection with the disposition of various territories now occupied by the enemy."[94]

Admiral King commented on this proposal favorably, stating "that it is eminently desirable to set up the proposed Committee, without delay, to formulate the U. S. view as to surrender terms for Japan, disposition of territories now occupied by the enemy in the Far East and Pacific, and collateral matters."[95] He stated that the machinery set up for the European Advisory Committee and the Control Commission for Germany had been inadequate, resulting in "belated and piecemeal handling" of American policies.[96] He recommended that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the committee and that the Under Secretary of the Navy, of the Central Division (OP-13), represent the Navy. His evaluation was, "I think the Committee proposed by Mr. Stettinius will be adequate, particularly if JSSC is part of it. It should be noted that JSSC has under its control the Joint Post-War Committee to do the spade work."[97] This statement, incidently,

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93. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Stettinius to Forrestal, November 9, 1944, Declassified 1970, King papers.

94. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Admiral King to Forrestal, November 14, 1944, Declassified 1970, King papers.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

indicates the Admiral's reliance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff system.

When Stettinius succeeded Hull (officially on December 20, 1944), the State-War-Navy Secretaries Committee was revived, holding its first meeting on December 19, 1944. It now had better organization with an agenda and with Assistant Secretary McCloy appointed recorder. The Three Secretaries' Committee met once a week at the State Department. The meetings were informal. Unfortunately, decisions were often not passed on throughout the three departments. Assistants eventually were included in the meetings, who got together afterwards to decide "who said what" and to ensure proper dissemination of decisions.[98]

Meanwhile, the "working-level committee" (the idea which had been favorably endorsed by Admiral King) had been formed in November 1944--a probable time record for establishing a large inter-departmental committee after its initial suggestion.

The initial members of the committee were James C. Dunn (State), then Director of the Office of European Affairs; Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy (Army); and Assistant Secretary Artemus L. Gates (Navy), all of whom had worked together on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and its American inter-departmental counterpart. The State member was chairman, as requested by Stettinius' first letter, "in view of the fact that much of the work of the proposed committee will have to

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98. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, U.S.N. (Ret.), Interview, September 4, 1969.

do with political problems involving foreign policy and relations with foreign nations."[99]

One major change, however, had been made in the conception of the committee. It was not restricted to Far Eastern and Pacific issues. It was called the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, or SWINC as it was dubbed), which had a full-time secretariat and smaller "working groups" of permanent and ad hoc subcommittees.[100] It was authorized to make positive commitments for the three departments; and its main purpose was to "reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters of common interest and, under the guidance of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, establish policies on politico-military questions referred to it."[101]

Thus, the lack of coordination on the Far Eastern issues, such as the disposition of the islands, had some role in the initiation of the first effective and competent coordination of the three departments in the politico-military field. Also, of interest is the first use of the term "politico-military"

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99. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Stettinius to Forrestal, November 9, 1944, Declassified 1970, King papers.

100. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 320 and Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 347-348. The committee continued until June 30, 1949, under the name of the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee. It was the direct ancestor of the National Security Council. See: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (2 vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955), Vol. 2, p. 58.

101. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (November 11, 1945), pp. 746-747.

in an official document.

There was effective and direct liaison between SWNCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with some military personnel holding positions in both systems and many SWNCC papers going formally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and/or concurrence.[102] The Service Secretaries were brought back into the mainstream of things. By way of this machinery, the Service Secretaries now started to play an increasingly important role in the issue of the Japanese mandated islands.

Area subcommittees were established within SWNCC for Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Far East. SWNCC was a vast improvement over the pre-war Standing Liaison Committee. Its main drawback was that it was formed so late in the war that "the practical shape of its subject matter was largely determined by the military commanders in the field, Eisenhower in Europe and MacArthur in the Far East."[103] This criticism did not apply to the controversy over what to do with the Japanese mandated islands and the connected problem of developing a policy on a trusteeship system acceptable to all departments. This issue was still very much in contention at the time of the formation of SWNCC.

The second major organizational change at the end of 1944 was within the State Department. It did not affect the issue of the islands' disposition as dramatically as did the initiation

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102. The files of SWNCC papers at the U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office show an extremely close liaison and coordination between the JCS and SWNCC.

103. Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Army and The State; Civil-Military Elements in National Policy, p. 97.

of SWNCC, but it did streamline the State Department and organize it for the work of initiating the United Nations Organization. The final, hectic work involved in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, with its trusteeship system, was done within this State Department organization.

Stettinius and Grew were confirmed as Secretary and Under Secretary of State on December 20, 1944, and quickly put into effect a reorganization plan that had been developed within the State Department. Dr. Pasvolsky continued as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs and was in charge of "the work of preparing for a United Nations Conference to establish an International Security Organization."[104] The Office of Special Political Affairs, under Edwin C. Wilson since May 8, 1944, and under Alger Hiss after January 27, 1945, assumed more responsibilities. It had a Division of International Organization Affairs under Durward V. Sandifer, with Benjamin Gerig as associate chief, who also headed the new Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Under the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, came Ralph J. Bunche as associate chief; and James F. Green, who was in charge of the Trusteeship Administrative Branch.

The new Division of International Security Affairs, under Joseph E. Johnson, was responsible for matters regarding the security phases of the proposed United Nations organization

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104. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 349.

including "the relevant security aspects of United States foreign policy generally."[105] The high-level Policy and Post-War Programs Committees were transformed rather than abolished; being effectively replaced by a new Secretary's Staff Committee. This committee had a secretariat under Mr. Charles W. Yost which succeeded the former secretariats of the Policy and Post-War Programs Committees.[106]

Thus, the State Department was now better organized to handle the issues relating to the proposed United Nations Organization. Within this new organization, the same individuals as had previously worked on the trusteeship issue continued to be responsible for that project.

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About this time, the second major round of this issue broke into the open. The question of which governmental agency should administer the islands began to be raised.

Within the Navy, it had a very inauspicious beginning in September 1944 when Captain H. W. Vanderbilt, Assistant Officer in Charge of the Military Government Section of the Central Division (OP-13-2, headed by Captain L. S. Sabin), prepared an informal memorandum suggesting "the removal of all Japanese

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105. Ibid., p. 351.

106. The members of the Secretary's Staff Committee were: The Secretary of State as Chairman; the Under Secretary, Joseph C. Grew; the Assistant Secretaries; the Legal Adviser, Mr. Hackworth; and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Organization and Security Affairs, Leo Pasvolsky. The Assistant Secretaries included William L. Clayton, Economic Affairs; Nelson A. Rockefeller, Latin American Relations; Brig. General Julius C. Holmes, Administration; Dean Acheson, Congress-State Relations; and James C. Dunn, European Affairs.

from the former Japanese Mandated Islands as a war-time measure which would yield post-war returns in easier and better administration of the islands."[107]

In replying to this memorandum, Captain Colclough, of the Central Division, raised a broader question--that of the form and organization of a naval government in the mandates. He directed the Military Government Section on September 7, 1944, to undertake a study of the problem.[108] However, nothing further was done on this matter until December when "it had become evident that Cominch-CNO [Admiral King] and the Secretary of the Navy were interested in this problem, and at that time Admiral Horne wrote a general memorandum to the Secretary on the subject."[109] With this high-level interest, a group of officers in the Military Government Section (OP-13-2) were designated to prepare preliminary plans for the study. As soon as they made their report, the Military Government Section was directed to prepare a comprehensive plan for the government of the Japanese mandated islands.

Soon, it became evident that a special group of officers assigned full-time to this work would be required if the plan was to be prepared expeditiously. Two officers returning from Europe were, therefore, assigned to a special "Z Plan" group, under the direction of the head of the Military Government Section; and in early March 1945, three officers from the staff

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107. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, OP-22 Office History, April 10, 1944, to December 1, 1945, Declassified 1970, MILGOVTBRANCH CNO JOB 60-A-2109, box 35, CNO files.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

of the Princeton School of Military Government were added to the group.[110] The various plans that this group devised will be briefly discussed in the next chapter. They are fully described in the definitive work by Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, U.S.N.R., United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Their importance in regard to this study lie in the fact that the Navy only commenced making such plans as late as December 1944 after indications of high-level interest. Also, of interest for this study is the degree to which the plans included civilian participation in the government of the islands. This aspect will be mentioned later.

At this very same time, December 1944, the Interior Department first expressed interest in obtaining the role of administrator of the islands. On December 12, 1944, Jack B. Fahy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, drafted a scathing review and analysis of the Navy's administrative record in American Samoa (1900-1944), Guam (1899-1941) and the Virgin Islands (1917-1931). This sixteen-page report ended with:

> In conclusion, the naval administration of Guam, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands, has not conformed either with the best interests of the United States or with those of the islanders. Part of the failure is due to public and Congressional apathy. But the basic failure can be traced to fundamental obligations of the naval organization to military goals.
>
> As a matter of policy the War and Navy Departments should have a free hand in the establishment and maintenance of military bases. But such bases can be efficiently

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110. Ibid.

> run without creating political dictatorships. Civilian populations, regardless of whether they reside in the Hudson Valley or Guam, must be provided with a form of government that is both civilian and representative.[111]

Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes was evidently casting covetous eyes on the Navy-administered islands in the Pacific, i.e., American Samoa and Guam, and by extension, the mandated islands. Some Navy personnel had evidently been reciprocating these sentiments, for Ickes wrote the following letter to Forrestal on November 1, 1944:

> For Personal Attention
> Dear Jim:
> I have again received word from a reliable source that the Navy is working on a bill to transfer jurisdiction over the islands and territories [Interior administered Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands] from this Department to the Navy. I may have told you that I mentioned this matter to the President, and he expressed his opposition to any such transfer. I am virtually certain that work is being done in the Navy, and I believe that it is being done without your consent. I have reason to believe that a Captain Ramsey, of the Judge Advocate General's Office, is participating in this activity.
> I hope that you will take immediate steps to put a stop to this enterprise.[112]

Perhaps it was this sub-rosa activity within the Navy that prompted Mr. Fahy to prepare his report attacking the Naval administration of island possessions. Additionally, the military had taken over the government of Hawaii from Interior after

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111. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Preliminary Report on Naval Administration of Island Possessions by Jack B. Fahy, Declassified, 1969, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands-Pacific-Gen-Pt 1.

112. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Forrestal, RG 48.

Pearl Harbor. As early as July 1942, Admiral Nimitz had told Admiral King that the "military government in the islands [referring to Hawaii] is working out and urged that after the war, it should continue."[113]

It is impossible to determine which Department first started the in-fighting, but this was the beginning of a long and bitter conflict between the Navy and the Interior Department that was to last through the 1950's. Both Departments desired to administer the Pacific island possessions, and Harold Ickes' personality and contempt for the Navy only exacerbated the struggle.

* * *

Prior to leaving the year 1944, it is useful to take a look at Congressional and public opinions concerning this issue during this period, August 1944 through January 1945. There really was no public-opinion problem on this issue. The relatively small groups that did express considered opinions on the subject were, more or less, evenly divided and tended to offset each other. The general public held general attitudes, such as a bias against imperialism which was offset by a desire to promote American security in strategic areas.

Public opinion is a subjective matter. As mentioned earlier, one Gallup poll was taken on this issue (May 1944); and it indicated that 69 percent of those polled favored "keeping" the islands. This poll is the only "objective" indication

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113. U. S., Naval Classified Archives, Notes of CominCh-CincPac Conference, July 4, 1942, Declassified 1970, King papers.

of the public opinion concerning this issue. Even in the case of this poll, the public-opinion polls at this time were not as precise as at present. Furthermore, the poll may have merely reflected the general attitude of those polled toward promoting American security. The poll does not indicate whether or not those polled had thought much about the question or cared much about it one way or the other.

The personal conceptions of the individuals involved in the decision-making process on the problem of the postwar disposition of the mandated islands were more important than any pressures from Congress or the American public in general. The policy makers were, however, influenced by their perceptions of the public and Congressional opinion; with each side probably emphasizing in their own minds, as well as in their proselytizing, those expressions that supported their own position on the issue.

For example, Mr. Green a former State Department officer who had been concerned with this issue, recalls:

> State felt that outright annexation would not be acceptable to the American public and to world opinion. Rightly or wrongly, I believe (and I may well be wrong on this) that this estimate of public opinion played its part in the strong anti-annexation policy in State, particularly in the drafting levels.
>
> Roosevelt was the smartest politician of his ear and would certainly not have adopted a policy that he knew ran completely contrary to congressional and public opinion.[114]

Of what opinion was expressed, the most vocal individuals

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114. James F. Green, letter and interview, September 3, 1970.

and groups definitely were those in favor of American retention of the islands. The American Legion recommended in September 1944 that "support be given such measures as may be needed to assure our nation of the continued control and supervision of such Army and Navy bases as may be deemed necessary for national security and protection of our nation."[115]

In Congress, Senator McKellar (D-Tenn.) introduced a resolution asking for permanent American tenure of all Japanese islands between the equator and 30°N which would include all of the mandated islands.[116] The resolution also asked for permanent American tenure of Bermuda, the West Indian colonies, and the Galapagos Islands. Senator Reynolds (D-N.C.) concurred with Senator McKellar and offered to extend the proposition to include "southern" California.[117] Senator Albert B. (Happy) Chandler (D-Ky.) announced the United States must "have possession of every island in every ocean which, if in the possession of an enemy, would be a direct menance to the people of the United States."[118] Of course, this was a period close to the 1944 elections, and the political statements might not always reflect sober judgment; but the general tenor is important.

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115. John W. Masland, "Group Interests in Post-War American Pacific Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council Paper No. 6, January 1945, p. 25, Resolution adopted by the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the American Legion, Chicago, Illinois, September 18-20, 1944.

116. U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., August 15, 1944, p. 7007.

117. Ibid., August 15, 1944, pp. 7017-7018 and August 18, 1944, p. 7170.

118. Ibid., August 15, 1944, p. 7017.

The "anti-annexation" view was supported by a variety of organized groups such as church groups, labor groups affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems (which summarized the views of faculty groups in forty-five colleges and universities) all of which advocated the advancement of dependent peoples, with a variety of administrative machinery recommended. However, beyond their general attitudes, the above groups gave very little attention to the Japanese mandated islands.[119]

The Universities Committee proposed three main solutions for the islands. One solution was to put them under the direct supervision of the international organization. Another solution was to put them under a regional commission representing the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and China. The commission might, in turn, report to an agency of the international organization. The third solution was that they should be mandated by the international organization to some one country, in the case of many islands to the United States. The report stated the first solution was favored by two-thirds of the faculty groups expressing an opinion, and that the other third were evenly divided between the other two solutions. However, several groups mentioned they would favor the third choice as an alternative if the first one was unavailable.[120]

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119. Masland, "Group Interests in Post-War American Pacific Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council Paper No. 6, p. 10.

120. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

The Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945, discussed dependent peoples. It was attended by Phillip C. Jessup, Admiral T. C. Hart, Ralph J. Bunche, Huntington Gilchrist, and Felix M. Keesing, among other Americans. A total of twelve countries were represented. The round-table discussions strongly emphasized the need for the political development of dependent peoples. Those representing subject peoples felt that "security" might become an excuse after the war for the deferring of independence. The representatives from the colonial powers argued that their countries had no desire to extend their possessions and that they were in favor of future self-government but had to keep in mind their responsibilities which, if hastily abandoned, would increase the "instability and insecurity of the world as a whole."[121] When the mandated islands were discussed, an American member, not identified, told the round table that the United States, because of postwar security commitments to the Philippines, might need bases in the islands. The United States would then need to exercise full sovereignty over the islands. He pointed out that the "islands were deficient in economic resources and that their maintenance will involve enormous expense.... There was no doubt, however, that if the general doctrine of accountability prevailed, the United States would fully accept its requirements."[122] A British member said that a transfer of the

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121. Security in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), pp. 89-90.

122. Ibid., p. 117.

islands to the United States could hardly be considered a matter of imperialism but "of common sense and world security, as well as in the interests of the local people; but such a matter was tied up with the future of the mandate system. There could be no objection if the transfer were with the consent of the people and made by international agreement and if the principle of accountability were adopted."[123] There is no record of other responses. "Accountability" referred to the proposed requirement that the administering powers, while having full sovereignty, would make reports on the administration of their dependent territories and would permit visits by members of an international authority.

* * *

The year 1944 ended with the State Department anxious to have an approved trusteeship plan ready for the San Francisco Conference. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had blocked any discussion of trusteeship at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. The President had directed the State Department on November 15, 1944, to redouble its efforts in examining the trusteeship proposals in consultation with the military and naval authorities. At the same time, the President had indicated that the principle of international trusteeship should be firmly established with adequate machinery for this purpose.

The State Department trusteeship planners had already compromised their original position by downgrading the international supervisory aspects of the trusteeship plan. Now

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123. Ibid.

some further action had to be taken by them in order to meet the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs Staff had objected to the State Department's goal of including the mandated islands within the proposed trusteeship system and to any inter-governmental discussion of territorial trusteeship or territorial settlements prior to the end of the war.

The State Department planners evidently decided to fight one objection at a time. They decided to press for their main goal of incorporating some form of international trusteeship system in the United Nations Charter. The question of incorporating the mandated islands in the trusteeship system, as well as any other territorial settlements, could be set aside for a time.

Accordingly, Secretary of State Stettinius sent identical letters, undoubtedly drafted by the trusteeship planners, to Forrestal and Stimson stating that the State Department was "confronted with the need of reexamining the whole matter from the viewpoint of further procedure."[124] Stettinius stated that this necessity arose because the topic of international trusteeships had been raised by the other participants at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations; although, the United States government had eliminated the topic "in deference to the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[125] He summarized the comments

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124. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27 file, Appendix A, Stettinius to Stimson and Forrestal, December 30, 1944, Declassified March 1970. Also published in: Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, Appendix 54, pp. 660-661. Appendix C below is a copy of the SWNCC 27 file which includes a copy of this letter.

125. Ibid.

of the Soviet, British, and Chinese delegations and then mentioned that "in none of the above instances was any question raised as to the particular territories which might be involved. The emphasis was exclusively upon general principles and, particularly, upon the kind of machinery which might effectively and appropriately be established in conjunction with the international organization."[126]

Stettinius expressed the following two conclusions and, in doing so, communicated the State Department's willingness to meet the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to territorial discussions prior to the end of the war:

> 1. It is inescapable that the question of international trusteeships will have to be discussed at least at the general conference, and that in all likelihood a chapter on general principles and machinery will have to be included in the final charter of the United Nations.
>
> 2. It is entirely possible, in dealing with this subject, to separate the formulation of general principles and of provisions for machinery from consideration of specific territories, the latter subject to be left for future determination.[127]

Secretary Stettinius then stated that his department was presently working on a draft proposal for inclusion within the United Nations Charter which would be limited to expressions of general principles and to provision of appropriate machinery of an international nature. Also, under consideration was the possibility that this proposal might be discussed with the

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126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

British, Soviet, and Chinese governments prior to the general conference.[128] He ended by inviting the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments to participate with State in the preparation of this proposal.

It is interesting to note that this letter was addressed to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. It was not addressed directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Earlier, correspondence concerning the trusteeship proposals had been between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President had directed the State Department to consult with the "military and naval authorities." The State Department planners probably felt that the Secretaries of War and Navy would be more receptive than the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs had maintained a firm position throughout the prior discussions. The Service Secretaries, having been relatively isolated from the discussions, might prove to be less in opposition to the inclusion of an international trusteeship system in the United Nations Charter.

Additionally, this was the exact time that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy were initiating the new machinery for inter-departmental policy liaison. The recognition that many of the policy problems contained both military and political aspects was developing among the officers of the three departments.

The Stettinius letter did end by inviting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the War and Navy Departments, to participate with State in the preparation of the trusteeship proposal.

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128. Ibid.

However, it is significant that this invitation was followed by Stimson and Forrestal being asked to "designate members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that purpose."[129] The word "designate" implied that the Service Secretaries had administrative control over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was just not so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still answered only to the President. The letter, in respect to both its addressees and its wording, reflects the desire of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy (as well as their subordinate officers) to reassert themselves in relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After being almost completely restricted to relatively unimportant responsibilities for the reasons stated earlier in this chapter, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy were now attempting to assume new responsibilities.

Relatively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to wield the most power throughout the war. Following them in general influence were the War and Navy Departments. The civilian departments trailed behind. Yet, December 1944 marks a slight shift in influence in that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy began to play a more active and influencial role--at least in regard to the issues of a future trusteeship system and the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. From this time on, the Service Secretaries and their representatives gradually take the more active role, relative to the Joint

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129. Ibid.

Chiefs of Staff, in representing the "pragmatist" position on the deliberations concerning the trusteeship system and the disposition of the mandated islands.[130]

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130. It must be noted that the assumption of a more active role in inter-departmental deliberations on a policy issue does not necessarily mean that a shift in power has occurred. However, the changes in scope of a bureaucratic agency's activities does provide some rough indication of the contractions and expansions of that agency's power. A much more accurate indicator of power is the degree to which the agency actually achieves its goals, e.g., budgetary allocations or maintaining its initial positions in formulating joint policies with other agencies. In other words, the degree to which an agency "gets its own way" in dealings with other agencies or interest groups is an accurate indication of that agency's power.

Both the Army and Navy are aware that they are not the makers of policy but they have a responsibility to define to the makers of policy what they believe are the military necessities of the United States.... The United States must have the means with which to implement its responsibilities.... Those that hate war must have the power to prevent it.

James V. Forrestal
April 17, 1945

I never haggled with the President. I swallowed the little things so that I could go to bat on the big ones. I never handled a matter apologetically and I was never contentious. It took me a long time to get to him. When he thought I was not going for publicity and doing things for publication -- he liked it.... While it would be difficult at times and [there] would be strong pressures for me to speak to the public, I thought that it was far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member of a team and try to do my convincing within that team than to take action publicly contrary to the desires of the President and certain members of Congress....

Marshall, on his
relationship with
President Roosevelt

CHAPTER TWO

FINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP PLAN 1945

The December 30, 1944, letter from Secretary Stettinius was referred by the War and Navy Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The comments of the latter were presented to Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal in the form of a recommended reply to be signed by Stimson and Forrestal and sent to Stettinius. It was dated January 19, 1945.

This draft reply to the Secretary of State repeated the main points of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's letter of August 3, 1944, and the Secretary of State's letter of December 30, 1944. The draft letter read:

> In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom I am in agreement, [this was to refer to the signers of the letter, both Stimson and Forrestal] find no objection, from the military point of view, to the proposed discussion of International Trusteeships, provided such discussions:
>
> a. Give full consideration to the future defense needs of the United States.
>
> b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the disposition of any territory under the sovereignty of the United States, or any Japanese territory occupied by United States forces.
>
> c. Consider no agreement that may eventually give to any foreign nation claim to any control of the "Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.
>
> In this connection, it is desired to emphasize that all studies and discussions of this subject should give full consideration to the policy approved by the President 23 November 1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the "Blue Area" described as "Required for the direct defense of the United States...."

> The usual military representatives, who are working with the Department of State in connection with the establishment of the International Organization, will be available for work in connection with these discussions.[1]

This draft letter forwarded to the two Secretaries by Admiral Leahy demonstrates clearly the Joint Chiefs of Staff position on this issue. When Secretary of War Stimson received the draft, he was not satisfied with it and took a "harder" line on the matter. He had Assistant Secretary of War McCloy draft a proposed joint War-Navy reply to Admiral Leahy. The McCloy draft basically stated that without prior understandings on the part of the three or four principal nations "as to the role each is to play in guaranteeing the maintenance of peace, that is to say, as to the nature of the responsibility which is implicit in the word 'trusteeship,' the discussion of trusteeships at a general conference will open the door to the broadest kind of claims on the part of some powers and we will incur the hostility of others, to whom our interest in the subject may appear suspect."[2]

The draft letter further stated that the signers were doubtful of the possibility of discussing trusteeships without

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1. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27 file; Memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy from the Joint Chiefs of Staff enclosing a draft letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1945, Declassified, March 1970. See: Appendix C for a copy of the entire SWNCC 27 file.

2. Ibid., Proposed letter submitted by the Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration as a Secretary of War and Navy joint letter to Admiral Leahy, dated February 1, 1945, Declassified, March 1970. See: Appendix C below.

discussing the particular areas for which they were intended. The draft letter continued by reiterating the idea that any discussions of particular areas would create dissension among the allies and harm the war effort. It concluded:

> For these reasons I [this was to refer to the signers of the letter, both Stimson and Forrestal] think our Government should not propose a discussion of trusteeship at present and should in fact make a determined effort to avoid discussion of the subject. We need not fear that this attitude will provoke suspicion since it is based on a realistic ground, the impracticability of discussing the organization and machinery of trusteeship without some common understanding of the obligations of the trustee and without full knowledge of the types and character of the territories to be dealt with.
>
> I realize that these considerations are not solely military and for that reason, may not all have been brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or considered by them. Nevertheless, these considerations bear, in my opinion, so directly on the possibility of attaining objectives of prime military importance that I believe the State Department would be greatly aided by a full expression of opinion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these points.[3]

The last paragraph is an interesting example of the Joint Chiefs of Staff being urged to consider political aspects in the development of their position on an issue. Additionally, in this case it is interesting to note that the political factors considered by McCloy led to his taking a "harder" position vis-a-vis the State Department.

Assistant Secretary McCloy informally presented this draft to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal for consideration as

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3. Ibid.

a joint War-Navy reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal, however, did not believe that McCloy's draft was the proper response nor the proper method of considering the problem. He desired to use the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee system and to build up the role of the Service Secretaries in general. Accordingly, he had prepared a draft reply to the Secretary of State from the two Service Secretaries and had his representative on SWNCC, Artemus L. Gates, submit this draft, along with the preceeding letters and drafts pertaining to the problem, to SWNCC for consideration before action was taken. This was one of the first important utilizations of SWNCC.

The Navy's covering letter to SWNCC pointed out that the determination of proposals agreeable to all concerned within the government was the first priority, for it was "premature to endeavor to decide finally what to do about initiating external discussions of any kind until our own position has been formulated with reasonable care and prevision."[4] It urged that the work of drafting such proposals be proceeded with as expeditiously as possible, and "that the drafts be submitted to the War and Navy Secretaries and, through them, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment."[5] This covering letter clearly indicates the more active role that Secretary Forrestal was determined to play in this issue and the more orderly procedure he was promoting. It is a far cry from the

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4. Ibid., Paper submitted to SWNCC by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, February 15, 1945, Declassified, March 1970. See: Appendix C below.

5. Ibid.

days when Secretary Knox was uninformed on the basic positions.

The proposed letter submitted by the Navy to SWNCC for consideration as a joint letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State placed the matter of intergovernmental negotiations as second in priority to formulating a policy acceptable to all concerned within the American Government.

The draft letter then stated, "if we are able to agree within our own Government upon proposals which we would be willing to discuss with other nations, then in my opinion [the opinion of the signers, the Secretaries of War and Navy] such discussions should be limited to the four powers which took part in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, and only after full examination and complete agreement among those powers should the subject be opened for consideration by a general conference of the United Nations."[6]

This, the Navy believed, incorporated McCloy's and Stimson's view that the general international conference was not a desirable forum for such discussions at this point. The Navy also reasoned that there was no need to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider their conclusion, since they had already indicated their approval of the introduction of the trusteeship subject into a general conference. It could, therefore, be assumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have no objection

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6. Ibid., Proposed letter submitted by the Navy Representative on SWNCC for consideration as a joint letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, dated February 15, 1945, Declassified, March 1970. See: Appendix C below.

to the more limited discussions envisaged by the proposed letter.[7]

The Navy's draft letter took note that discussions had already commenced within the State Department on draft proposals for possible discussion by the United States with Great Britain, Russia, and China on the general principles of international trusteeships and the machinery for their effectuation. It also noted that appropriate military and naval representatives were taking part in these discussions.[8]

These discussions were taking place within a new ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization. Agreement had been reached in January 1945 on its establishment, and the State Department had appointed its members on January 5; but the first meeting was not held until February 2, 1945.

The first meeting of this committee was probably delayed until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the proposed discussions with their previously listed conditions. There is no documentation on this connection, but the military members of the new committee represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would not have participated without the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, one would conclude that the JCS gave their approval to the establishment of this committee and to the commencement of discussions on the subject

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7. Ibid., Paper submitted by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, February 15, 1945, Declassified, March 1970.

8. Ibid., Proposed letter submitted by the Navy Representative on SWNCC for consideration as a joint letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, dated February 15, 1945, Declassified, March 1970. See: Appendix C below.

at the same time or even prior to their submittal to the Service Secretaries of a draft reply to Secretary Stettinius' letter. They did not wait for the Service Secretaries' approval and were, therefore, probably disquieted by Assistant Secretary of War McCloy's and Secretary Stimson's harder line on the question of discussions of proposed trusteeship drafts. They were probably heartened when Secretary Forrestal placed the emphasis on the development of an intra-governmental position, leaving the question of inter-governmental negotiations for later consideration.

This whole situation is indicative of the state of politico-military affairs at that time. The Service Secretaries were starting to play a more active role in the issue, as evidenced by their expressions of divergent views in regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommended reply to the Secretary of State. Of interest is the comment in the Navy Department's proposed letter that the draft proposals should be submitted to the War and Navy Secretaries and, through them, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. Additionally, the Service-Secretary-oriented SWNCC was utilized for the first time in this issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still operated in an orbit of their own as exemplified by their participating in the ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization prior to any approval of such discussions by the Service Secretaries. However, the Service Secretaries, as well as the Secretary of State, were beginning to assert some authority on this issue.

On February 26, 1945, SWNCC agreed, by informal action, to

forward to the Secretary of State a letter over the signature of Mr. Dunn, Chairman of SWNCC, which was almost identical to the one submitted by the Navy.[9] By this time, the inter-departmental discussions were already proceeding within the ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization.

The Secretary of State, however, did benefit by receiving, via his representative on SWNCC, the undiluted views of the War and Navy Departments, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since all of the preliminary documentation leading to the final letter from Mr. Dunn had been submitted to SWNCC for consideration.

The State Department was represented on the ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization by Dr. Pasvolsky (Chairman), Assistant Secretaries Dunn (also on SWNCC), Nelson Rockefeller, and Clayton, as well as Mr. Isaiah Bowman. Admiral Willson represented the Navy Department, while Generals Embick and Fairchild represented the War Department and Air Corps respectively. These military representatives were all from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent his Under Secretary, Abe Fortas, and his Director of Interior's Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Mr. Benjamin Thoron, on the basis of Interior's administration of certain island

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9. Ibid., SWNCC 27/1, Memorandum from the Chairman of SWNCC to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1945, Declassified, March 1970. Also: U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 93-95.

possessions of the United States.[10] This was the first official representation of the Interior Department on a committee considering trusteeship provisions. The Interior Department was also to be represented at the San Francisco Conference by Abe Fortas and Benjamin Thoron on the direct request of Secretary Ickes.[11]

While this committee was being established, informal discussions were held between the State Department and Col. Oliver F. G. Stanley, British Minister of State for the Colonies. Harley Notter has recorded that these discussions concerned the possibilities of regional commissions for colonial territories, of a declaration of standards for administration of all dependent territories, and of trusteeship. There evidently was little substantive agreement between the State Department and Col. Stanley, for Notter states that there was "recognition, most fully expressed in the discussion of January 18, of the heightening urgency for effecting an exchange of papers on trusteeship before the projected general United Nations

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10. Other members of the committee were Charles W. Taussig, Chairman of the United States Section, Anglo-American Caribbean Commission as well as an adviser to the Department of State's Caribbean Office; Edwin C. Wilson, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs and the committee's Acting Chairman, when necessary; Charles P. Taft (brother of Senator Taft), Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and alternate for Mr. Clayton; Mr. Haley, Director of the Office of Commercial Policy; and Gerig and Green from the staff of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Admiral Harold C. Train represented Admiral Willson on one occasion, and Alger Hiss attended for Mr. Wilson on one occasion.

11. U. S., National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Letters, Ickes to Stettinius, March 9, 1945; and Grew to Ickes, March 22, 1945.

conference convened."[12]

The State Department was going ahead with exploratory discussions with the British even before a united position had been worked out within the American Government. This was the one action that the Navy Department was to stress should not be done in its draft letter submitted to SWNCC on February 15, 1945.

The State Department had difficulties with the British Government over the question of trusteeship. These difficulties were soon to be demonstrated clearly by Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta. However, the State Department, according to Harley A. Notter, recognized that the immediate problem in the remaining preparation on trusteeship for the United Nations conference was not international but in arriving at an agreed policy proposal within the Government.[13] Notter continues his comments by stating that the agreed policy proposal in regard to trusteeship would have to take into account "all the vital national interests of the United States involved in this complex question, including especially provision for the security of the United States in the Pacific."[14] Notter then states:

> Congressional interest in the disposition to be made of the Pacific islands not under the control of an Allied power was strongly expressed in this period, and a subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives was appointed on January 23 to study this matter.[15]

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12. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, p. 389.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

It is interesting to note that Notter's account does not specify the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Department, or the Navy Department in this reference to the immediate problem in the remaining preparation on trusteeship. The immediate problem was mainly caused by the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Congressional interest shown at this time only served to reinforce the bargaining positions of the "pragmatists" in the Pentagon and the State Department.

About January 20-21, 1945, Forrestal entered in his diary a memorandum that Stimson had prepared for the Secretary of State which was eventually delivered on January 23 just prior to Stettinius' departure for the Yalta Conference. Forrestal recorded that Stimson felt the disposition of the mandated islands should be settled by the big powers in advance instead of through the proposed trusteeship system. As Stimson phrased the point in his memorandum to Stettinius, "You will get into needless mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will include them [the mandated islands] before the necessity of their acquisition by the United States is established and recognized."[16] Secretary Stimson further pointed out in his memorandum to Stettinius that the mandated islands could not properly be regarded as colonies since they did not have large populations or considerable economic resources. He then continued:

> They do not really belong in such a classification. Acquisition of them by

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16. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 28-29.

> the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world.[17]

These points made by Stimson in his memorandum to the Secretary of State on January 23, 1945, were the same as those expressed in the draft letter submitted to Forrestal by John C. McCloy on February 1, 1945, for consideration as a joint letter from Stimson and Forrestal to Stettinius. Therefore, Stettinius and the other State Department officers knew Stimson's views on the subject as of January 23, 1945, which was prior to the first meeting of the ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee. The State Department did not receive Forrestal's views until the Navy submitted its proposed joint War-Navy letter to SWNCC on February 15, 1945, which was after the ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee had accomplished a large segment of its work.

At the first meeting of the ad hoc Inter-departmental Comcittee, held on February 2, 1945, Dr. Pasvolsky stressed the "necessity of responding to the approaches of other governments concerning our views on a trusteeship system."[18] This was a repetition of the main point in the Secretary of State's December 30, 1944, letter.

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17. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 600.

18. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 389.

A breakthrough of sorts occurred during the second meeting held on February 8. Certain essential differentiations between strategic and non-strategic areas for trusteeship purposes were developed at this meeting. This was the new idea referred to above. Strategic areas would come within the purview of the Security Council where the unanimity rule would apply.[19] This was the basic concept that eventually proved acceptable to all parties. Of course, the military had gone into the discussions with the firm agreement that any discussions or agreements would not prejudice the ultimate decision as to the disposition of any specific territory.

The trusteeship plan eventually adopted by the committee specifically stated that it made no assumption about the inclusion of any specific territory. It included a special category of trusteeships: that of "strategic areas" which would come under the United Nations Security Council where the United States' veto would safeguard American interests.[20]

An additional safeguard, at least in the eyes of the State Department drafters, was the provision that the terms of all trusteeship agreements, including any alteration or amendment, would have to be agreed upon by "all the states directly concerned." James F. Green believes:

> This was State's invention -- probably Pasvolsky's invention, but I am not absolutely sure -- to ensure that the United

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19. Ibid., pp. 389-390.

20. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 134. Memorandum by the Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent Areas, March 17, 1945. The Committee completed its work on March 15, 1945; its final report being dated two days later.

> States would be involved in every trusteeship agreement, including a possible one for the Japanese Mandated Islands. The US had no status under the League, of course, but did have a claim as one of the Allied and Associated Powers that concluded the peace settlement. The phrase was sufficiently broad to justify US interests as conqueror of the islands in World War II. The phrase would also exclude the USSR, it was hoped. From State's viewpoint, "the States directly concerned" and later Security Council veto would amply safeguard US interests in a trust territory.[21]

No evidence is available to indicate exactly when or by whom the "strategic-area" suggestion was made. Between meetings of the Inter-departmental Committee, the State Department representatives on the Committee, as well as Ralph J. Bunche, Robert W. Hartley (Pasvolsky's assistant), Johnson, Notter, and Sandifer, met to consider the problems and devise or appraise solutions. The original idea may have come from one of these men or, possibly, from one of the other Departments represented on the Committee. Secretary Stimson had come close to it in his thinking. Ambassador John D. Hickerson states it probably originated in Pasvolsky's and Benjamin Gerig's "United Nations Office" of the State Department; and that it was a real compromise of "one-worlder" Gerig's principles to accept the strategic trusteeship concept.[22] James F. Green believes that the originator probably was the "incredibly ingenious Pasvolsky." He writes of Pasvolsky, "He played, I believe, the principal role in working out the veto formula, which would protect US and Soviet interests; the

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21. James F. Green, letter, September 8, 1970.

22. Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Ret., Interview, June 19, 1969.

formula of 'the States directly concerned,' which would maximize US and minimize Soviet influence in the trusteeship agreements; and probably the eventual formula for strategic trust territories, to reconcile the civilian-military positions. So far as I can recall, he supported the view that all the mandated territories should be placed under UN trusteeship agreements, but agreed with the military that the special US position in the Japanese islands should be recognized."[23]

Ambassador Hickerson believes that Pasvolsky and Gerig probably felt it was the only way to break the deadlock after seeing how strongly the Navy felt about annexation. For Ambassador Hickerson, who was on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and in the State Department's European Affairs Office, the strategic concept was acceptable since annexation of the islands appeared to be out of the question. He had previously argued within the State Department for the exclusion of the mandated islands from trusteeship by their annexation rather than water down the proposed trusteeship system in order to include the islands, while at the same time, protecting American security interests.[24]

The State Department felt that American security would be fully safeguarded by such a "strategic trusteeship." From this time on, the State Department argued for making the islands a "strategic trusteeship" with the United States

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23. James F. Green, letter to the author, September 8, 1970.

24. Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Ret., Interview, June 19, 1969.

as sole administrator.

The military documents make no mention of the concept of "states directly concerned" as being a safeguard. They do mention the veto provision of the Security Council, as applied to a strategic trusteeship agreement, as being a safeguard. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still not ready to discard their preference for outright annexation. As a fall-back position, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now had a category of trusteeship that was the next closest thing to annexation. They continued to stress the point that their cooperation in developing the trusteeship system did not prejudice in any way the ultimate decision on the postwar disposition of the mandated islands.

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While the plan was still being worked out in the Interdepartmental Committee on Dependent Areas, President Roosevelt took the original, broad trusteeship ideas to the Yalta Conference. During the meeting on February 9, 1945, Secretary Stettinius started to read them to Churchill; and the Prime Minister exploded! He stated that "after we have done our best to fight in this war and have done no crime to anyone I will have no suggestion that the British Empire is to be put in the dock and examined by everybody to see whether it is up to their standard."[25]

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25. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), Foreword, no page number.

Eden writes that "though the Prime Minister's vehemence was a warning signal to the Americans it appeared to give most pleasure to Stalin. He got up from his chair, walked up and down, beamed, and at intervals broke into applause. This embarrassed Roosevelt and did not really profit anybody, except perhaps Stalin, who was able to please himself and point [at] the division of his allies at the same time."[26]

Churchill calmed down when Stettinius explained that the United States did not contemplate any discussions of specific islands or territories to be placed under the trusteeship system. Stettinius added, "later on, we have in mind that the Japanese mandated islands be taken away from the Japanese. We have nothing in mind with reference to the British Empire."[27]

Churchill, still distrustful, obtained the Allies' approval to the following statement for the record:

> It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship should be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.[28]

These statements reassured American military leaders as much as they did the British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found a helpful ally in Prime Minister Churchill, and vice versa.

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26. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning, p. 595.

27. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, Foreword, no page number. See also: Edward R. Stettinius, FDR and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1949), pp. 232-239 and: Leahy, I Was There, p. 313 for slightly different accounts of the incident.

28. Stettinius, FDR and the Russians, p. 212.

One disturbing thought is suggested by Sir Llewellyn Woodward's comment that one of the reasons why Churchill did not oppose President Roosevelt on matters which Churchill considered secondary was that "he expected to have to resist American proposals hostile to the recovery of British territory."[29] Churchill was concerned with Roosevelt's "thing" about India and so opposed to placing any part of the British Empire under international supervision and/or trusteeship that it effected his position on non-related issues. Churchill explained his Yalta position in a letter to the Lord President of the Council on March 10, 1945, as follows:

> The expression "mandate system" was only used at Yalta to limit the territories which would come within the scope of discussions affecting 'territorial trusteeship.' This is necessary in view of the disappearance of the old League of Nations, on whose authority the mandates were held. It in no way governs any arrangement that may be made for the future. We are certainly not committed to the maintenance of the mandate system; but there is no question of subjecting any non-mandated British territories to any form of territorial trusteeship unless we choose to do so of our own accord. I should myself oppose such a departure, which might well be pressed upon nations like Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium, who have great colonial possessions, by the United States, Russia, and China, who have none.[30]

It is interesting to speculate whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries had been previously

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29. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, p. xlvii.

30. Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, Vol. 6, pp. 739-740.

aware that the British Government was so hesitant about a new trusteeship system. The State Department letter of December 30, 1944, had asserted that a provision on trusteeship was bound to appear in the United Nations Charter because of the British, Soviet, and Chinese interest. This same point had been made by Dr. Pasvolsky at the first meeting of the ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee. The United States Government was the initiator of the trusteeship system. The British, Soviets, and Chinese may have wanted discussions on trusteeship for their own reasons; however, they probably would have acquiesced in the dropping of such discussions from the San Francisco Conference agenda if such action had been urged by the United States Government.

The papers in the SWNCC 27 file indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries were definitely influenced by the State Department's assertation, undoubtedly initiated by Dr. Pasvolsky, Gerig, and the other "internationalists," that a trusteeship system was bound to be in the United Nations Charter because of British, Soviet, and Chinese interest. The question is not whether, but how much, influence this assertation had on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's decision to approve discussions on trusteeship at the San Francisco Conference. Another question is whether or not Dr. Pasvolsky, Gerig, and the other "internationalists" in the State Department led the Joint Chiefs of Staff "down the garden path" on this matter.

At a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roosevelt talked of his ideas on the trusteeship of the mandated islands. Forrestal summarized the discussion in his diary as follows:

> He [Roosevelt] said that his idea which he advanced to Stalin and Churchill, was based on the concept of what he called multiple sovereignty - that is, sovereignty would be vested in all of the United Nations, for example, of the Pacific islands, but that we would be requested by them to exercise complete trusteeship for the purpose of world security. He further said that the Australians had advanced the theses that they would take by direct acquisition everything south of the equator, leaving to us those islands north of that line [the mandate]. This he said was unacceptable. I said there were a number of places that we ought to have for our naval security - Kwajalein, the Marianas, Truk, etc. He also included Manus in this category and said that he would even be inclined to have military rights on Noumea while leaving to the French the economic accruals from New Caledonia. The Secretary of War [Stimson] expressed the hope that if the trusteeship idea was adopted the basis of our exercise of powers under it would be very clearly stated so that there could be no misunderstandings in the future.[31]

This account, if accurate, indicates that Roosevelt had clarified his thoughts on the sovereignty of the islands since his letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the past July. He had written then that the idea that the United Nations would ask the United States to act as Trustee for the Japanese mandated islands did not necessarily involve a decision on permanent sovereignty. Now, the President elaborated on his concept by stating that the sovereignty of the islands would be vested in the United Nations.

At the Three Secretaries' [State-War-Navy] Meeting on March 13, Stimson repeated his concern about the trusteeship concept and "told the Secretary of State [Stettinius] he

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31. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 33.

thought he would in due course have to get rid of the gentleman [Leo Pasvolsky] in his Department who was the sponsor of this idea. The Secretary of State agreed, said he had discussed this matter last night with Mr. Hull."[32] This account is very remarkable. There are no other indications or evidence to support this account which would seem to reflect doubts about the views of the man who, above all others, played the key role in developing the whole United Nations system, including Trusteeship. The "pragmatists" would naturally have some doubts about Dr. Pasvolsky, and Stimson's comment can be seen in this light. However, there is no explanation for Stettinius' reply to Stimson.

On March 15, Mr. Charles W. Taussig, the Chairman of the United States Section, Anglo-American Commission and a member of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization, met with the President and briefed him on the trusteeship discussions within the Inter-Departmental Committee. Mr. Taussig was a friend of Roosevelt and Fortas, serving as a one-dollar-a-year man. He has been described by a close associate, Frances McReynolds Smith, as follows:

> He [Taussig] was one of the original braintrusteers under Roosevelt and had access to the White House at all times. He was a man of vision, courage and principle and had definite ideas on the treatment of the inhabitants of these islands - as well as those in the Caribbean. He was a strong advocate of trusteeships and I believe was one of the real architects of the idea of a 'strategic trusteeship.'

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32. Ibid., p. 36.

> He did, I know, influence the President's thinking on the whole subject of territories.... Taussig was definitely a friend and advocate of islands peoples and their rights.[33]

Mr. Taussig was later a member of the American Delegation to the San Francisco Conference. He recorded his briefing of the President by first stating that he outlined the agreement that had been reached within the Inter-Departmental Committee on the general category of strategic areas. He then told the President that "the military had indicated that they would interpret strategic areas as an entire area - for instance, all of the Japanese islands, north of the Equator, that might come under the administration of the United States."[34]

Mr. Taussig was evidently disturbed by this interpretation of the military representatives on the Committee. He reported to the President that under that interpretation the entire group of islands, irrespective of whether or not they were fortified, would be exempt from substantially all of the international agreements pertaining to civilian populations.[35]

Mr. Taussig then stated that the military representatives had been unwilling to agree to divide strategic areas into two categories--closed areas and open areas. The President replied that he would favor these two categories, and the open areas should be subject to international agreements.

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33. Frances McReynolds Smith, letter to the author, September 23, 1970.

34. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 121-122. Memorandum of Conversation with President by the Adviser on Caribbean Affairs (Taussig).

35. Ibid.

The President said that if the military, at a later date, wanted to make all or part of an open area a closed area because of a change in strategy, provisions should be made that this could be done with the approval of the Security Council.[36]

Mr. Taussig's account then continues with a very interesting insight into the attitudes of some of the participants in this policy debate:

> The President then asked me, "What is the Navy's attitude in regard to territories? Are they trying to grab everything?" I replied that they did not seem to have much confidence in civilian controls. The President then asked me how I accounted for their attitude.
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> I said that I thought that the military had no confidence in the proposed United Nations Organization. The President replied that he thought that was so. I told the President of the letter that Admiral Willson showed me addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, referring to the need of sending representatives to San Francisco in order to protect themselves against "the international welfare boys." The President then said that neither the Army nor the Navy had any business administering the civilian government of territories; that they had no competence to do this.[37]

The President's comment--that neither the Army nor the Navy had any business administering the civilian government of territories; that they had no competence to do this--reflects a lack of objectivity on the part of the President. The Navy had, in fact, administered the civil governments of American

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36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

Samoa (1900 to this time), Guam (1899-1941), and the Virgin Islands (1917-1931). The Army had previously administered the Philippine Islands, Cuba, Puerto Rico for short periods, not to mention the experiences of the Army and the Marine Corps in administering the civil affairs of various Caribbean states between the world wars. Additionally, Hawaii was currently under military government.

Mr. Taussig only refers to "the military" and does not differentiate between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries in attributing a lack of confidence in the proposed United Nations Organization and a fear of the "international welfare boys." However, these attitudes appear to have been completely shared by Stimson, Forrestal, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, it might be said that many State Department officials also shared these attitudes.

Forrestal met with Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy on March 30, 1945, to discuss their fears over the trend of thinking on trusteeships. Stimson thought that the United States "might be tempted into making quixotic gestures the net result of which might be that we would surrender the hardly won islands which we had taken in the Pacific to the principle of trusteeship, whereas the British, Dutch, and French would not."[38] Stimson was also of the opinion that the State Department proposals camouflaged the realities of the situation and were pointlessly roundabout. He said:

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38. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 37.

> The State Department proposals were meticulously building up a world organization which was to be the trustee and were proposing that we should turn over these bases to this trustee and then take back the management of them and try to make the powers of management big enough to give us the power which we now hold from our efforts in the war.[39]

Stimson felt that the United States should retain the necessary bases to secure the American position in the Pacific. He stated that the United States could do this with no objections from other states if the fact could be properly demonstrated that the defense of strategic islands was essential to the United States and a definite advantage to all Pacific powers. Stimson elaborated on this statement as follows:

> My point was that we had always stood for freedom and peace in the Pacific and we had waged this war to throw out an aggressor and to restore peace and freedom and everybody knew it; that these bases had been stolen by the aggressor, who had used them to attack us and destroy our power; that we had fought this war with much cost of life and treasure to capture these bases and to free from the threat of aggression all of the peace-loving nations of the Pacific. We had actually thus saved from threat Australia and the Philippines and we were engaged in the process of doing it to the East Indies and to China; that if we had called attention to all of this and then said that we proposed to hold the bases which we now had gained in this painful struggle as a means and for the purpose of protecting freedom and peace in the Pacific, no one would have objected. In other words, we should have announced our possession with a declaration of trust in which all peace-loving nations were the beneficiaries.[40]

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39. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War, pp. 601-602. [Diary, March 30, 1945 entry]

40. Ibid.

At this time, there was no indication that other nations would have objected to American sovereignty over the mandated islands. Australia and New Zealand had declared in their January 21, 1944, agreement that no postwar disposition of Pacific islands should be made without their consent. However, at the beginning of the United Nations Conference, the representatives of Australia and New Zealand, as well as the representatives of The Netherlands, stated publicly that the United States should retain control of the mandated islands, some advocating annexation and others stating that they did not care whether it was done by annexation or by trusteeship.[41]

The potential territorial aggrandizers, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, would probably not have objected to American annexation of the mandated islands. The Soviet Union, in fact, had received American assurances at the Yalta Conference of American support for Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The Soviet Government was, therefore, in no position to object to American annexation of the mandated islands. Furthermore, there is no indication that the Soviet Union would have taken possession of any more territory than it actually did if the United States had annexed the mandated islands. The United Kingdom was not planning to acquire any more territory as a result of the war. The American

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41. The New York Times, April 20, 1945, quoting Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs; The New York Times, April 24, 1945, quoting Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Foreign Minister, The Netherlands; and The Washington Star, April 24, 1945, quoting Prime Minister Peter Fraser of New Zealand.

planners knew this. American annexation of the mandated islands would not have changed this British policy.

Stimson's argument--that no one would have objected to American possession of the strategic bases in the mandated islands--was never adequately refuted by the "internationalists." The argument that the United States should not annex any territory in order to discourage other nations from annexing territory was contradicted by the American agreement to support Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.

Secretary Stimson proposed at the March 30, 1945, meeting with Secretary Forrestal that a joint War-Navy letter be sent to the State Department expressing the view that "(a) These islands were of primary importance not merely to the security of the United States but of the world, and essential to the success of any world security organization. (b) That we propose not only to keep them but to exercise our ownership as a trust on behalf of world security, not for any national advantage."[42]

Forrestal and Stimson decided, however, that a better idea would be a joint State-War-Navy letter to the President. Accordingly, at the Three Secretaries' Meeting on April 2, 1945, held in Stimson's office, Stimson presented a letter drafted by his Special Assistant, Mr. Harvey H. Bundy.

The Three Secretaries agreed that it was not possible to arrive at agreement with respect to any satisfactory draft

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42. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 38.

paper on the subject of trusteeship with a view of presentation for discussion of the subject with the sponsoring powers before the San Francisco Conference.[43] Forrestal wrote in his diary that it was decided to "try to get postponement of the whole subject of trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference, and that they should also draft a public statement, to be made either by the President or the Secretary of State, to the effect that the United States intended to keep the islands but 'only for the continued insurance of peace and liberty for all nations and peoples' adjacent to the Pacific."[44]

The decisions reached by the Three Secretaries demonstrate how interwoven were the issues of trusteeship and the disposition of the mandated islands. Forrestal and Stimson had gone to the meeting with the goal of obtaining a joint State-War-Navy letter to the President on the issue of retaining the mandated islands. The ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee had already agreed to a trusteeship plan which presumably did not prejudice the ultimate disposition of the mandated islands. However, the Three Secretaries now agreed that the issues of trusteeship and the disposition of the islands were interwoven; and there was, therefore, disagreement with respect to a satisfactory trusteeship plan.

The State Department immediately drafted a memorandum to the President, for Stettinius' signature, which incorporated

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43. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Proposed State Department memorandum to the President, dated April 2, 1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy (SC) A14-7/EF files. See: Appendix D for a copy of this document.

44. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 38.

segments of Bundy's draft concerning the reasoning behind American retention of the Pacific islands. The draft memorandum stated that the Secretaries of War and Navy felt strongly that "the position of this Government with respect to the necessity for retaining complete control over certain strategic areas in the Pacific should be made known unequivocably to other nations and to the world before any discussion even of machinery or principles with respect to a trusteeship system could be entered into."[45] The draft ended with the recommendation that the United States Government should inform the representatives of the other sponsoring powers (United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China) and the provisional government of France that it would be unlikely that the United States could develop any definite ideas as to machinery and procedures for a trusteeship system prior to the opening date of the San Francisco Conference; and, if such were the case, it would be advisable for the nations convened at the Conference to agree to postpone any discussions of trusteeships until after the United Nations Organization was formed.[46]

Secretary Stettinius was to prove indecisive and vacillating throughout the inter-departmental discussions on this topic. No reasons were recorded for his agreement to the probable postponement of any discussions of trusteeship at the San

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45. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Proposed State Department memorandum to the President, dated April 2, 1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy (SC) A14-7/EF files. See: Appendix D for a copy of this document.

46. Ibid.

Francisco Conference. Unfortunately, there is no indication as to which State Department officers drafted the memorandum. This memorandum must have greatly disturbed the "internationalists" within the State Department.

On April 7th, Stettinius reported to his Staff Committee that serious differences of opinion existed among State, War, and Navy Department officials regarding trusteeships, and he was going to send a "short memorandum to the President presenting both sides and pointing out the importance of my discussing it with the President and reaching a decision promptly."[47] Stettinius wrote in his diary that he was very dissatisfied with the proposed trusteeship system developed by the ad hoc inter-departmental committee which he claimed had been developed while he was out of town and without full consultation with him (he had been at Yalta). Yet, he also wrote that the memorandum that the State Department had drafted after the April 2 Secretarial meeting did not fit with his views either.[48] Unfortunately, his own views were never written down.

At the next Secretarial meeting on April 9, Stettinius informed Stimson and Forrestal that he "did not propose to associate himself with the document [the State Department draft memorandum] ... that he proposed to let the document go as a statement by War and Navy, informing the President that he reserved judgment." When Forrestal asked him why he did not

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47. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 140-141. Extracts from the diary of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., March 18, 1945-April 7, 1945.

48. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 209-210. Extracts from the diary of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., April 8-14, 1945.

want to go along with the recommendation to postpone trusteeship discussions at San Francisco, Stettinius said "that while his private views accorded with ours, he was under orders to the contrary."[49] This comment by Stettinius is remarkable. The only person in the Nation who can give orders to the Secretary of State is the President. If it had been the President, then Stettinius should have informed the other two Secretaries of this so that they could plan accordingly. If it were not the President, the best guess would be Harry Hopkins or, a more remote possibility, former Secretary Hull. Possibly, he was referring to Pasvolsky and his trusteeship "experts."

Secretary of the Interior Ickes had sent a letter drafted by Under Secretary Abe Fortas to the President on April 5, 1945, urgently recommending against any postponement of the discussions at San Francisco on trusteeship. The letter, shown to Stettinius by the President, may have had some influence on Stettinius' actions. It stated:

> I am considerably disturbed ... as to the attitude of the Army and Navy with respect to the international trusteeship problem. Under Secretary Fortas, who participated in the State-War-Navy-Interior committee discussions of this problem, has advised me from time to time of the attitude taken by the representatives of the various agencies. I understand that the representatives of the Armed Forces [probably referring to both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries] have indicated a strong feeling that the United States should insist upon complete sovereignty of the Japanese mandated islands. I am now informed that the War and Navy Departments are urging that the matter of international trusteeship should not be discussed at the San Francisco Conference, or at least should not be discussed until

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49. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 38.

> there is a firm agreement as to United States jurisdiction over the Japanese mandated islands.
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> I agree that the United States should be the administering power for the Japanese mandated islands. The arrangement worked out by the interdepartmental committee seems to me to assure to the Government all of the rights which it could desire for security purposes. The only question in my mind is whether the arrangement has not gone too far in providing a scheme by which these areas may be exempted from international accountability. But I feel most strongly that if the United States should insist upon complete sovereignty, an international grab-bag would result.... I also feel that it would be a mistake to fail to reach an agreement on the subjects of mandated territories and dependent areas at the San Francisco Conference. The elimination of this topic from the agenda of the Conference would arouse suspicions and would be a continuing source of hostility and distrust.[50]

This letter from Secretary of the Interior Ickes indicates that Under Secretary Fortas was well informed as to the results of the Three Secretaries' Meeting of April 2, 1945, and the resulting State Department draft memorandum. Mr. Fortas had been a member of the ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee which had drafted a proposed trusteeship plan. Probably, the "internationalists" in the State Department had informed Mr. Fortas of the move to postpone any discussion of trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference in the hope that Mr. Ickes could help counter such a movement.

The argument that any elimination of the topic of mandated territories and dependent areas at the San Francisco

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50. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 198-199. Secretary of Interior to the President, April 5, 1945. An apparent earlier draft of this letter, stronger in tone but without substantive difference, is on file at U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen.

Conference would be a source of hostility and distrust was opposite the views of Secretary Stimson. Additionally, the "internationalist" argument that American sovereignty over the islands would result in an "international grab-bag" was included in the letter. Of course, Secretary Ickes was not aware of the American agreement with the Soviet Union concerning Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The letter, however, does not cite any evidence to support the charge that a "grab-bag" would result.

At the President's press conference of April 5th (his last press conference), he indicated he wanted the islands placed under a trusteeship by saying when asked whether the controlling government in the islands would be the United States, "I would say the United Nations. Or it might be called the world, which has been much abused and now will have the chance to prevent any more abuse."[51] Another account records he said, "the United States and the other United Nations must accept trusteeships over Japanese mandated islands, build new naval and air bases..."[52] This statement to the press made while Roosevelt was in Warm Springs may also have influenced Stettinius.

For whatever reasons or influences, Stettinius had informed the Secretaries of War and Navy on the ninth that he would not recommend postponing the trusteeship discussions at

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51. Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (9 vols., New York: Random House, 1938-1950), Vol. XIII, p. 610.

52. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to the President, April 13, 1945. See also: The New York Times, April 13, 1945.

San Francisco but would inform the President of Stimson's and Forrestal's views while stating that he, himself, reserved judgment.

On that very same day, Stettinius sent to the President the trusteeship plan as developed by the ad hoc Inter-Departmental Committee on Dependent Areas along with a long letter detailing the differing views of the State Department and the War and Navy Departments.

Stettinius stated in the letter to the President that the main difference between the Service Secretaries and the State Department was not on the trusteeship plan but on the question of considering trusteeship at that time. He explained that Forrestal and Stimson were stating their position separately, but then continued by detailing the Service Secretaries' views. Stettinius stated that the Service Secretaries felt: (a) the United States should retain complete control over certain strategic areas in the Pacific; (b) that this point should be made known unequivocally to other nations and to the world before participating in any discussions on trusteeships; and (c) that any discussions on this matter should be postponed since they believed it would be impossible to discuss the form of trusteeships without bringing into discussion particular areas which would lead to disputes between the Allies and prejudice the united military efforts underway to finish the war.[53]

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53. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 211-214. Secretary of State to the President, April 9, 1945.

The Secretary of State did not take a personal position but stated the countering arguments in terms of the "Department of State's" beliefs and views. Stettinius, however, did not go so far as to declare that he was reserving judgment, as he had informed Stimson and Forrestal he would do. He stated the Department of State's position as follows:

> The Department of State agrees, of course, that any plan must provide for our retaining such strategic positions, as of right, in the Pacific, as you and your military advisers deem necessary. It believes that this is provided for in the draft plan attached within the system of international trusteeship. The Department of the Interior, as Secretary Ickes has written you, agrees with the Department of State. The Department of State believes further, that if we do not include these areas, with adequate safeguards, within the trusteeship system we shall prejudice all possibility of international trusteeship, and that it would appear to large sections of the public to violate our expressed statements against annexation of territory as a result of the war....
>
> The Department of State recommends that the matter be settled now, and in favor of the attached draft, with possible minor revisions on which, I think, the three Departments can agree. The Department of State believes that having repeatedly taken the lead in raising this matter with other countries, we admit a serious internal weakness by not having a policy when the moment for action arrives. We also, by so doing, expose the whole Dumbarton Oaks plan to attack in this country and in other countries by its failure to face up to this question. The lack of trusteeship proposals in the plan to date has already been criticised. Recent polls indicate the public is in favor of such a system.[54]

These arguments are clearly those of Pasvolsky, Gerig,

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54. Ibid.

and the other "internationalists" within the State Department. Secretary Stettinius, as usual, did not state his own personal views. The letter was concluded by a request that a representative of the State Department and a representative of the War and Navy Departments go to Warm Springs, where the President was relaxing, to discuss the problem in order that a prompt decision could be reached.

Meanwhile, the Service Secretaries were disconcerted by Stettinius' actions. Stimson and Forrestal discussed the matter over the telephone that afternoon (April 9, 1945) and tentatively decided to submit their views directly to the President. Mr. Bundy informed General Marshall that:

> Secretary Forrestal now reports that the Secretary of State is inclined to shift his position athird time and perhaps present no recommendation to the President....
> The Secretary [Stimson] just telephoned me to say that his position and that of Mr. Forrestal would be much better stated by the attached letters than it could possibly be stated in any more elaborate paper by the Secretary of State which attempted to state to the President the War and Navy Department views.[55]

This memorandum from Stimson's Special Assistant, Harvey H. Bundy, to General Marshall reflects exasperation of the two Service Secretaries with Stettinius' repeated change of mind. It demonstrates the close working relationship between Stimson and Marshall. Mr. Bundy evidently thought about keeping General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed as to

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55. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, to General Marshall, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

Stimson's activities. Another example of this phase of Bundy's job is his memorandum to Stimson attached to the draft letter:

> If the joint letters are sent there should be a request for a personal hearing before the President with Secretary Stettinius present. This is not now in the draft letters.
>
> The Joint Staffs will probably also want a representative present.[56]

The two draft letters concerned both the question of postponement of trusteeship discussion at San Francisco and the question of strategic control over the Japanese mandated islands. The first letter, dealing mainly with the strategic control question, stated that postwar strategic control of the islands would be necessary for the United States to discharge its responsibility in respect to freedom in the Pacific. It concluded:

> It is, therefore, with misgivings that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have contemplated the establishment of international trusteeships in respect to these islands. They believe it is desirable to retain full control, at least with respect to certain former Japanese-held islands and former Japanese Mandated Islands, accompanied by a declaration on the part of the United States that it will hold these areas in the interests of the same cause for which we are now fighting, the cause of freedom of all law-abiding nations in the Pacific Ocean. We believe a Declaration of Policy should be made public promptly and before any discussions about trusteeships. We enclose a proposed draft of such a declaration.[57]

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56. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Harvey H. Bundy (initialed: HHB) to Secretary of War, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

57. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Draft of joint SECWAR and SECNAV letter to the President, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. See: Appendix E for a copy of this draft letter.

The second draft letter was shorter and dealt specifically with the question of postponing any discussion of trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference:

> Dear Mr. President:
>
> In view of recent developments and the strong possibility of radical differences of opinion at the coming conference in San Francisco, we desire to bring to your attention the dangers involved in discussing at that time international trusteeships as applied to particular areas in which the United States or other nations have vital interests. We do not believe it will be possible to discuss effectively the form of trusteeships as a general proposition without bringing into the discussion the particular areas as to which the probability of sharp disagreement is evident.
>
> We very much fear that the discussion of the territorial problems and adjustments involved will bring about disputes between the United Nations which may greatly prejudice united military operations which are necessary for the prompt finishing of the war with Japan as well as that with Germany.
>
> We suggest to you the advisability of postponing these questions of trusteeships until such time as hostilities in the Pacific as well as the European Theater are terminated.
>
> Faithfully yours,[58]

The history of what came of these letters is an interesting story. Secretary Stimson was evidently anxious to get the letters refined, typed, signed and sent to the President. This was never done. The two Secretaries did not know that Stettinius had sent the draft trusteeship plan to the President that very day.

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58. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Draft of joint SECWAR and SECNAV letter to the President, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

Not knowing of Stettinius' action, Secretary Forrestal assured Mr. Stimson "that there was no immediate urgency in this matter," and Stimson, therefore, left Washington on the tenth for Tennessee without having signed the letters.[59]

Before Stimson left Washington, he signed a joint Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy letter to Stettinius at General Marshall's request. This letter had been drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and requested that the Chiefs of Staff be present at any meetings with the President "preliminary to the San Francisco Conference, on the matter of trusteeships or other disposition for the islands in the Pacific Area" in view of the vital interests of American national defense involved in such considerations.[60] This letter was given to Forrestal for his signature and decision on the necessity and timing of it in light of his discussions with Mr. Stettinius.[61]

Meanwhile, the staffs of the two Service Secretaries worked to refine the two draft letters to the President. This staff work was not completed until April 13.

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59. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Col. W. H. Kyle, Aide to the Secretary of War, to Major Mathius F. Correa, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, April 9, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

60. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Draft joint SECWAR and SECNAV letter to SECSTATE, signed by Secretary Stimson, no date, attached to memorandum from Mr. Harvey H. Bundy to Major Correa, April 10, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files (SC) A14-7/EF.

61. Ibid., Memorandum from Mr. Harvey H. Bundy to Major Correa, April 10, 1945.

In the meantime, two events occurred which, in conjunction, completely changed the course of events on this entire issue. The first event was the President's receiving Stettinius' letter with the trusteeship plan and cabling Stettinius from Warm Springs on the tenth, "Your message on International Trusteeship is approved in principle. I will see your representative and that of the Army and Navy on the 19th. That will be time enough. And if you have already left I will, of course, see you on the 25th."[62] Thus, President Roosevelt approved the trusteeship plan "in principle" after receiving Stettinius' letter. This action was to influence greatly the three Secretaries and the new President.

The second event, of course, was the death of President Roosevelt on the afternoon of April 12, 1945. His death, only two days after approving the trusteeship plan "in principle," finalized that decision. President Truman's first decision as President was to continue with the plans for the San Francisco Conference for drafting a United Nations Organization Charter. All of the high governmental officials were anxious to have as smooth a transition as possible allowing the new President time to attend to the most pressing problems. Mr. Stettinius did, however, brief President Truman on this current matter on April 13 asking for an early conference on the question with all concerned.[63]

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62. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 211-214. Secretary of State to the President, April 9, 1945; Footnote to p. 211.

63. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to the President, April 13, 1945.

Arrangements were made between the Departments of State, War, and Navy for a high-level conference to iron out the difficulties on this issue. This conference was held at the State Department on April 16, 1945. It is interesting to note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not represented at this all-important meeting. They had specifically requested representation at any Presidential meeting on this subject and, by logical extension, at such a meeting as this one. This was a foretaste of the downgrading of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Truman relative to their former position under President Roosevelt.

Those present were: Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, Joseph C. Grew, James C. Dunn, Leo Pasvolsky, Harvey H. Bundy (Special Assistant to the Secretary of War), and Major Mathias F. Correa (Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy). At the outset of the meeting, it was agreed that the issue of international trusteeships would not be eliminated from discussion at San Francisco. This important decision was not resisted by Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal. Their position on this matter seems to have changed since the 9th, as will be further demonstrated. The reason, no doubt, being the death of the President just after he had approved the trusteeship plan "in principle" and President Truman's public announcement that the United Nations Conference would be held as scheduled.

Next, Secretary Stettinius urged that the declaration of policy annexed to the draft letter of the Secretaries of the Navy and War addressed to the President (now evidently revised and dated April 13, 1945) not be promulgated at this time

"because of the effect it would have on the other nations participating in the conference."[64] It was agreed it would not be announced at that time, but "at some future date such a declaration would be promulgated."[65]

The statement of policy, which was drafted by Mr. Bundy, was premised on the United States entering into discussions on a trusteeship system at San Francisco. It declared that

> the United States does not seek annexation of territory or economic wealth but strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and atolls [in the Pacific] are vital to any effective military guaranty of peace in the Pacific.... In order to discharge its responsibility as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights and such rights will involve complete control in the case of certain atolls in the Pacific....
>
> The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable under a trusteeship system to provide, by agreements, for the maintenance of such United States military and strategic rights and

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64. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal, minutes of April 16, 1945, conference, dated April 16, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. See: Appendix F for a copy of this document.

65. Ibid. On May 2, 1945, James Forrestal wrote a letter to Secretary of War Stimson that referred to this agreement and asked Stimson's view as to whether or not it would be proper to renew their inquiry to the Secretary of State. He concluded, "I share your feeling that we should do nothing that would either embarrass him or hamper him. At the same time I am quite anxious that the views of the War and Navy Departments with regard to our external defense should be on record quite clearly with the President." U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Forrestal to Stimson, May 2, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files (SC) A14-7/EF. Evidently no action came of this letter and the draft declaration of policy was never sent to President Truman.

> control as will be necessary to assure peace and security in the Pacific Ocean or elsewhere in the world.[66]

The wording is of importance since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still remaining firm on their position that any discussions or agreement on a trusteeship system should not prejudice the ultimate decision for the disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. This draft statement indicates that Forrestal and Stimson were now willing to have the islands as a strategic trusteeship on the condition that the United States have absolute control. The actual draft letter of April 13, 1945, has not been located to confirm this; but subsequent statements by Forrestal and Stimson, especially at the April 17 conference, would seem to support this conclusion.

The draft letters of April 9, 1945, were arguing for postponement of any trusteeship discussions at San Francisco; whereas, the draft policy statement attached to the April 13, 1945, letter is premised on such discussions being held. This is further evidence that Forrestal's and Stimson's positions changed on this matter sometime after the ninth and before the sixteenth of April. Not only was their position changed about whether or not trusteeship discussions should proceed at San Francisco but, also, about the practicality of obtaining sufficient strategic control of the islands within a trusteeship system. Their first letter of April 9, 1945, had

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66. U. S., Naval Archives Office, Draft Declaration of United States Policy, HHB #2, April 16, 1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. See: Appendix G for a copy of this document.

stated their "misgivings" on the establishment of international trusteeship in respect to the former Japanese mandated islands. Now, their policy draft dated April 13, 1945, stated that it would be "practicable" to maintain American strategic and military rights in the Pacific islands under a trusteeship system.

The reasons for this change of position could only be caused by the President's cable on the tenth approving the trusteeship plan "in principle" and his death immediately after that decision. President Truman may have given Stettinius some indication of his feelings on the matter when Stettinius briefed him on the issue on April 13. However, Stettinius had urged an early Presidential meeting with all concerned to resolve the difficulties; so, President Truman probably did not make any decision at the briefing. Additionally, the draft policy was refined and dated April 13, the same day Stettinius saw the President.

Stimson and Forrestal were strong men with clear views. Their views were not likely to change suddenly. They may have seen the inevitable, or what they considered the inevitable, and changed their positions to bow to the inevitable. However, such a change in position probably did not reflect a change in their personal views on the advisability of proceeding with discussions on trusteeship at San Francisco or the practicality of obtaining sufficient strategic control of the islands within a trusteeship system.

During the conference on April 16, Forrestal asked Stettinius whether or not it would embarrass him if the

Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the President their draft letter (dated April 13, 1945) that detailed their positions. Stettinius replied it would be embarrassing at that time and "asked that the sending of such a statement be deferred 'for a few days.' The implication of his statement, although it was not entirely clear, was that he did not wish such a statement to go forward to the President until the San Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it was well underway. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that they acquiesced in his request."[67] The San Francisco Conference was scheduled to commence on April 25, 1945, only nine days hence. Perhaps Stettinius felt that such a statement might complicate his relations with the new President.

It was also agreed at this meeting that the United States draft on trusteeship (the one approved "in principle" by President Roosevelt) would include language that made it clear the United States did not commit itself to placing any particular territory under the system. The formula worked out at this meeting was that the draft was changed to read: "It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which specific territories within the foregoing categories should be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms."[68]

Finally, Forrestal asked that the United States draft be further changed to provide that the initial negotiation of

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67. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal, dated April 16, 1945, Declassified June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

68. Ibid.

trusteeship agreements for strategic areas would be in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. Dr. Pasvolsky dissented, believing all negotiations should be made with the General Assembly but was overruled. It is apparent that Forrestal and Stimson were still keeping their options open by including a statement that the United States was not committed to placing any particular territory under the system. At the same time, they were also stiffening the strategic trusteeship provisions in case the islands were ever placed under that category.

On the 17th, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy met with the full United States Delegation to San Francisco and discussed their decisions of the day before.[69] At this meeting on the 17th, Forrestal expressed his fundamental philosophy on civil-military relations and on this issue in particular:

> 1. Both the Army and Navy are aware that they are not makers of policy but they have a responsibility to define to the makers of policy what they believe are the military necessities of the United States, both for its own defense and for the implementation of its responsibility for maintenance of world peace.... 2. I take it as a premise about all discussions of world peace that the United States is to have the major responsibility for the Pacific Ocean security, and if this premise is accepted there flows from it the acceptance of the fact that the United States must have the means with which to implement its responsibilities.... 5. I closed by re-emphasizing the fact that retention of power by the United States was

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69. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 311-322. Eleventh meeting (Executive Session) of U. S. Delegation, April 17, 1945.

> not inconsistent with the work on and the hopes for a world peace organization - that <u>those that hate war must have the power to prevent it</u>. [Emphasis added][70]

Senator Vandenberg, a member of the delegation, noted of this conference that Stimson made a "particularly moving speech - told of the mistake we made after the last war in letting Japan get these mandated islands.... He said he didn't care so much about the 'title' to these islands <u>if</u> we have <u>absolute</u>, undisputed control over our base needs."[71] This is a different attitude than Secretary Stimson revealed in his diary on March 30. Unfortunately, there is no mention of this conference or any change in attitude in his memoirs. While noting that Forrestal backed up Stimson "100%", Senator Vandenburg wrote that he, himself, agreed with the State Department which insisted "that this [control over the islands] must be accomplished without setting a precedent for all the other Big Powers to take what they claim they need for their defense (precisely as Russia is already doing)."[72] It is difficult to tell whether this comment about Forrestal referred to his backing Stimson on the necessity for complete control over the islands or to backing Stimson's view that the "title" to the islands did not matter so long as the United States had control. There is no clear mention of this fine distinction in Forrestal's diary, although the latter interpretation appears,

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70. Millis, ed., <u>The Forrestal Diaries</u>, p. 45.

71. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., <u>The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 169.

72. <u>Ibid.</u>

in the context of events, to be the correct one. Forrestal is clearly for absolute control, but he does not specifically mention whether he is still for annexation at this time or whether he now feels compelled to accept a strong strategic trusteeship for the islands.

That night, and at the Delegation meeting the next day, the final wording of the trusteeship plan and a United States trusteeship policy was hammered out. Stettinius was able to submit a mutually agreeable policy recommendation to the President.[73] The President approved it the same day. The policy, not intended for publication but intended, mainly, as a guideline for the American Delegation at San Francisco, stated:

> It is not proposed at San Francisco to determine the placing of any particular territory under a trusteeship system. All that will be discussed there will be the possible machinery of such a system.
>
> The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable to devise a trusteeship system which would apply only to such territories in the following categories as may, by trusteeship arrangements, be placed thereunder, namely: (a) territories now held under mandate: (b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war; and (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which of the specific territories within the foregoing categories shall be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.
>
> This system would provide, by agreements, for (1) the maintenance of United States military and strategic rights, (2) such control as will be necessary to assure general peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well

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73. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 350-351. Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to President Truman, April 18, 1945.

> as elsewhere in the world, and (3) the advancement of the social, economic, and political welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent territories.[74]

This policy is a far step from that which was behind the initial plans drafted by the State Department in 1942 and 1943. These had emphasized the international supervision aspect of the trusteeship system and the economic, social, and political advancement of dependent peoples. They had also envisaged wide usage of the trusteeship system, including dependent territories of the Allies as well as former mandates and territories detached from the Axis powers. This policy was also a far departure from President Roosevelt's initial plans for a string of bases around the world under the control of the new international organization.

On the other side, the new policy was a far cry from the initial position of the military services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still maintaining their annexationist position on the former Japanese mandated islands, but the question of trusteeships would be discussed at the San Francisco Conference and a trusteeship system established. The Secretaries of War and Navy had changed their original position against any such discussions prior to the end of the war and evidently felt compelled (or constrained) by President Roosevelt's final wishes to agree to placing the islands within the strategic trusteeship category of the new system as long as American military and strategic rights were maintained.

Of interest is the relative listing of what the new

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74. Ibid.

trusteeship system would provide. The military factor of maintaining American military and strategic rights was listed first. This goal was followed by that of obtaining "such control as will be necessary to assure general peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well as elsewhere in the world." Finally, at the bottom of the list came the concern for the "advancement of the social, economic, and political welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent territories."

* * *

As stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still absolutely for annexation. They feared that control of the islands might be inadvertently lost at San Francisco by some "quixotic" gesture. Admiral Leahy sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy on April 24, 1945 (the day before the San Francisco Conference convened) stating the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views on the military aspects of certain matters that would be discussed at San Francisco. Among other matters, he stressed, "If the question of Territorial Trusteeships is considered, the position of the military advisors should be based on the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, that unrestricted strategic control by the United States of the Japanese mandated islands and certain other islands in the Pacific is essential to the future security of the United States."[75]

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75. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Admiral Leahy to SECNAV and SECWAR, April 24, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

To ensure that there were no "quixotic" gestures on this issue, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had representatives on the American Delegation as advisers who briefed Governor Stassen, the American representative for this matter on the Big-Five discussions (preliminary discussions held at San Francisco by the American, British, Soviet, French, and Chinese delegations) and, also, the American delegate on the conference's Committee II/4, which was writing the trusteeship section of the Charter after receiving the Big-Five's draft. These military advisers ensured that there was no deviation from the policy approved by the President on April 18, 1945.[76]

The military leaders also felt that some public pressure had to be developed in favor of their position. Admiral King publicly called for retention of the islands and asked "how long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of fighting and building and winning and giving away, only to fight and build and win and give away again?"[77] This is the first public statement (April 5, 1945) on the controversy by an American military leader.

The question of military leaders making public statements on matters still under contention within the Government is a major question of civil-military relations and of the proper role of the military within a democracy. The question is

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76. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 448-452, 1205-1206, 1209, 1279-1280, 1303, 1417-1421. Minutes of U. S. Delegation meetings.

77. Army and Navy Journal, Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945), p. 987. Also: The New York Times, April 5, 1945, and U. S. Congressional Record Appendix, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. A1660 and A1706.

merely raised at this point and will be analyzed to some extent in the conclusions chapter.

Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, had long agreed with Admirals Leahy and King on the necessity of retaining the former Japanese mandated islands. As early as September 1944, he had expressed the opinion to Admiral King and the Secretary of the Navy that the United States should "keep our Marshall and Caroline bases."[78] Now, probably having seen the reports of Admiral King's public comments, Admiral Nimitz spoke out to the reporters on Guam saying that the Marianas (in the Mandate) and Iwo Jima (in the Bonins) were "vital to our defense in the future.... Those islands are as important to the United States as the Hawaiian Islands."[79]

Public support quickly came. Former Admiral Hart, now a Senator from Connecticut, made similar statements.[80] The Senate Naval Affairs Committee sent a subcommittee, headed by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-Va.), to "oversee" the American Delegation at San Francisco "to see that the United States got control of the mandated islands."[81]

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78. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Minutes of Conference at San Francisco between CominCh and CincPac with SECNAV present, September 29-October 1, 1944, Declassified, 1970, King papers.

79. The New York Times, April 13, 1945.

80. Address by Senator Hart given April 22, 1945, over NBC network. Quoted in: Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 170.

81. The New York Times, May 4, 1945, and May 8, 1945.

Secretary Forrestal received almost daily reports on the subject of trusteeships from his Special Assistant, Keith Kane, who was an adviser to the American Delegation.[82]

No amendments were submitted to the trusteeship plan proposed by the Americans that would have seriously harmed American security interests. One amendment to include "independence" as a political goal for dependent areas, rather than just "self-determination," created a stir between the Navy and the Interior Departments.[83] The Delegation as a whole refused to get involved in an inter-departmental fight; and the situation was finally resolved by avoiding the word "independence" in Article 73(b) of the Charter concerning non-self-governing territories in general, whether or not they were trusteeships. The Navy Department did not consider the term "independence" in that context to be of military concern.[84]

The problem was also resolved by qualifying the word "independence" in Article 76(b) of the Charter concerning the basic objectives of the trusteeship system. The Navy Department was more worried about the trusteeship system (Chapter XII of the Charter) than about policies dealing with dependent

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82. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandums from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports from Keith Kane, dated April 30-May 25, 1945. All declassified June 20, 1969. Includes State Department drafts of April 17 and 26, 1945, Secretary of the Navy files, A14-7/EF.

83. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 1205-1216, 1279-1280. Minutes of U. S. Delegation meetings.

84. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports from Keith Kane, May 21, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

areas in general. Thus, the phrase in Article 76(b) under Chapter XII was qualified to read: "their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement."[85]

It is clear that the qualification was intended by the Americans to fit the former Japanese mandated islands. It is also of interest that the Navy Department was not worried that much about the use of the word "independence" in the Chapter dealing with dependent territories in general, [Chapter XI under which was Article 73(b)] even though Hawaii, Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands might be (as they, indeed, became) involved.

This Chapter (XI) on non-self-governing territories had originally been proposed by the Australian Delegation as an amendment to the trusteeship proposals. The Navy Department considered the original Australian proposal "clearly unacceptable from the point of view of the military."[86] Several revisions were made in the original Australian proposal at the urging of the Navy Department. The final result, including

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85. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1968).

86. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal concerning status of Australian amendment to the Chapter on Trusteeships, June 8, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

a requirement to submit reports "subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require" on each nation's own non-self-governing territories, did not adversely affect American military interests.

Overall, the final forms of the Chapters of the United Nations Charter that cover trusteeships, Chapters XII and XIII, did not vary to any major extent from the Presidential Policy on Trusteeship dated April 18, 1945.[87]

* * *

Within the American public, some of the non-governmental organizations associated with the American Delegation to the San Francisco Conference pushed for a strong trusteeship system while other pressure groups concentrated on the United States gaining control of the former Japanese mandated islands. Such organizations have been mentioned at the end of the preceeding chapter.

Other indications of public opinion were the comments of several members of Congress, military and naval experts, educators, writers and others contained in two issues of The United States News. This magazine had a column entitled: "Question of the Week;" and this controversy was of such public interest that the column was devoted to it on two successive issues, May 4 and 11, 1945. The question was phrased:

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87. For the details of the negotiations on the drafting of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco, see the definitive work: Ruth Russell and Jeanette Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, October 1958).

> Should the United States take title to the former Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific, or have military use of them and administer their affairs under an international trusteeship?[88]

The published answers to this question, thirteen in all, were approximately balanced on each side of the issue. The editors probably selected the responses in order to present "equal time" for the two sides of the issue. For example, the "annexationist" side of the issue was represented by Senator Taft. His comment on the question was as follows:

> I believe the U. S. should take title to the former Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific. The inhabitants are so few that there can never be any question of their self-government. Our men have conquered them and I see no reason why we should be trustees for an international body.[89]

Published directly under Senator Taft's comment was the opposite point of view presented by Frederick J. Libby, Executive Secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War and former European Commissioner for the Society of Friends. Libby's comment was as follows:

> We must live up to our pledge in the Atlantic Charter to abstain from territorial aggression, regardless of whether our allies do so or not. Nations must return to the standards of common honesty, and our country must take the lead.
>
> For us to take title to these islands on the further side of the Pacific Ocean would commit us permanently to a policy of imperialism, the ultimate outcome of which would almost certainly be another great war.[90]

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88. The United States News, Vol. 18 (May 4, 1945), p. 30, 32; and The United States News, Vol. 18 (May 11, 1945), p. 30, 32.

89. Ibid., May 11, 1945, p. 30.

90. Ibid.

Of interest, because of his present position as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is the published comment of Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), a member at that time of the House Committee on Naval Affairs. In response to the question presented by The United States News, Representative Hebert stated:

> Those of us who live have no right to dissipate possessions which were bought and paid for with the blood of those who have died. The time has come when Americans must be realistic and practical for their future safety and security.
>
> During times of war, I as a member of Congress, was willing to accept the opinion of the military leaders as to what was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. If the opinion of these military leaders, who have been so successful, was good enough in times of war, they are good enough for me in times of peace to prevent, as long as possible, another war.
>
> The Navy should have complete control and direction of whatever islands in the Pacific that are needed for the safety and security of our nation. We cannot lack backbone, courage and determination now by advancing such a weasel proposition as trusteeship. Annexation, with the complete force and might of U. S. power behind it, is the only realistic approach and answer to our future safety.91

The comments quoted above which were published in The United States News demonstrate the basic cleavage between the "internationalists" and the "pragmatists" over the question of the disposition of the former mandated islands. Of interest, because of his later position as Secretary of State, is the published comment by Representative Christian A.

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91. Ibid., May 4, 1945, pp. 30 and 32.

Herter (R-Mass.). Representative Herter's response to the column's question was as follows:

> I do not see how we can insist on outright acquisition of the islands as being essential to our national security without acknowledging that any other nation, if it is strong enough to do so, has the right to seize by force of arms and acquire whatsoever territories it might deem necessary to its own national security.
>
> I feel confident that we can achieve the desirable end of assuring our own security through the process of trusteeship and at the same time retain a moral position of very real benefit toward the solution of a number of other vital territorial problems.[92]

The fact that the question and the resultant comments were published in a mass-circulation magazine is indicative of the public interest at that time concerning this issue. Representative Hebert's comment reflects the fact that the Admirals had gone to the public for support. In fact, the question of the disposition of the mandated islands had never really been this much in the public eye until after April 5, 1945, when Admiral King made his statement. The question had definitely never been so well defined for the public as it was at this time.

It appears that most Americans at this time were in favor of retaining control over the islands. The public debate was generally limited to the question of whether to annex the islands or to administer them under some form of trusteeship agreement. The division of opinion was not over whether or not the United States should control the islands but over the

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92. Ibid., May 11, 1945, p. 32.

legal form of control, i.e., trusteeship or annexation. There were many public statements by various supporters of the two points of view during the spring and summer of 1945. The annexationists appeared to be the most vocal side at this point in time.

* * *

Secretary of State Stettinius, whether for diplomatic reasons at the San Francisco Conference or for domestic, political reasons, felt the need to state publicly on May 28, 1945, that the United Nations Charter sufficiently safeguarded American security interests in the Pacific.[93] He also felt the need for a formal military endorsement of the Charter for insurance purposes and for use in the Senate Hearings on the Charter.[94] The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their endorsement on June 23, 1945, stating they were "of the opinion that the military and strategic implications of this draft charter are as a whole in accord with the military interests of the United States."[95] The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy gave their concurrence to this statement.[96] This statement was not a change of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that American

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93. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 310 (June 3, 1945), Secretary of State speech of May 28, 1945.

94. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, p. 1355. Minutes of 76th meeting of the U. S. Delegation, June 19, 1945.

95. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 1430-1431. Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, June 26, 1945.

96. Ibid.

control of the mandated islands by sovereignty was considered by them as the only sure way of guaranteeing American strategic rights. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to continue until late October 1946 their unsuccessful fight against the application of the strategic trusteeship system to those islands.

During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Charter (July 9-13, 1945), Secretary of State Stettinius testified that the War and Navy Departments had stated that the military and strategic implications of the Charter were, as a whole, in accord with the military interests of the United States. He then continued by saying:

> No commitment is made to place any particular area, strategic or nonstrategic, under the trusteeship system. The Charter thus leaves for future determination to what extent and under what terms islands in the Pacific which are taken from Japan at the end of the present war are to be placed under the trusteeship system. Any agreement into which the United States might enter to this end would have to be on terms satisfactory to us.[97]

Following Stettinius, Dr. Pasvolsky gave his testimony. When he started to mention the trusteeship system, the Chairman, Senator Tom Connally, inserted into the record letters to him from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Stimson's letter, dated July 6, 1945, merely repeated the quote above of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Forrestal's letter, dated July 9, 1945, stated the Joint Chiefs of Staff's quoted position, attributed it to them, and endorsed it. However, Forrestal's letter then went on to express his concern

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97. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, p. 221.

about the trusteeship system as follows:

> A further specific comment concerning the Charter, which I believe to be of sufficient importance to warrant calling it to your attention, has to do with the chapter on the trusteeship system. This chapter has been a matter of particular concern to the Navy because of our recognition of the fact that undivided control of certain strategic areas in the Pacific wrested from the Japanese by our armed forces in this war, is essential to the security of this country. Our agreement that this Charter is in accord with the military interests of this country is conditioned by our understanding that the United States is not committed by this charter or any provision thereof to place under trusteeship any territory of any character, and that if this country hereafter determines to place any territory under trusteeship this will be done only on such terms as it may then voluntarily agree to.[98]

After some Senatorial comments about the meaning of the term "as a whole" as used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries, the discussion returned to the subject of the trusteeship system. Senator Connally, who had been on the American Delegation at San Francisco, then stated, "in short, it was our attitude that if we are in possession of an island which we have conquered from Japan at the cost of blood and treasure we can remain in possession of it, if it is within the strategic area, until we consent to have it go under trusteeship; and when we do agree that it go under the trusteeship, we have the right to stipulate the terms upon which it will go there."[99]

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98. Ibid., p. 314.

99. Ibid., p. 315.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not testify at the hearings; therefore, their position on the trusteeship system was not advanced before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Stettinius testified that the Charter had been drafted with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments. Secretary Forrestal's letter put forward the Joint Chiefs of Staff's general endorsement of the Charter as a whole. However, there was no specific comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the trusteeship system.

Enroute to the Potsdam Conference, President Truman made a public statement on July 20, 1945, that dismayed the annexationists. The President stated, "we are not fighting for conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of monetary value that we want out of this war."[100]

The official Potsdam Declaration did not clarify the situation, merely reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration's terms that Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands and "such minor islands as we determine."[101]

President Truman must have thoroughly confused the issue when he stated during a broadcast, August 9, 1945, in his report on the Potsdam Conference:

> ... though the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace.

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100. Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (3 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol. 2, p. 69.

101. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 318 (July 29, 1945), Potsdam Declaration, p. 137.

> Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.[102]

It is possible that Forrestal and Stimson did after all take their letter and statement of policy (dated April 13, 1945, see above) to the President, and this was the result? This, however, is pure speculation since no evidence has been located concerning the background of this particular statement. President Truman had now been in office for four months and presumably had become completely knowledgeable of the controversy over the disposition of the former mandated islands.

The August 9, 1945, statement, of course, raised many questions. Were the mandated islands considered already in American possession? Or were they to be "acquired" by arrangements "consistent with the United Nations Charter?" What did the President mean by that phrase? That the United States would refrain from the use of force in acquiring bases? This could be a logical interpretation to avoid worrying the current possessors of bases that the United States wanted. It was openly known that the United States was pressuring Australia for cession of a base on Manus island, as well as desiring other bases around the world.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, originally under President Roosevelt's direction and later under the direction of President Truman, had drafted postwar, world-wide base requirements.

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102. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 320 (August 12, 1945), President's broadcast August 9, 1945, p. 208.

These base requirements were continually being modified, and the State Department was currently conducting diplomatic negotiations for their acquisition.

President Truman's August 9, 1945, statement was interpreted by those advocating the inclusion of the former mandated islands within the trusteeship system as implying that the United States would acquire the military bases consistent with the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter. This interpretation was vastly different than the interpretation which focused on the prohibition on the use of force.

When the war ended on September 2, 1945, with Japan accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration by the instrument of surrender, the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands was still far from settled.

In its proper manifestation the jealousy between civil and military spirits is a healthy symptom.

Mahan: Naval Administration and Warfare, 1903

A more egregious error never took possession of the mind of an American than the notion that a military officer should take no part in political affairs.... If a military officer feels no interest in the important political struggles of the day ... he acknowledges himself at once to be a mere machine ... a hireling.

"Alcibiades," in Army & Navy Chronicle, 1836

The Party commands the gun; the gun will never command the Party.

Mao Tse-tung

There are some militarists who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 1937

CHAPTER THREE

POSTWAR INTER-DEPARTMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE DECISION OF STRATEGIC TRUSTEESHIP FOR THE MANDATED ISLANDS

As stated earlier, the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had conducted many studies at the President's direction on the probable postwar base requirements. The military, for the purposes of these studies, defined the term "post-war" as "the period following cessation of organized resistance by Germany and Japan, and preceding effective implimentation of international security organization."[1] It is interesting to note that by this definition the world is still in the "post-war" period.

On January 7, 1944, the President had forwarded to the Secretary of State the Joint Chiefs of Staff's study on post-war island air bases which the Joint Chiefs considered necessary for the postwar period. The State Department was requested to initiate negotiations with the various governments concerned to acquire permanent or long-term benefit of the bases.[2] On February 1, 1944, the President again wrote the Secretary of State referring to the letter mentioned above and supplementing the letter by broadening the scope of postwar bases to include all military bases instead of air bases alone. These

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1. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, CominCh-CincPac conference minutes, March 5-6, 1945, Declassified, 1970, King papers.

2. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SECNAV letter to SECSTATE, October 4, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 38 files.

studies listed the proposed postwar bases in terms of various categories according to the degree of American control desired. One category was for those bases for which base-rights agreements were desired with the host governments. Those bases would be administered directly by the United States, jointly administered, or administered by the host country with American usage privileges.

Another category was entitled: "exclusive rights are desired." The exclusive rights would presumably be obtained by annexation, strategic trusteeship, or through some form of agreement with the host country (such as the Panama Canal Zone or Guantanamo Bay). The methods of obtaining "exclusive rights" were not delineated in these studies. The former mandated islands were included within this "exclusive rights" category. Additionally, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Bonin-Volcano Group (Iwo Jima), and Marcus Island (administered by Australia) were included within the "exclusive rights" category.

Within the islands under the "exclusive rights" category, naval bases were planned at Majuro, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Truk, the Palaus, Ulithi-Yap (all within the former Japanese mandated islands), the Iwo Jima area, and on Marcus Island.[3]

On July 7, 1945, the Secretary of State wrote to the Secretaries of War and Navy suggesting a new over-all examination of United States requirements for military and base rights outside the continental limits of the United States.[4]

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3. Ibid.

4. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWN-3475 dated November 7, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 38 files.

The Navy had just completed a reevaluation of its requirements, for it was aware of the probable postwar budget restrictions. Secretary Forrestal had approved the resulting "Basic Post-War Plan No. L" dated May 2, 1945, for planning purposes.[5] This plan stated that all of the former Japanese mandated islands, plus Marcus Island, the Ryukyus, and the Bonin-Volcano Islands, "should be wholly under United States control for strategic reasons, but the establishment of facilities is necessary only at key points as indicated below...."[6] Under this plan, most of the bases in the former mandated islands would be in "reduced or maintenance status" or in "caretaker status - available for emergencies only."

This plan demonstrates that the Navy Department planners saw the strategic value of the former mandated islands not only in the positive sense, i.e., the presence of active status bases, but also in the negative sense, i.e., the denying of the entire area of the islands to any other power. When budget limitations dictated, the status of the bases envisaged within the former mandated islands was downgraded to either the reduced or the caretaker levels of maintenance. The strategic value of the islands was still recognized, even though very few active bases would be maintained within the area.

Also, of interest is the fact that the methods of obtaining "exclusive rights" were mentioned in this plan. The former

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5. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Navy CNO OP-50D letter dated May 7, 1945, Subject: Basic Post-War Plan No. L, Declassified, 1970, (SC) A16-3/EN, King papers.

6. Ibid.

Japanese mandated islands, Marcus Island, the Ryukyus, and the Bonin-Volcano Islands were placed within the category of those areas "where the United States may reasonably expect to secure exclusive military rights either through trusteeship or through some other form of negotiated agreements."[7]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still agitating for full sovereignty, i.e., annexation, over the former mandated islands. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan, they presumably felt that full sovereignty could be achieved by means of "some other form of negotiated agreements." The peace treaties, for example, could be utilized to legitimize American annexation of the former mandated islands.

In contrast to the controversy over the former mandated islands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments were favoring the placing of the Ryukyus and the Bonin-Volcano Islands within the strategic trusteeship system. At no time was annexation of the Ryukyus or the Bonin-Volcano Islands seriously considered.

The question of the postwar base structure in the Pacific and the acquisition of the Japanese mandated islands, in particular, was also the subject of interest and study on the part of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. In January 1945, the Committee constituted a subcommittee to study this matter. This subcommittee was headed by Representative Ed. V. Izac of California. The subcommittee toured the Pacific islands in July and August of 1945 and reported its

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7. Ibid.

findings and recommendations on August 6, 1945. The report stated that the United States "should take outright the Japanese mandated islands and the outlying Japanese islands. There are those who favor trusteeship of these islands. There are those who subscribe to the thesis that what is everybody 's job is nobody's responsibility. Regardless of which view prevails, the United States should have the dominating control over these islands."[8]

In justification of this recommendation, the Subcommittee report cited the heavy loss of American life in capturing the islands and the following considerations:

> We will have restored peace to the Pacific almost single-handedly and if we are to be charged with the responsibility of maintaining that peace, we must be given the authority and the means by which to maintain the peace - one of the principal means being the authority over strategic islands in the Pacific. Nor must the fact be overlooked that our retention of these islands will be predicated solely upon the desire and responsibility to maintain peace in the Pacific, rather than upon imperialism. Prewar mandates mean little to enforcement of world peace if the countries that hold them are incapable of maintaining and defending the islands.[9]

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Meanwhile, the Navy had been developing various plans for the civil government of the former Japanese mandated islands.

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8. U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of Pacific Bases, 79th Cong., 1st sess., First report, dated August 6, 1945, p. 1014. See also: The Washington Post, August 19, 1945.

9. Ibid.

The initiation of this work was mentioned earlier. Substantive progress had started in March 1945; and during the succeeding six months, many different draft plans were prepared.

The first plan (April 28, 1945) proposed a civilian administration within the Navy Department divorced from the naval establishments in the Pacific and responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy.[10]

The second plan (June 14, 1945) presented four alternative forms of government for the mandated islands. These forms were: (1) of the Guam-Samoa pattern, (2) of the military government pattern, (3) by a civilian organization in the Navy Department, and (4) of a mixed military-civilian nature. The study recommended that the last alternative be approved. However, Admiral King approved the first alternative and directed that a comprehensive plan be developed on that pattern.[11] This new plan was submitted on August 15, 1945, and modified on August 28, 1945. A final draft, dated September 17, 1945, provided for a government patterned after prewar Guam.

The major policy problems that necessitated the many changes in the Navy draft plans were the question of the extent to which civilians would be used in administrative capacities and the question concerning the areas to be under naval jurisdiction after the war.[12]

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10. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, OP 22 Office History, April 10 to December 1, 1945, Declassified, 1970, MIL-GOVTBRANCH CNO JOB 60-A-2109, Box #35.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

On the first question, Secretary Forrestal insisted that, for political and public relations reasons, the civil government be divorced from the local military command structure.[13] Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, objected to the removal of the civil government from the chain of military command but, otherwise, approved the final draft plan.[14]

This question of the degree of civilian participation and the civil government's relation to the military chain of command was an internal Navy Department debate. Secretary Forrestal showed acute sensitivity to the public opinion and political factors involved in this matter by his insisting that the civil government be divorced from the local military command structure.

The second question, concerning the areas to be under naval jurisdiction after the war, developed into an interdepartmental controversy. During the fall of 1945, the controversy concerning which governmental agency would have responsibility for the postwar civil administration (as distinct from the temporary military government assumed by the Navy as each island was conquered) matured into a head-on clash among the Navy, War, and Interior Departments.

The Navy got the first jump on this question when Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards drafted a letter from Secretary Forrestal to the President requesting consent to naval administration of the Marianas. This consent was given by President Truman on

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13. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Francis X. Downey, SECNAV Office, Memorandum to Major Correa, October 18, 1945, Declassified, 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A17-10.

14. Ibid.

August 14, 1945, without consulting any of the other departments.[15] The Navy's letter also suggested that "consideration be given to placing under naval government all islands taken from the Japanese."[16]

The Army heard of this authorization; and for the first time in this entire issue, the Navy and the Army split on their interests. The Army wanted to administer Okinawa as well as the following islands within the former Japanese mandate: Saipan, Tinian, and Kwajalein. The Army also wanted to administer Midway and Wake.[17] The Army had been taken by surprise by the President's sudden granting of the Navy's request to administer the Mariana Islands (which included Saipan and Tinian).

Indeed, even the Navy was surprised at the President's action. Only one day after the President had received the request, it had come back marked "approved" over the President's signature.

Drew Pearson later wrote a column which made public most of what happened in this matter between August and October 1945.[18] His column is very detailed and, as for the points

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15. Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (3 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol. 2, pp. 70-71.

16. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary Stimson memorandum to the President, September 10, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 191/D files.

17. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Note by Admiral Edwards on memorandum from M. B. Gardner to Admiral King, November 15, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.

18. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," The Washington Post, October 15, 1945.

that can be verified, very accurate. Obviously, a source within one of the agencies had leaked the information to him. Among the unsupported facts, Pearson claimed that President Truman's Naval Aide, Rear Admiral James Vardaman, had helped to "grease the ways" in obtaining the President's approval, which came as a surprise to the Navy. Another unverified fact included in the column was the statement that the Army and Army Air Corps considered the Marianas as vital to long-range bomber operations and did not want to be "hamstrung" by naval administration.[19]

In an attempt to retrieve the situation, Assistant Secretary McCloy drafted a memorandum which Secretary Stimson sent to the President on September 10, 1945. It referred to the President's approval of the naval administration of the Marianas and the suggestion that consideration be given to placing the other ex-Japanese islands under naval government. Then, the memorandum requested the President to consider that decision as granting "interim authority" pending inter-departmental study and recommendations. The memorandum continued:

> The question of military bases in the Pacific is a matter of vital interest to both the War and Navy Departments, and the subject of continuing studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Only by an integrated system of mutually supporting bases for land, sea, and air forces can military security and control be achieved. The type of government to be established over those Pacific islands, such as the Marianas and Okinawa, which are key areas in our national security program, is an important consideration in the establishment of an

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19. Ibid.

> integrated system of land, sea and air bases, and concerns both the War and Navy Departments as well as other departments of the Government.
>
> It is therefore recommended that your approval of the recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy on this matter be regarded as an interim authority, and that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy be directed to study and submit joint recommendations on the type of government to be established on the various Pacific islands.[20]

Surprisingly, the President also marked this memorandum "approved" the day after it reached the White House. As Pearson reported, "it was obvious to them [the Army] that the new President believed in speed, not consultation."[21] Perhaps the President had confidence in these Cabinet members and assumed all was well and all necessary coordination had been made.

Assistant Secretary McCloy submitted the President's action on Secretary Stimson's memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) on September 19, 1945, and recommended that the SWNCC Subcommittee for the Far East be charged with preparing the study.[22]

These actions by the War Department disturbed the Navy in no uncertain terms. Drew Pearson's column, in another unverified statement, reported that Secretary Forrestal quickly sent a memorandum to President Truman on September 11 (the same day

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20. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary Stimson memorandum to the President, September 10, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 191/D files.

21. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," The Washington Post, October 15, 1945.

22. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 191/D, September 19, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 191 files.

the President had approved the Army's request) asking whether he had approved a "permanent" policy of putting the islands under naval administration or a mere "interim" policy pending joint study and recommendation. This memorandum, according to the Pearson column, immediately came back marked "approved as an interim proposition pending the findings of the State-War-Navy Departments."[23]

At the same time, Admiral Edwards sent the Navy's civil-government plan to Admiral Nimitz for his comment. Admiral Edwards made one major concession in this plan by eliminating Okinawa from the islands to be administered by the Navy on the ground that it had too large a civilian population for a naval government. This was a concession to the Army.[24]

Additionally, the Pearson column stated that Under Secretary of the Navy Artemus L. Gates called McCloy and suggested that "it would be better if the Army and Navy worked things out between themselves without consulting the State Department. Then, they could surprise the other Government agencies with an accomplished fact which couldn't be upset."[25] This, of course, is unsubstantiated; but it is supported to some extent by the fact that on September 24, 1945, only five days

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23. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," The Washington Post, October 15, 1945.

24. In July 1946, the Navy transferred control of the civil administration of the Ryukyus, including Okinawa, to the Army. The Army is still administering the Ryukyus. These islands are scheduled to be returned to Japan in 1972.

25. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," The Washington Post, October 15, 1945.

after McCloy had submitted the Army's request to SWNCC, the Army requested that it be withdrawn from consideration by the subcommittee.[26] No reason was officially given for this request, but it was withdrawn from the SWNCC agenda.

The reason for this request might not have been from any Machiavellian Army-Navy deal but from the actions of the Interior Department. As stated previously, the Interior Department had commenced its own studies about the same time as the Navy, December of 1944. Mr. Jack B. Fahy's hostile study of naval administration was updated in April 1945 in order to prepare a case against naval administration over any Pacific islands.[27]

This increased concern was partly as a result of Representative Cole's introducing a bill in the House in January 1945 "to transfer all activities in regard to the territories and possessions to the Navy Department."[28] It was also a reaction to the appointment by the House Naval Affairs Committee of a subcommittee to study the Pacific islands (the Izac Subcommittee).[29] Mr. Fahy was determined to have Interior

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26. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 191/1, September 24, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC 191 files.

27. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Military Government of United States Territories and Island Possessions, by Jack B. Fahy, April 1945, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands-Pacific-Gen-Pt 1.

28. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, B. W. Thoron, Director, to Mr. Jack B. Fahy, January 8, 1945, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands-Pacific-Gen-Pt 1.

29. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, B. W. Thoron to Abe Fortas, January 23, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-1 Admin. Gen. Pt 2.

"become strongly associated, inside and outside the government, in people's minds as the agency that actually spark-plugs the administration of colonial matters."[30]

Interior had no idea that the Navy Department had received President Truman's approval to their request for naval administration of the Marianas on August 14, 1945. On August 23, 1945, Edwin G. Arnold, the Director of Interior's Division of Territories and Island Possessions, sent a memorandum to Interior's Under Secretary Abe Fortas. In it, he mentioned the report (described above) of the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the House Naval Affairs Committee (the Izac Subcommittee) and requested a discussion of the entire problem with Mr. Fortas and Eric Beecroft (Arnold's Special Assistant) in order to determine the course Interior should take in inter-department discussions and the preparation of any specific proposals.[31] This discussion within Interior was held within the week.

Drew Pearson's column, in yet another unverified statement, reported that Acting Secretary Fortas went to the Pentagon for a conference with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Sullivan and several admirals. Mr. Fortas outlined the Interior Department's views of how to handle the Pacific islands and proposed that the Navy and the Interior Departments set up a joint committee to study the subject. The Pearson column stated that

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30. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Jack B. Fahy to B. W. Thoron, January 16, 1945, RG 126, 9-0-48 Islands - Pacific Gen. Pt 1.

31. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Edwin G. Arnold to Abe Fortas, August 23, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands - Gen. Pt 2.

"Sullivan and the admirals listened politely and with poker faces. They knew Truman had OK'd their memo making the Navy supreme over Pacific islands, but they never uttered a peep. Fortas left knowing nothing."[32]

Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, sent a two-page letter to the President on September 12, 1945, concerning civil administration of any areas that might be placed under the supervision of the United States. This was the day after the Army had received the President's approval for "interim" naval administration of the Marianas and joint State-War-Navy study of the question. Ickes' letter does not refer to any of the recent decisions by the President. It presents an argument for civilians administering inhabited areas adjacent to strategic bases without handicapping the activities of the defense services. The main points of the letter were as follows:

> It would be in keeping with the traditions of the American people to devise suitable forms of civil administration, under civilian personnel, for the peace-time government of new overseas territories, with adequate provision being made to protect the security interests of the United States and to enable this Nation to assist effectively in maintaining the conditions of permanent peace.
>
> Although I recognize that it will be some time before decisions can be made concerning either the disposition or the administrations of Pacific territories, I have asked the Division of Territories and Island Possessions to make a general study of the problems of the Pacific Islands and to be ready to undertake a more detailed preparation

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32. Drew Pearson, column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," The Washington Post, October 15, 1945.

> of plans. We ought to draw fully upon expert opinion and upon the practical experience gained by the Department of Interior which has long been the chief Federal agency responsible for the well-being of indigenous peoples in the territories....
>
> To be prepared adequately for the conduct of civil affairs, I believe that you will wish the work of planning to begin at once, without awaiting decisions either as to the time required to complete the tasks of military government or as to the particular geographic areas to be administered by the United States.
>
> With your approval, I shall ask the Division of Territories and Island Possessions to draft a detailed report for submission to you as soon as possible. In the preparation of such a report, dealing with the conduct of civil affairs in new territories, I assume that the Departments of State, War, and Navy would be consulted regarding any plans or programs which they may have developed.[33]

This letter is a remarkable indication of the lack of any coordination among the agencies concerning the postwar civil administration of new territories. It also appears that the Interior Department was now six months behind the Navy in developing plans for the civil government of the former Japanese mandated islands. Interior evidently had no knowledge of President Truman's decisions of August 14 and September 11. The files of the Interior Department documents indicate that this letter was not a cynical attempt by Interior to "muscle in" based on foreknowledge of the recent actions of the Navy, Army, and the President. The letter was based on an internal

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33. Harry S. Truman Library, Ickes to the President, September 12, 1945, Official file, 85-L. See: Appendix I for a copy of this letter.

memorandum from Edwin G. Arnold to Secretary Ickes dated two days previously, September 10, 1945.[34] There is no mention by Mr. Arnold either of the Army-Navy dealings on the subject, or of the President's recent decisions. The Interior Department was obviously "out of the picture" in regard to recent events concerning plans for the civil administration of the former mandated islands.

The President evidently replied to Ickes' letter on the next day, September 13, 1945, in a vague, general manner concerning the conduct of civil affairs in Pacific areas. No copy of the President's letter has been located, but it is referred to in Secretary Ickes' next letter to the President. It is evident that the President's reply did not alert Interior to his recent decisions concerning the civil administration of the Pacific islands.

The military's actions could not be kept secret forever, especially after John C. McCloy submitted the problem to SWNCC. Word was bound to leak to Interior. About September 24, 1945, the day the War Department requested that the problem be removed from the SWNCC agenda, the Interior Department found out about the President's actions.

The Interior Department reacted quickly. Abe Fortas, Acting Secretary during Secretary Ickes' absence in London, signed a letter addressed to the President on September 28, 1945, and sent it to the White House at once by special

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34. U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Memorandum to the Secretary from Edwin G. Arnold, September 10, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt 2. See: Appendix H for a copy of this memorandum.

messenger. In this letter, Mr. Fortas mentioned that, since Mr. Ickes' letter of the 12th and the President's reply of the next day, he had been informed that the President had referred the subject of the civil administration of the Pacific islands to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.[35] Mr. Fortas then stated he was sure that it was the President's intention to include the Interior Department in the discussions. The letter concluded with the following, "I hope that you will advise the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and Secretary Ickes that you wish the Interior Department to participate in the discussion of this problem."[36]

Prior to this concluding request, Mr. Fortas set forth Interior's basic argument for civilian administration of overseas dependent areas:

> By maintaining naval administration of Samoa and Guam, the United States has had the dubious distinction of being the only Pacific power which governs an inhabited colonial area as a mere appurtenance of a military base. This is not, I believe, a distinction which the American people will justify at a time when enlightened opinion, at home and abroad, demands expert attention to the progress of dependent peoples.
>
> I recognize the vital interests of the Department of State and the defense services in determining policies and methods of administration in all areas having strategic importance in international affairs.... If we commit

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35. Harry S. Truman Library, Abe Fortas to the President, September 28, 1945, Official file, 85-L. See: Appendix J for a copy of this letter.

36. Ibid.

> ourselves to the principle of civil government, we strengthen the already strong case we have for retention and control of strategic bases.
>
> The Department of the Interior would like to assist in assuring expert civil government with a view to the ultimate attainment of democratic institutions and economic stability in dependent areas.[37]

This letter is further substantiation of the conclusion that Interior was completely unaware of the state of affairs concerning this problem when Ickes sent his letter to the President on September 12, 1945. Abe Fortas did not have to fear Ickes' disapproval of this initiative since Ickes had signed the letter of September 12, 1945, and since Ickes' opinion of naval administration was well known.[38]

The President, however, deferred action on the letter; and Secretary Ickes wrote a letter on October 18 to remind the President of Fortas' letter and to "offer the suggestion that a joint expert group representing the four Departments visit the Pacific islands for the purpose of preparing for you a detailed plan for interim administration, pending decisions and agreements concerning future disposition and administration of the islands."[39] President Truman then took action and sent a memorandum to the four Secretaries (State, War, Navy, Interior) on October 20, 1945, appointing them as a committee to study "the problems arising from the

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37. Ibid.

38. See: Harold L. Ickes, "The Navy at Its Worst," Collier's, Vol. 118 (August 31, 1956), pp. 22-23, 67 and below pp. 193-194 for examples of his attitude toward the Navy.

39. Harry S. Truman Library, Ickes to President, October 18, 1945, Official file, 85-L. See: Appendix K for a copy of this letter.

Administration of the Pacific Islands. This should be done without delay and we should outline a policy which is satisfactory to all four Departments."[40]

Following the appointment of this Cabinet Committee, representatives of the four Secretaries met on October 25, 1945, in the office of Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.[41]

The War Department representative, Mr. Lovett, proposed a subcommittee be appointed to consider the problems involved in the administration of the Pacific islands. He also recommended that this subcommittee "determine formally what real estate we will assert title to" in the Pacific after ascertaining what areas have been selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use as military bases.[42] He further recommended that a group representing the four Departments be sent by the subcommittee to the Pacific to study the problems at first hand.

While the group agreed to establish a subcommittee and to send a study group to the Pacific, it disagreed over the

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40. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, President to SECSTATE, SECWAR, SECNAV, and SECINT, dated October 20, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt 2.

41. Those present were Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, for Mr. Dunn; Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War, for Mr. McCloy (who normally represented the War Department on SWNCC); Mr. Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Mr. Michael W. Straus, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, for Mr. Fortas; and several others.

42. U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Minutes of October 25, 1945, meeting, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt 2.

suggestion concerning the determination of areas over which title should be asserted. The State and Interior representatives felt that this determination was not within the terms of reference of the President's charge to the Committee.

Of interest in regard to the increasingly assertive role that the agencies were beginning to play vis-a-vis the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the group's agreement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's opinion concerning essential base requirements would be useful to the subcommittee but would not define or limit the work of the subcommittee.

Differences arose regarding islands covered by the President's instruction. For example, Mr. Gates of the Navy Department proposed that the Marianas should be exempt from the scope of the Committee's study since their administration had already been given to the Navy by the President. The account of the meeting, written by Jack B. Fahy of Interior, does not specify whether the War Department representative supported Mr. Gates on this proposal. It does mention that both Mr. Gates and Mr. Lovett made reference to the interim jurisdiction over certain islands already given to the Navy Department by the President. It would be interesting to know whether or not the Army and the Navy were presenting a common position on the Marianas. If they were taking a common position on this matter, it might have reflected an attempt to make a separate deal between themselves. The suggestion that a possible separate Army-Navy deal had, as mentioned above, been raised in the Pearson column published only ten days prior to this meeting.

Mr. Fahy's account of the meeting stated that there was

no objection to the Interior Department's representative stating at the close of the discussion concerning the scope of the Committee's study that he interpreted the President's letter to mean that the Committee was to consider in its discretion any problems arising from the administration of the Pacific islands "regardless of present arrangements."[43] Of course, Mr. Fahy's account may be biased in its report that there was no objection to that statement.

Organizationally, Mr. Lovett suggested that the subcommittee be regarded as a subcommittee of SWNCC with Interior also represented on the subcommittee. He stated that this arrangement would provide the subcommittee with the assistance and facilities of SWNCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Straus of Interior objected to this proposal and obtained the agreement that the proposed subcommittee would be under the Committee of the Four Secretaries (sometimes referred to as the Quadripartite Committee) appointed by the President's memorandum of October 20.[44] Mr. Straus evidently did not feel that the Interior Department would be on an equal footing with the other departments within the SWNCC context.

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43. Ibid.

44. The subcommittee members were the following: Edwin G. Arnold representing Interior, with Jack B. Fahy and Eric Beecroft as his alternates; Fred Searls, Jr. representing State, with John D. Hickerson as his alternate; and, probably, McCloy and Gates representing War and Navy Departments respectively; although, these representatives were never listed. The subcommittee did not meet until January 30, 1946.

The State, War, and Navy Departments had not been consulted by the President prior to his appointment of the Committee of the Four Secretaries on October 20. In fact, none of these departments welcomed the appointment of the Cabinet Committee to study the problem of civil administration of the various Pacific islands.

The Presidential memorandum of October 20, 1945, was the first official connection of the State Department with the question of which agency should administer the former Japanese mandated islands. The State Department was engaged in negotiations with various foreign governments for base rights in the Pacific and had no desire to become embroiled in a new controversy at a sensitive time.

The War and Navy Departments would obviously have preferred that Interior, as well as State, remained out of the discussions over which agency should administer various Pacific islands. The Interior Department's claim to a legitimate interest in such discussions was recognized by the President's memorandum. The Army and the Navy would have preferred to keep the competition for the administration of the former mandated islands restricted solely to themselves. Now, a new competitor was on the scene.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were being left out of this debate over the civil administration of the Pacific islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were conspicuously absent from the President's appointed committee and its subcommittee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still insisting on exclusive American strategic control over the former Japanese mandated islands.

This position was reaffirmed on November 7, 1945, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's detailed answer to the State Department's request for an overall examination of postwar overseas base and base-rights requirements.[45]

Mr. Eric Beecroft, of the Interior Department's Division of Territories, attempted to have a meeting called of the inter-departmental subcommittee but was rebuffed by the State Department. After several attempts to get someone in the State Department to take action, he met with Mr. Searls of the State Department on November 13, 1945. Beecroft summarized the discussion in the following memorandum for the Interior files:

> he [Searls] said he was firmly convinced that, while delicate discussions concerning the islands [many islands such as Manus, Marcus, and Okinawa were concerned, not just the mandated ones] were in progress, all talk about the handling of civil affairs should be deferred. Too open a discussion of civil affairs would be a disturbing influence on current conversations looking toward acquisition of such areas. If inter-departmental meetings were held, the talk about the islands would reach too wide a circle.
>
> I said I understood the delicacy of the subject from the State Department's viewpoint and that I was sure that every other Department of the Government would want to assist in simplifying the task; but I wondered, I said, whether the degree of difficulty or delicacy in international discussion would not depend on the kind of civil affairs program proposed by the United States. Mr. Searls said he believed it

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45. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Over-all Examination of U. S. Requirements For Military Bases and Rights, SWN-3475, November 7, 1945, Declassified, 1970, SWNCC files.

> was always better ' to catch the rabbit first.'[46]

Mr. Beecroft's memorandum for the files did not have any security classification assigned to it and was, therefore, an unclassified document. One wonders at his understanding of the delicacy of the subject, especially since he had desired to discuss the matter with Searls over the telephone before Searls told him to come to the State Department for a personal meeting if he desired to know Searls' viewpoint. All the State and military documents for this matter were either TOP SECRET or SECRET, whereas all of the Interior documents for this period of time were classified either CONFIDENTIAL or UNCLASSIFIED.

Mr. Beecroft was very disturbed by Mr. Searls' comments. His account of the meeting indicated that the conversation was very strained. For example, his memorandum of the conversation stated:

> Mr. Searls said he would be glad if I would give his views to Mr. Straus and others concerned in the Interior Department. I said I would do so. He added pointedly that I should not assume these to be only his personal views.
>
> I then drew Mr. Searls' attention to the wording of the President's memorandum of October 20, which called for action 'without delay' and for an outline of policy 'satisfactory to all four Departments.' Mr. Searls' comment on this was: 'I think you can assume that the Secretary has read that letter.'
>
> I did not feel that I should remain with Mr. Searls at this time to debate whether the Secretary of State could overrule the President. I therefore repeated

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46. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, memorandum by Eric Beecroft, November 15, 1945, RG 126, Islands, Pacific Gen. Pt 1.

> that I would convey his views to my Department. The remainder of our conversation, as I was leaving, related only to a mutual acquaintance.
>
> Later in the day, I called Mr. Searls' secretary and asked her for his title. She said she was sorry to say that Mr. Searls had no title. In reply to a further question as to whether he was attached to the Office of the Secretary of the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Mr. Dunn), she said she thought he was 'a little closer to the Office of the Secretary.' A later inquiry to the Information Office of the Department brought a similar answer, namely, that Mr. Searls had no title but was attached to the Secretary's office.[47]

Secretary Ickes, of course, was not happy with the course of events. On November 27, 1945, he fired off a short blast to James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State. He stated that the subcommittee had not yet met more than a month after the President had appointed the Four Secretaries' Committee. He ended by stating "in view of the plain words of the President's directive, I am sure that you will agree that we cannot defer action on this matter any longer. Would you ask the Department of State's representative on the subcommittee to summon a meeting of the group in order that work can begin at once on the recommendation required by the President?"[48]

Secretary Ickes was so anxious for this work to be accomplished that he was the only one of the four Secretaries to request money ($19,800) from the President's Emergency Fund

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47. Ibid.

48. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Byrnes, November 27, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt 2.

for his "participation in the Committee established by the President."[49] This sum had been arrived at by a detailed breakdown of probable expenses for the study trip to the Pacific. Perhaps this was a way for Secretary Ickes to press his interest. The other Secretaries may have felt no need for special expenses or had not bothered to think about the matter in that much detail.

The high point of dissension between the State and Interior Departments came during December of 1945. Secretary Byrnes had replied to Ickes' letter on December 6, 1945, stating the same reasons for the delay that Searls had given Beecroft. He also stated that there had been yet no determination as to trusteeship, ownership, or exclusive rights in regard to several of the islands, including the former Japanese mandated islands. Secretary Byrnes put the icing on the relationship by sending a copy of this letter to the President.[50]

Secretary Ickes replied in kind by sending a long, critical letter back to Byrnes, while sending a copy to the President. It was drafted by Beecroft and approved up the line by Fahy and Fortas prior to being signed by Ickes on December 29, 1945. The last sentence stating that a copy was going to the President was typed separately on the carbon copy which would seem to indicate that it was a last minute addition, probably added

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49. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget, November 6, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen Pt 2.

50. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Byrnes to Ickes, December 6, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt 2.

by Secretary Ickes, himself. Some of the more important points in this letter are quoted below:

> As I understand the problems of administration in the Pacific islands, they are not, for the most part, hypothetical ones that might arise only in the event of certain international agreements, but immediate and interim problems of an administrative and economic character arising from our de facto control.... To await formal international decisions before providing orderly administrative arrangements would be to leave these arrangements to haphazard, day-to-day planning. I am sure that this Nation's interests would not be served by such a delay....
>
> With respect to all of the Central Pacific islands taken from Japan, about which I am mainly concerned, the actual governing responsibility has been assumed wholly by the United States for the time being. Even if we knew that these islands would later be assigned to another power, I assume that in the meantime the United States Government would be obliged to look after the welfare of their inhabitants....
>
> I am sure that, to accomplish these results (the assisting of the natives toward a better way of life), the American people will be overwhelmingly in favor of civil government. Not only is our own tradition decisively opposed to military rule, but even the old colonial powers have apparently outgrown it. The Japanese themselves maintained civil government in the mandated islands....
>
> I cannot understand why attention should be centered only on acquiring 'bases' when local human problems and our relations with the island peoples constitute an immediate and pressing responsibility of the United States Government. The President's memorandum of October 20 referred not to 'bases' but to 'islands.' That memorandum still stands, and, for the reasons that I have stated, I hold to the opinion that the sub-committee should go to work at once to prepare the required recommendations as directed by the President.
>
> I request that you have the subcommittee summoned to draft an interim report for submission to the President by the Committee of four Secretaries on or before February 1.

> Since a copy of your letter of December 6 was sent to the President, I am sending him a copy of this communication.[51]

Thus, it is clear that relations were extremely strained between the State and Interior Departments.

Meanwhile, the Navy was not wasting any time. It was engaged in a two-way fight--one between it and the Army and another one which was shaping up between the Navy and Interior but was being delayed by State's actions.

Secretary Forrestal orally directed the naval commander of Guam, Henry L. Larsen, to submit a report summarizing reasons for continuing the naval administration of the islands under American control in the Pacific.[52] The report, dated November 8, 1945, which was prepared by Larsen in response to this instruction, stated that the information was desired "promptly" by Secretary Forrestal, so promptly that the information had been "hastily and perhaps incompletely recorded."[53]

This report was forwarded via Rear Admiral G. D. Murray, Commander Marianas. Admiral Murray concurred with the opinions and recommendations contained in Larsen's report and added his own observations on why the former Japanese mandated islands should be administered by the Navy. He presented a concise exposition of the Navy's rational for administering the former

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51. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Byrnes, December 29, 1945, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt 2.

52. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Island Commander, Guam, to the Secretary of the Navy, November 8, 1945, ser. 007780, Declassified, June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.

53. Ibid.

mandated islands listing nine reasons.[54]

Separately, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, sent his comments on this matter to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 1, 1945, and November 12, 1945. Admiral Nimitz's letters emphasized the necessity for "unity of command" in the Western Pacific area regardless of which agency administered the former mandated islands. In his November 12, 1945, letter, Admiral Nimitz stated:

> It is the opinion of the Commander in Chief that the security of the Pacific Ocean Areas would not be jeopardized were the responsibility for civil administration transferred to a civilian agency such as the Department of the Interior, providing the authority of the military commander remains paramount within the boundaries of military areas and provided that the Area Commander is empowered in times of emergency, or threatened emergency, to take such steps as may be necessary to prevent espionage and acts of sabotage. The considerations which prompted the recommendation referred to in the foregoing paragraph [for the chain of governmental responsibility to be married to the chain of military command] are equally applicable to a civil administration under a civil agency. Such an administration should be common to the Bonin, Volcano, Mariana, Caroline and Marshall groups as well as to American Samoa. Any arrangement resulting in the parcelling out of responsibility for civil government among several departments of the Federal Government will militate against uniformity of policy and will retard the social and economic advancement of the native populations.[55]

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54. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Commander, Marianas, to the Secretary of the Navy, November 21, 1945, ser. 003059, Declassified, June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files. See: Appendix L for a copy of this letter.

55. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Admiral Nimitz to CNO, November 12, 1945, ser. 004485, Declassified, June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.

It, therefore, appears that Admiral Nimitz, who shortly thereafter relieved Admiral King as Chief of Naval Operations, was not that concerned as to which agency administered the former Japanese mandated islands as long as there was uniformity of policy and the authority of the military commander in the area was sufficient and clearly defined.

Meanwhile, the Navy and War Departments were holding joint discussions in an attempt to settle their differences in this matter. Mr. M. B. Gardner, of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, developed a plan for the consideration of the Army planners on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was dated November 14, 1945, and recommended that administration of all of the islands be uniform (under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas) in order to avoid increased overhead and undesirable duplication. The naval commander would delegate the actual administering of the islands to a Deputy Governor General on Guam who would deal directly with a joint agency similar to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee which would be a policy-making and advisory body under the War and Navy Departments. The Deputy Governor General would deal with this joint agency for matters of administration and civil government, while dealing with the naval commander in Pearl Harbor on matters concerning military operations.[56]

This plan got nowhere with the Army officers in the Joint

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56. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, draft agreement attached to a memorandum from M. B. Gardner to Admiral King, November 15, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.

Chiefs of Staff. They told Gardner that it was a matter for the War and Navy Departments rather than for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gardner reported to Admiral King that he believed that the real reason was "that the Army will not admit to any primacy of responsibility in the Pacific Ocean Areas on the part of the Navy. The Army Planners admitted that they wished control of Iwo, Saipan and Tinian, and would seek, further, military agreements as to the use of other stepping-stone islands, notably Midway, Wake and Kwajalein."[57] Admiral Edwards added the following hand-written note to the bottom of Gardner's report:

> Admiral Nimitz feels strongly that civil government in the Pacific should be administered entirely by one Department. He would prefer that the Navy undertake the task, but if the Navy can not have all islands except the Ryukyus (which is apparently what is impending) he thinks the Interior Department can handle the task satisfactorily.
>
> Since the matter is now deadlocked, I recommend that SecNav, in his next meeting with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State, propose that the Interior Dept take over as soon as the status of the former Jap islands is settled.[58]

When the report, with Admiral Edwards' attached note, reached Admiral King, he added a note dated November 18, 1945, telling one of his assistants, "Show Gardner's memo to SecNav - and recommend that we press that solution."[59] It is unclear

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57. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, M. B. Gardner to Admiral King, November 15, 1945, Declassified, June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

whether Admiral King referred to Gardner's draft agreement or to Admiral Edwards' recommendation.

Evidently, Gardner's suggestion was adopted as a basis for negotiations in light of a report dated January 9, 1946, by George A. Brownell, Brigadier General, U.S.A., and John L. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. This report refers to their having been informally appointed by the Secretaries of War and Navy to "consider and make recommendations with respect to the civil government of various Pacific islands."[60]

Their recommendations closely follow those of Gardner's draft agreement. They agreed that Guam, American Samoa, Bonins-Volcanoes, Marcus, and the former Japanese mandated islands should be under civil governments administered by the Army and the Navy. The islands listed above would come under the policy control of a joint Army-Navy civil government commission located in Washington. The local administration of civil government would be the responsibility of the local Army or Navy commanders. Brownell and Sullivan divided the islands on the basis of which service would have the initial local responsibility. Under this division, the Army would administer the Bonins-Volcanoes, Marcus, and Tinian. Tinian was one of the Marianas, part of the former Japanese mandate. The Navy would administer Guam, Rota (in the Marianas), the Marshalls, and the Carolines. The six-member Joint Army-Navy

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60. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Brownell-Sullivan memorandum for the Secretaries of War and Navy, January 6, 1946, Declassified 1970, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

Commission (three from each service with the Secretaries deciding on deadlocks or the President, if need be) would determine which service would administer the other islands and any future changes.

The two men reported disagreement over the island of Saipan (in the Marianas); each wanting his own service to be the initial administrator. They also recommended that the Ryukyus (with Okinawa) be administered by the Interior Department because of their large population.[61]

This report was initialed by Secretary Forrestal as approved; yet, evidently, nothing came of it. For some reason, the War Department after January 1946 ceased pressing its claim to administer any of the former Japanese mandated islands. Perhaps the Army, realizing the pressure coming from Interior in respect to the former mandated islands, decided to concentrate on obtaining the administration of the Ryukyus rather than press for Tinian and Saipan. All of these islands (Okinawa, Tinian, and Saipan) would make excellent long-range bomber bases. Strategically, any one of them would probably have been acceptable for this purpose.

The Army eventually administered the Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcanoes (with Iwo Jima and Marcus). It is interesting to note that none of the Interior Department papers even mention these two island groups. Interior's attention was focused, primarily, on the former mandated islands and, secondly, on Guam and American Samoa. The Army might have

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61. Ibid.

noticed this fact.

The main reason for Interior's lack of interest in the Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcanoes and the Army's success in obtaining the role of administrator (in contrast to the Navy's failure vis-a-vis Interior) is tied in with the American Government's policy that the Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcanoes were to be considered under the "residual sovereignty" of Japan with the presumption, therefore, that they would be eventually returned to Japan.[62] This, of course, was not the policy in regard to the former Japanese mandated islands.

* * *

At the same time that the Brownell-Sullivan report was being submitted, Secretary of State Byrnes wrote a letter to the President in an indirect reply to Ickes' bitter letter of December 29, 1945. He stated that he could not summon the subcommittee to draft a report for submission to the President on or before February 1, 1946, as Secretary of War Patterson was out of the country that week. He, himself, would be leaving for the United Nations Assembly meeting in London the next week. Byrnes continued, however, "I do not wish my absence to deny to Secretary Ickes his request for prompt action. If you agree that action must be had promptly, Under Secretary Acheson will call a meeting as soon as Secretary Patterson returns. Or, if you do not think this advisable,

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62. The Bonins-Volcanoes were returned to Japan in 1968, and the Ryukyus are to be returned in 1972.

you can withdraw my name from the committee and advise the other three Secretaries, War, Navy and Interior, to report to you."[63]

Secretary Byrnes then stated his own views to the effect that "under the position you [the President] took at Potsdam there can be no final settlement as to the disposition of enemy territory until there is a peace conference."[64] Secretary Byrnes continued with the following thoughts which would indicate he favored military administration of the former mandated islands:

> Whenever we have a peace conference and the state of the Pacific Islands is determined it would then be timely to determine the character of the occupation, whether military, civilian or whether it would be shared by military and civil authorities....
>
> In other words, my thoughts are (1) that if you desire to introduce civil administration prior to a peace conference during the period of military occupation, it should be done only after consultation with the Supreme Commander [MacArthur] and whatever Department is placed on the Island should report through the Supreme Commander; and (2) that as to the administration which will follow the decisions at a peace conference, consideration should be given to whether or not the Army and Navy, because of military installations on some islands, and because the population is not large, should be placed in charge, rather than to have two Departments operating where there are few people.
>
> For the reasons above given [sic] I do not see the necessity for immediate

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63. The Harry S. Truman Library, Secretary of State to the President, January 5, 1946, Official files 85-L.

64. Ibid.

> decision. However, the Secretary of the Interior is earnestly of the opinion that it is urgent. If the matter is not disposed of before my return, I shall be glad to discuss it with my colleagues. If, on the other hand, it is disposed of, whatever decision is reached will be entirely satisfactory to me.[65]

With this parting letter, Secretary Byrnes departed for London where he was once again confronted with the problem of the disposition of the former mandated islands.

Before turning to Byrnes' actions at the United Nations Assembly meeting in London, a word should be said about the President's Navy Day speech on October 27, 1945. In this speech, he repeated the pledge that the United States did not seek "one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power."[66]

Yet, this public statement could be read in different ways. The question whether or not the United States would submit the former Japanese mandated islands to an international trusteeship was still undecided within the Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still maintaining their view that the "islands should be under permanent and exclusive United States control."[67]

On December 1, 1945, the State Department transmitted to the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

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65. Ibid.

66. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Presidential speech quoted: Vol. 3, p. 8.

67. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 5.

their comment a document of 106 pages entitled, "Tentative Foreign Policy of the U. S." From the politico-military relations point of view, this was a far step from the days prior to the war when the State Department never officially informed the military as to foreign policy.

The first twenty-five pages of the document contained the fundamental points of foreign policy and were intended to be released to the public. On page seven there was the following:

> Military bases. Although the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we intend to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.[68]

This was exactly the same wording as the President's broadcast of August 9, 1945. Therefore, the President's October 27 speech did not reflect any change in policy in this matter.

Meanwhile, the question of what the United States intended to do with the former mandated islands remained alive in the public domain. The Soviet Union was also curious to know the American intentions. At the first meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow on December 16, 1945, Molotov asked Byrnes what the United States intended to do with the islands. Byrnes

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68. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Tentative Foreign Policy of the U. S., drafted by the State Department, December 1, 1945, Declassified 1970, Leahy papers.

told him that the Government's views had not yet been formulated, and the only agreements concerning Japanese islands in the Pacific were the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agreement regarding Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.[69] Thus, Byrnes kept his options open while gently reminding the Soviets that if the United States kept the mandated islands, the Soviet Union had nothing to complain about as they had Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. However, there were no indications of any Soviet objections to possible American annexation of the former mandated islands.

At this point, the "debacle" revolving around the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which opened in London on January 10, 1946, can be described. The confusion started on the ship enroute to the conference. Forrestal recites that Byrnes, at a cabinet meeting on January 29, told of his "difficulties with Senator Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles, who, spurred on by General Kenney [General George C. Kenney, U.S.A., Air Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee] during conversations on the way over on the boat, let the word leak out that there was dissatisfaction with the American policy and position on trusteeship.... Byrnes said that the fact had to be faced that Vandenberg's - and for that matter Dulles's - activities from now on could be viewed as being conducted on a political and partisan basis."[70] Just before the General Assembly session, General Kenney told newsmen

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69. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 218.

70. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 132.

at a press conference that the United States should annex all the Japanese islands that it needed.[71]

These comments and leaks to the press naturally produced press speculations and foreign inquiries at London. Perhaps for these reasons, Secretary Byrnes suddenly cabled home on January 15 asking the President for permission to state that the United States would be prepared to place the islands under the trusteeship system "either under ordinary trusteeship arrangements or as strategic areas."[72]

The military were unaware of Byrnes' cable to Washington and were concerned with the press reports which appeared in the London morning papers on January 15, 1946. These reports had indicated uncertainty among the American representatives at the United Nations meeting "as to what the United States position should be as to the future status of the Pacific islands."[73]

The Secretary of the Navy fired off a message to the Commander of Naval Forces in Europe, located in London, asking what was happening. This message was sent from Washington at 3:10 p.m. on the fifteenth. The Admiral in London called in Admiral Turner, the naval representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, the next day and reported to Forrestal:

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71. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 10. See also: Hans W. Weigert, "U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25 (1947), pp. 250-262.

72. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 11.

73. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, memorandum from ASST SECNAV FOR AIR (Sullivan) to SWNCC, January 17, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 249 files.

> Turner informs me question of trusteeships has so far as known been discussed only in US delegation with Military Staff Committee representatives present. No decisions have been arrived at. State Department has been informed by military that as yet no instructions have been received from Joint Chiefs of Staff. Consequently discussions have been purely on informal basis and no recommendations to delegation have been made by our military representatives. In this connection attention is invited to USREPMIL-COMNO 161606 to JCS [a message from the military representatives to the JCS on the 16th]. Turner recommends position of CNO might be that any offer by US to place Japanese Mandates or Volcano and Bonin Islands or Ryukyus under UNO trusteeship might well be deferred until after ratification of Japanese peace treaty, and that for present trusteeships establishment might be confined to those territories still held by allied powers under original League of Nations Mandates. However there is a tendency among some civilian members of delegation to favor early offer by US to agree to trusteeships for captured Pacific territory in order to produce favorable effect toward offer by other countries to agree to place under trusteeship territories which come under Article 77 para 1C UNO Charter.... He considers press reports unjustified conflict in ideas between civilian and military delegations.[74]

This message indicates that the military representatives of the American delegation did not know that Byrnes had sent the cable to Washington nor did they appreciate the seriousness of the situation. It also provides another motivation for the Byrnes cable--that some civilian members of the delegation wished to induce other countries into placing their dependent territories under the trusteeship system (Article 77, para 1C of the Charter).

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74. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, COMNAVEU message to SECNAV, DTG 162212, January, 1946, Declassified 1970, Secretary of the Navy files.

There is no indication of Byrnes' personal views on the desirability of announcing that the United States would place the former mandated islands under the trusteeship system. Perhaps he was pressed by certain members of his staff of the delegation. The United States delegation included Pasvolsky, Cohen, Dunn, Hackworth, Hiss, Bunche, Gerig, Green, Hartley, Notter, Sandifer and Fortas. The "internationalists" were therefore well represented on the United States delegation.

The President held a news conference on the fifteenth (it is not known if he had already seen Byrnes' cable) and made certain extemporaneous remarks, in general terms, on this subject. The State Department's Radio Bulletin reported on this press conference as follows:

> The President declared that those (islands) we do not need will be placed under UNO trusteeship, and those we need we will keep. Asked how long we intended to keep these islands, Mr. Truman said, as long as we needed them.... Asked if they would be under individual trusteeship of this country, President replied in the affirmative in regard to those islands we need.... Asked if we would have to ask UNO's authority for our individual trusteeships, President replied affirmatively....[75]

The Radio Bulletin reported that the President also said that some islands would be under individual trusteeship as well as collective trusteeship, "but that policy would have to be worked out by the United Nations as it went along. He said

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75. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 343 (January 27, 1946), p. 113, quoting the Department of State Radio Bulletin of January 15, 1946.

that we had not demanded any of the islands we need."[76] These statements could not have been more ambiguous! The questions by the reporters certainly did not clarify anything. The President was never asked about the inconsistency between his first statement and his answer to the second question.

In Washington on the seventeenth, John L. Sullivan, the Navy's representative on SWNCC, sent a memorandum to the other members of SWNCC referring to the London press articles and the President's remarks to the reporters. He stated in this memorandum that there was an "urgent need" for the State, Navy, and War Departments to consider the question "with a view to reaching agreement as to United States policy with respect to the future status of the Pacific Islands."[77] He recommended that a special meeting of SWNCC be held "as soon as possible" to consider the present state of affairs, to send instructions or guidance to the Delegation in London, and to then "decide upon steps to be taken to develop and clarify the governmental position at the earliest practical date."[78] Sullivan took this action without knowing of the cable that Byrnes had sent to Washington on the fifteenth.

On the same day that Sullivan sent his memorandum to the other members of SWNCC, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson obtained the President's consent for Byrnes to make a statement that the United States would be prepared to place the former

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76. Ibid.

77. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from AsST SECNAV FOR AIR (Sullivan) to SWNCC, January 17, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 249 files.

78. Ibid.

mandated islands under the United Nations trusteeship system "either under ordinary trusteeship arrangements or as strategic areas." Acheson obtained this Presidential consent, and so cabled Byrnes on the seventeenth without ever having consulted the Army, Navy, or Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not known who within the State Department took the initiative in proposing this action to Dean Acheson. Undoubtedly, the officers concerned with trusteeship matters who had remained in Washington were responsible for this action by Acheson. They should have informed Acheson about the prior inter-departmental discussions concerning possible trusteeship for the mandated islands and the firm annexationist position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Acheson, himself, should have known about the Joint Chiefs of Staff's position from the public press.

President Truman must also be criticized for giving his consent to the request, as he knew of the inter-agency controversy over the issue. Perhaps, he believed that all necessary coordination had been made prior to Acheson presenting Byrnes' request. However, this is hard to believe. He had been in office long enough by this time to realize the extent of the differences within the Government over the disposition of the former mandated islands.

Dean Acheson has subsequently described (in his memoirs) his impressions of President Truman's administrative style. Acheson's impressions are completely contrary to the circumstances surrounding this hasty Presidential decision without the benefit of prior consultation or coordination. Acheson's

description of President Truman's administrative style is as follows:

> Mr. Truman brought another major asset to decision. He had a passion for orderly procedure and a deep, if simple, idea of how to attain it. Although many presidents had been lawyers, none of them -- notably his immediate predecessor -- utilized in administration the law's most fundamental procedure. For centuries courts have required all parties in interest to be present before the court at the same time with the right to be heard and to hear one another. President Truman introduced this procedure into executive administration. To it he added an equally ancient, and in administration equally novel, practice of law: the decision was immediately reduced to writing.[79]

This comment is made by the individual who went to the President and obtained his hasty decision granting approval for Secretary Byrnes to announce in London that the former mandated islands would be placed under some form of trusteeship. No rule concerning all parties being present before the court was followed at that time by either Acheson or the President. Acheson does continue in his memoirs to state that the vehicle for these administrative innovations was the National Security Council. This organization was created in 1947, which was after this "hasty decision."

However, the belief in the principles of hearing all interested parties and, immediately, reducing all decisions to writing was supposedly held by the President independently of the existance of the National Security Council. Perhaps

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79. Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp. 732-733.

such debacles as this Presidential decision served to reinforce the President's belief in these administrative principles and contributed to his urging the creation of the National Security Council.

It is not known how the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned of the State Department's actions. However, it is known that as soon as they heard of Byrnes' request and the President's approval, they transmitted via Admiral Leahy an unsolicited position on the matter to the President.[80] The Joint Chiefs also fired off a quick letter notifying the Secretary of State, and indirectly the President, that they still considered it essential to national defense for the United States to gain strategic control of the mandated islands by assuming full sovereignty.[81]

Forrestal heard of Byrnes' request, the Presidential decision, and Acheson's July 17 cable from Under Secretary of the Navy Sullivan on the afternoon of January 20. Sullivan had heard of these actions at a SWNCC meeting on the twentieth. This meeting had been called evidently as a result of Sullivan's earlier memorandum. At this meeting, Sullivan and the War Department's representative, Howard C. Peterson, learned of the situation from H. Freeman Mathews, the State Department representative. The War and Navy men were astonished and felt that the

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80. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum to Forrestal, unsigned (undoubtedly from Sullivan), on SWNCC meeting January 20, 1946, dated January 21, 1946, SWNCC 249 files.

81. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 12.

President should not commit the Government without consulting the War and Navy Departments.

Sullivan and Peterson convinced Mathews that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views should be brought to Acheson's attention at once. They also urged Mathews to cable Byrnes requesting him to make no statement until advised further after consultation with the President.[81]

Later that evening, Sullivan reported to Forrestal that cables had just been sent to Byrnes, with the President's approval, recinding the earlier authorization.[82] Fortunately, these cables arrived in London before Byrnes had made any announcement offering the mandated islands as a trusteeship. Evidently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's actions, plus the results of Sullivan's and Peterson's meeting with Mathews, had induced the President to recind his earlier authorization.

On the twenty-first, Forrestal decided to lodge a formal complaint with the President over Acheson's action. He took the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, with him to see the President. The meeting with the President was described in Forrestal's diary as follows:

> Royall and I said that we thought it was a most unwise and precipitate decision and requested the President to tell Byrnes not to make any such statement [evidently Forrestal and Royall did not let the President know that they had heard via Sullivan

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81. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum to Forrestal, unsigned (undoubtedly from Sullivan), on SWNCC meeting January 20, 1946, dated January 21, 1946, SWNCC 249 files.

82. Ibid.

> that the President had already sent cables to Byrnes recinding the authorization]. He said that the message had gone today requesting Byrnes not to commit this country to any definitive position; it was not clear to me, however, whether he meant that Byrnes was not to make any statement.
>
> I told the President that I think Acheson's method of securing his approval to Mr. Byrnes' request was not consistent with our general ideas of cooperation between War, State, and Navy, and rather in my opinion was a desertion of the general idea of cooperation by getting hasty decisions out of him on behalf of a particular point of view, and I told him I propose to make such a representation to Acheson in very strong terms. He said he hoped I would....
>
> This incident is a reflection of the rapidly vanishing determination in America to see to it that we do not repeat the mistakes of 1918-19 when the formerly German-owned islands of the Pacific were turned over to Japan and Australia ... under a secret agreement between England and Japan without American knowledge until after it was a fait accompli. It is a case for the greatest concern to see this tendency developing so soon in the attitude of the State Department.83

There is no account of this incident in Truman's, Byrnes', or Acheson's memoirs. It is almost like the "pot calling the kettle black" in terms of the Navy's end-run to the President, in August 1945, to obtain his consent to naval administration of the Marianas. Another interesting point is Forrestal's last paragraph. Earlier in the spring of 1945, during the drafting of the trusteeship system, it had appeared that Forrestal had reluctantly accepted the idea of strategic trusteeship for the mandated islands. Now, he expressed his opposition to announcing that the islands would be either an ordinary trusteeship

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83. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 130-131.

or a strategic trusteeship, as opposed to annexation, in order not to "repeat the mistakes of 1918-19."

On January 22, Acheson held a news conference and stated that in respect to strategic trusteeship agreements, a refusal of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council would mean there would be no agreement; and the result would be to maintain the status quo. These words implied that the United States had nothing to fear from a failure to reach an agreement protecting American strategic interests. If the United States did not like the final draft trusteeship agreement, there would be no obligation to accept it; and the status quo would be maintained. Furthermore, he pointed out that once such an agreement had been signed, it could not be changed without the consent of the United States, thanks to the veto power. In other words, the only way the United Nations would get the mandated islands under a trusteeship agreement would be by accepting terms agreeable to the United States. When a reporter asked him if the United States did not have to wait until a peace conference awarded the area to the United States before decisions could be made on trusteeship, Dean Acheson replied that he did not think it was necessary and that one could proceed in any order "that the nations think best."[84]

The press reports and public reaction increased in attention, rather than decreased, after the President's statement

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84. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 344, (February 3, 1946), pp. 150-151.

of January 15, 1946. James Reston in The New York Times reported that the Army and Navy, with the support of many Senators and Representatives, were still not reconciled to the trusteeship formula for the mandated islands, even under the strategic formula.[85] An informal poll conducted by The New York Times among a limited number of Senators and Representatives indicated more sentiment for annexation than for "individual trusteeship under the U.N.O."[86]

In February, the news of the Yalta decision (a year earlier) concerning the granting of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union was publicly revealed; and this information only increased the cry for annexation. Senator Byrd of Virginia stated that it would be "absurd" to consider placing Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet Union was gaining sovereignty over the Kuriles.[87] Former President Hoover spoke out in favor of annexation at the graduation ceremonies of the School of Naval Administration at Stanford. Hoover believed that "the holding of these islands is not an extension of imperialism because we have no designs of economic exploitation.... What we are doing is looking after not only our own defense but we are looking after the defense of the world as a whole."[88]

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85. The New York Times, January 17, 1946.

86. Ibid., January 31, 1946.

87. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 16.

88. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

In March 1946, a survey of American public opinion by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver showed 40 percent of the American people were for outright ownership of the islands, 28 percent were for American operation without ownership, and 25 percent were for the United States sharing its control with other members of the United Nations.[89]

The press reports and public reaction quoted above support Stimson's contention (expressed in the spring of 1945 and quoted above) that the United States could annex the islands without any major opposition and with considerable approval.

* * *

Meanwhile, the subcommittee of the Four Secretaries' Committee finally held its first meeting. As described above, the State Department had resisted the calling of this subcommittee which was supposed to consider the problems involving the civil administration of American possessed islands in the Pacific. The relations between the State and Interior Departments were strained over this question. The circumstances surrounding the calling of the first meeting and the conduct of the meeting, itself, demonstrate the strained relations between the State and Interior Departments.

On January 9, 1946, the President wrote to Acting Secretary of State Acheson expressing the wish that he call a meeting

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89. Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic, Vol. 116, No. 11 (March 17, 1947), p. 31.

of the Four Secretaries' Committee to start consideration of the problems arising from the administration of the Pacific islands. Acheson replied on the sixteenth that an ad hoc subcommittee had been appointed to consider those problems, and "I am taking steps to expedite the work of this sub-committee and as soon as it submits recommendations, and the Secretary of War returns, shall, in accordance with your wishes, call a meeting of the four Secretaries' committee."[90]

Mr. Beecroft, of the Interior Department, learned of these letters during informal talks in the State Department. He and his senior, Edwin G. Arnold, therefore, drafted a letter for Secretary Ickes to send to Acheson requesting a meeting of the subcommittee "at once."[91] Arnold's attached memorandum to Ickes stated that the letter would

> help to expedite the summoning of the sub-committee and would have the additional advantage of reemphasizing our view that the character of our actual administrative plans for the islands will have an important value in the development of a trusteeship policy.[92]

This memorandum was dated January 18, 1946, at the height of the confusion emanating from the American Delegation in London. Secretary Ickes signed the letter on January 22; and

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90. The Harry S. Truman Library, Acting Secretary of State Acheson to President, January 16, 1946, Official files 85-L.

91. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Ickes to Acheson, January 22, 1946, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

92. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Arnold to Ickes, January 18, 1946, RG 48, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

a meeting of the subcommittee was subsequently called for January 30, 1946, at the State Department.

Present at the meeting were the following:

Mr. Fred Searls, State Department, Chairman
Brigadier General G. A. Lincoln, War Department
Colonel Reynolds, War Department
Mr. E. G. Arnold, Interior Department
Mr. Beecroft, Interior Department
Captain L. S. Sabin, Navy Department

The meeting got off to a difficult start when Mr. Searls opened it by stating, "in view of the Department of Interior's desire to be 'Cannibal Governor of the Cannibal Island', it seemed appropriate for the representative of the Interior Department to state the position of that Department."[93]

Mr. Arnold stated that Interior felt it should have the responsibility for the civil administration of dependent peoples. He presented a rough plan for civil administration of the Pacific islands for the consideration of the subcommittee. The State, War, and Navy representatives gave Mr. Arnold an extremely difficult time. Mr. Searls basically repeated Byrnes' feelings about waiting until the disposition of the islands had been settled. Captain Sabin supported him and also stated the reasons why the War and Navy Departments were interested in retaining responsibility for civil administration in the island areas during the postwar period. General Lincoln, with Captain Sabin's concurrence, did state that Interior had a strong argument for administering the highly populated Ryukyus "as opposed to the island areas of the Central Pacific."[94]

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93. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Captain Sabin to Mr. Sullivan, January 30, 1946, SWNCC 249 files. See: Appendix M for a copy of this document.

94. Ibid.

The meeting ended with Mr. Searls stating that the Chair would entertain a motion to the effect that Interior would submit its plan formally to the subcommittee for transmission to the Committee of the Four Secretaries, but "the Subcommittee would recommend that no action be taken on it until such time as a final settlement on the international level were made as to the status of the islands. The motion was made and seconded. It was carried, with one dissenting vote on the part of the Department of Interior. The representative of the Department of Interior stated that he could not agree to a recommendation that nothing be done about it at this time."[95]

Interior went ahead and "polished up" its proposal and submitted it on February 20, 1946. It called for the Department of the Interior to be immediately designated as the administrative agency for "all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations."[96] It also recommended that, in the interest of economical and effective administration, the Micronesian area, including Guam, be regarded as a single unit, subdivided only for purposes of local administration.[97]

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95. Ibid.

96. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior proposal, February 20, 1946, RG 48, Office file of Oscar Chapman - Division of Territories. See: Appendix N for a copy of this proposal.

97. Ibid.

This proposal was considered by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on February 28, 1946. These three Secretaries unanimously decided to recommend to the President that "no action should be taken ... until such time as the status and title of the Pacific islands concerned should be determined."[98] This recommendation was transmitted to the President on March 6, 1946, without any notification of the Interior Department. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy did, however, forward the Interior Department's proposal of February 20, 1946, to the President but without their endorsement of that proposal.

The Interior Department was not informed of this action by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy until June 8, 1946. The Committee of the Four Secretaries never did meet to consider this Interior proposal.

Another reason for the lack of action, beside those stated by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy above, is suggested by the transcript of a telephone conversation that occurred more than a year later. On May 16, 1947, Secretary of the Interior J. A. "Cap" Krug, who had since replaced Ickes, met with Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. This was actually the first meeting of the Four Secretaries' Committee, and it will be described in detail in its proper sequence. After that meeting, Krug telephoned his assistant, Girard Davidson, and commented on the reason that Patterson gave

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98. U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Background Information Memorandum, May 1, 1947, signed by Roy E. James, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 1.

for the long delay in calling the first meeting of the Four Secretaries' Committee as follows:

> he [Patterson] said when President named this four-man committee, Byrnes decided it was useless to sit down with Ickes. He said something to the effect that he wouldn't sit down with him and that was the end of it. Then directed Fred Searles [sic] to get hold of Abe Fortas and work thing out and Patterson says that was done, but so far as I know, nothing was done.[99]

About April 3, 1946, the new Secretary of the Interior, J. A. "Cap" Krug, met with Secretary of State Byrnes for a general discussion of this matter.[100] On May 31, 1946, Eric Beecroft tried once again. He drafted a letter for the Secretary of the Interior to sign which was addressed to Secretary Byrnes. Krug signed this letter which reviewed the situation and asked for a meeting of the four Secretaries. He concluded:

> I am aware that the belief is held in some quarters that a transfer to civil administration now will be regarded as an intention to take and hold the islands permanently. However, I am of the opinion that an early announced decision to deal with native affairs through a strictly civilian administration would go far to strengthen the hands of the United States Government in international discussions. In the absence of such a decision, there appears to be a wide-spread belief, both at home and abroad, that our military interest in the Pacific outweighs our concern for the civil rights and the economic welfare of the island inhabitants.[101]

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99. Library of Congress, Transcript of telephone call from J. A. Krug to Girard Davidson, May 16, 1947, Krug papers.

100. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Memorandum from Arnold to the Secretary, April 3, 1946, RG 48 file, 9-0-7 Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

101. Library of Congress, Krug to Byrnes, May 31, 1946, Krug papers.

This is an interesting line of reasoning in terms of turning the argument of timing for the introduction of civil administration around to counter the State Department's position. Additionally, it is unusual to find the Secretary of the Interior advising the Secretary of State on foreign affairs. Attached to Interior's copy of this letter is a typed note, undated and initialed by "JAS" which indicated Interior's attitude toward the explanation for this delay:

> The failure of State to move ahead on the President's directive of October 20, even by May 31 (seven months later) would seem close in [sic] insubordination. There may be several explanations for this failure to act or at least to get a new directive. Byrnes was an independent operator, never really part of the State machinery, abroad most of the time at peace negotiations. Indeed, he was later fired by HST for becoming too independent! Mr. Searls was a lone wolf within State, representing Byrnes but outside channels. It was probably he who blocked action, from lack of interest, hostility toward Interior, or even on orders from Byrnes?[102]

Secretary Byrnes replied to Krug's letter of May 31, on the eighth of June. In this reply, he enclosed a copy of the letter that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy had sent to the President on March 6, 1946, which had recommended "that no action should be taken on this matter at this time for the reasons stated in Mr. Searls' report."[103]

This was the first time that Interior had been informed

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102. Ibid., attached note.

103. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, draft letter from Krug to President, attached to memorandum dated June 19 and 20, 1946, from Beecroft to Arnold and Chapman, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Territories, Declassified October 21, 1969.

of the action taken earlier by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Mr. Beecroft, now officially head of a new Pacific Branch in the Division of Territories, was extremely disturbed and wrote memorandums to his Director, Mr. Arnold, and to the Under Secretary, Mr. Chapman, on June 19 and 20, respectively. These memorandums reviewed the situation and suggested that Interior take the initiative in the matter. He enclosed a draft letter for Secretary Krug's signature addressed to the President. This draft referred to Byrnes' reply and the lack of knowledge by Interior of the action taken by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Mr. Beecroft let his frustration release itself on the third paragraph:

> I [Krug] cannot let this action by Secretary Byrnes go unchallenged. The decision of February 28 which he transmitted to you was, in effect, a decision to advise you that the Interior Department's participation in discussion of Pacific Island administration would be inappropriate. It was a decision to ask you to nullify an explicit order which you had issued on October 20 last. Its significance as a defiance of your order is apparent from the failure of the Secretary of State to summon the Secretary of the Interior to meet with the other three Cabinet members; from his failure to notify this Department that only three of the Secretaries had met and had decided to advise you that the full Committee should not act on this vital matter; and from the repeated actions of Mr. Searls, verbally and in correspondence for the past eight months, to block the inter-agency discussion which your directive explicitly required.[104]

The draft letter ended by requesting the President to reconfirm his directive of October 20, 1945, and to "request an immediate

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104. Ibid.

recommendation looking toward the establishment of civil govenment at the earliest feasible date in those Pacific islands which are under United States administration."[105] A memorandum was enclosed for the President's signature to accomplish this recommendation by Interior.

This draft letter for the Secretary's signature was cleared by Director Arnold, but it went to Krug with the following attached hand-written memorandum initialed "R.E.D.", which brought calmer minds to bear:

> I feel sure that you will not want to sign this letter in its present form.
>
> You were not Secretary of the Interior at the time the Secretaries of State, War and Navy met without benefit of presence of the Secretary of the Interior, nor when Secretary Byrnes wrote to the President.
>
> Therefore, without hurling criticism in a letter which despite its "Secret" classification will sooner or later be quoted publicly, I think you could appropriately and effectively ask the President to review the situation -- possibly in personal conversation with him, and then write a suitable letter for the record.[106]

Secretary Krug decided not to send any letter at all, with the terse comment, "I do not consider this the proper time for pushing civilian control of the Pacific islands!"[107] His reasons for this feeling are not recorded. He was later to indicate that he was not that opposed to naval administration. This viewpoint of his will be mentioned in more detail in the next chapter. For whatever reasons, the Interior Department under

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105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., attached memorandum, dated June 24, 1946.

107. Ibid., attached note by Secretary Krug.

Secretary Krug ceased agitating for the administration until May of 1947, after the decision had been made to submit the former mandated islands to a strategic trusteeship.

* * *

Public opposition to the annexationists was minor but vocal during the summer and fall of 1946. Secretary Ickes and Secretary Forrestal had always had bitter words whenever the subject of trusteeship or naval administration was raised. When Secretary Ickes left office in March 1946, he took his views to the public forum. On May 29, 1946, he delivered a speech entitled, "Meet the Navy" before a joint meeting of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations. He severely criticized the government for not having prepared a trusteeship agreement for the former mandated islands. Blasting the Navy for desiring a strategic trusteeship (which, actually, it did not want) in order that it could keep its administration of dependent peoples "top secret," he said:

> It is time that the State Department ceased to be beguiled by the pleasant tinkle of brass and the luster of gold braid, for it is the Navy which has largely been responsible for our moral failure to date as to our dependencies.... Naval absolutism sneers at every Constitutional guarantee ... The Navy is arbitrary, dictatorial and utterly disregardful of civilian rights ...
>
> The Navy is bent upon ruling these island peoples and it is determined that they shall not have those rights which the Charter of the United Nations guarantees;

> that they shall not have self-government or democracy or racial equality....[108]

He repeated the same sentiments in his journalistic column on June 14, 1946.[109]

The Institute of Ethnic Affairs, under the leadership of John Collier (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1933-1945; Editor of the Guam Echo, published in Washington) contended that military security and trusteeship under the General Assembly were compatable, and the United States should place the islands under a General Assembly trusteeship just because they "lie in a strategic zone where defensive and offensive interests of three powers overlap - China, the Soviet Union and the United States."[110] The Institute also declared that:

> When the military makes foreign policy, foreign policy makes toward war.
>
> All Americans know that the Army and Navy exercise a pressure power very strong and also dangerous to lasting peace.
>
> But apparently, few Americans - few editors, for example - are aware that the military control over our nation's foreign policy goes entirely beyond mere influence, mere pressure.
>
> The Army and Navy control over foreign policy exists as a formalized, technically and procedurally implemented arrangement.... [which] is known in Washington as SWNCC - the State, War and Navy Co-ordinating Committee through which foreign policies of even the remotest military interest must be cleared. That committee operates under an

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108. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 19.

109. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, memorandum from Beecroft to Arnold, June 1946, Declassified October 21, 1969, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Territories.

110. News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, Inc., Vol. 1, No. 5 (November 1946), p. 3.

> unanimity role, so that not merely Army and Navy acting together, but Army and Navy acting separately, are empowered to veto any proposal made by State.... The State Department technicians, adequate in numbers and often in technical knowledge, and internationally experienced, confront the military snap-judgment and prejudice; and again and again, to procure action at all, they find themselves accepting compromises or worse, to the grave and cumulative injury of the United States and of the peace hopes.[111]

Collier, Ickes, and former Vice President Wallace maintained a running public attack throughout 1946 on the military in general, and on the naval administration of the islands and the need for overseas bases in particular.[112] Forrestal took no public notice of these attacks even when The New York Times and the Washington Daily News both urged, in their June 18, 1946, issues, the development of a "colonial" policy, in light of the acquisition of the Japanese mandated islands and the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.[113]

In late August 1946, Secretary Krug announced publicly in informal remarks that the Four Secretaries' Committee had never met, and that he felt:

> that the proposal of the State, War and Navy Departments to defer a decision upon the form of Administration of the Pacific Islands formerly under Japanese mandate until the international status of those islands had been clarified was a reasonable

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111. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

112. These took the form of letters to editors of papers and public speeches. It is interesting to note that in 1945 and 1946, Ickes had "strongly opposed" the early granting of independence to the Philippines by taking a "vigorous stand" and showing violent opposition" to the idea. See: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 275.

113. The New York Times, June 18, 1946, and the Washington Daily News, June 18, 1946.

recommendation in the light of present circumstances.[114]

This comment was the subject of an August 30, 1946, editorial in the Honolulu Star Bulletin. Unfortunately, the editorial was also based on a speculative story from another source; and the result was an erroneous representation of Secretary Krug's attitude.[115] This same misrepresentation was picked up by The New York Times in its editorial of September 2, 1946. The Times stated, based on the Honolulu Star Bulletin editorial, that there was an "indefinite" postponement of any decision concerning the Pacific islands which America possessed; and that unless Congress should make the Executive branch change its mind, the islands would remain indefinitely under military rule.[116]

Secretary Krug sent a letter to the Honolulu Star Bulletin on September 9 protesting its editorial. Within the Navy Department, Captain R. L. Dennison drafted a defense of naval administration of the Pacific islands for Forrestal to send to The New York Times. In this draft reply to the Times editorial, Captain Dennison intentionally avoided raising the question of "sovereignty" versus "trusteeship" and any comment about the work, or lack of it, of the Four Secretaries' Committee.[117] As an exception to his policy of not answering the public

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114. Library of Congress, Krug to Editor, Honolulu Star Bulletin, September 9, 1946, Krug papers.

115. Ibid.

116. The New York Times, September 2, 1946.

117. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Dennison to Forrestal, September 7, 1946, OP-35 files.

attacks on naval administration, Forrestal decided to send this reply to The New York Times, and it was published in the paper on September 24, 1946.

To further offset the bad publicity, the Navy arranged for ten newspapermen to tour the various islands in the Pacific that were under naval administration, including the former mandated islands. Their reports were consistently favorable to the Navy's position and record in administering the islands.[118]

* * *

The Pentagon (the War and Navy Departments, plus the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was not only fighting Interior over which Department should govern the former mandated islands but was also embroiled in the question of whether or not these islands would be annexed or placed under strategic trusteeship. At the first meeting of the First Session of the United Nations at London in January and February 1946, the question of dependent areas had been deferred. However, the second meeting of the First Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in New York on October 23, 1946. The State Department desired to have an agreed policy concerning the former Japanese mandated islands prior to that meeting. All concerned wished to avoid the debacle that had occurred in January over Byrnes' request from London.

Little work was done on the problem until August 1946.

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118. The Baltimore Sun, January 11, 1947; The Christian Science Monitor, December 2 and 4, 1946; The Washington Post, December 1, 1946; The New York Times Magazine, May 19, 1947.

In the meantime, the Pentagon took an interest in the trusteeship agreements that were submitted by other nations (United Kingdom for Togoland, British Cameroons and Tanganyika; Belgium for Ruanda-Urundi) in March 1946. In respect to these trusteeship agreements, the question arose whether the United States should assert that it was a "state directly concerned." Secretary Forrestal wrote to Secretary of State Byrnes that he had no objection to the substance of these trusteeship agreements, but he believed the United States should not assert that it was a "state directly concerned" when the agreements were presented to the United Nations General Assembly for consideration. He gave the following reasons for this recommendation:

> I believe that the United States has no real interest in these territories other than a general concern for the welfare of their inhabitants.
>
> I further believe that any assertions by the United States of direct concern in these territories might well serve as a precedent for other nations voicing their direct concern with respect to trusteeship for Pacific islands in which we have a definite strategic interest. In as much as it is the view of the Navy Department that the number of states directly concerned in Pacific islands trusteeships should be kept to a minimum, I am strongly of the opinion that it would be most unwise for the United States to assert that it is directly concerned in connection with these four African territories.[119]

Forrestal was thinking ahead in case the former Japanese mandated islands or any of the other islands taken from Japan became trusteeships. Additionally, Australia was known to be

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119. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Forrestal to Byrnes, April 4, 1946, Declassified June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

intending to place the former mandate of North-east New Guinea under trusteeship. The strategically important island-base of Manus was located within that territory.

Within SWNCC, various studies were conducted on the implications of various interpretations of the articles in the Charter of the United Nations pertaining to trusteeships. For example, the question of "states directly concerned" was explored. On May 7, 1946, Captain Dennison wrote a memorandum commenting on a SWNCC paper concerning strategic trusteeships. He criticized the paper for placing too much importance on the mere designation of strategic areas. He concluded, "the protection of U.S. interests should be sought by suitable terms in the trusteeship agreement. There is no automatic protection in applying the designation of strategic areas."[120]

Thus, an awareness developed that the decision would not be merely whether to place the former Japanese mandated islands under a strategic trusteeship. It would be necessary to develop a definite strategic trusteeship plan for the mandated islands in order to see whether American security interests could, in fact, be protected under a strategic trusteeship.

Even with this consensus developing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evidently still felt that American security might be impaired under a strategic trusteeship plan for the former Japanese mandated islands. Accordingly, on June 28, 1946, they reviewed the situation and "reached a conclusion that

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120. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from R. L. Dennison to Captain Colin Campbell, May 7, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 38 files.

the United States sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands is, from the military point of view, necessary to the national defense, and decided to report that conclusion to the Secretary of State and the President."[121]

The issue of what to do with the mandated islands continued to be discussed throughout the summer and fall of 1946 within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Three (State, War, Navy) Secretarial meetings, and SWNCC in an attempt to reach a consensus prior to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in late October. The Interior Department was not included in these discussions.

Finally, at the SWNCC meeting on August 20, 1946, it was agreed to appoint an ad hoc subcommittee to "prepare as a matter of priority and for exploratory purposes, separate types of trusteeship agreements to cover territories formerly mandated to Japan and pre-war Japanese territory."[122] It was within this ad hoc subcommittee of SWNCC that substantive work was done in close liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy's OP-35 Division (under Captain Dennison) on the development of a draft strategic trusteeship agreement that might be acceptable to all parties.

In order to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree to the

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121. Library of Congress, Leahy papers (diary), Vol. 12, June 28, 1946, p. 66.

122. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, memorandum SWN-5660, August 20, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59 file. The designated members of this ad hoc subcommittee were: Dr. Hugh Borton, Department of State, Steering Member; Mr. Dean Rusk, Department of State; Mr. E. A. Gross, Department of State; Brig. Gen. Cortlandt VanR. Schuyler, War Department; Col. Sidney L. Giffin, War Department; Rear Adm. E. T. Wooldridge, Navy Department.

development of a draft trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands, several conditions had to be met. The development of any draft trusteeship agreement was to be without prejudice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's stated position that only traditional sovereignty could safeguard for all time the rights of the United States in the islands. It was also to be without prejudice to the ultimate decision on what to do with the islands. On these conditions, the Joint Chiefs then agreed that discussions leading toward a draft strategic trusteeship could commence.

Also, on these conditions, the Joint Chiefs stated that a strategic trusteeship agreement would be the next best thing to annexation and would probably prevent any future compromise of American security if it contained the following points:

(1) the entire trusteeship to be designated a strategic area;

(2) the United States to be sole administering authority;

(3) no limitation to be placed upon the utilization of all or any part of the area for United States security purposes;

(4) the right of the United States to exclude any areas utilized for military purposes from inspection or report to the United Nations or any of its agencies.[123]

Of course, a strategic trusteeship, by mere designation alone, would come under the Security Council where the veto power would ensure that any agreement followed the proposed draft and, once made, could not be changed without United States' consent.

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123. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 18.

With the above points in mind, the SWNCC ad hoc subcommittee set to work. The Army took little part in the work since it felt that the Navy sufficiently upheld the Army's interests.[124] By October, a draft trusteeship agreement had been developed containing the above four points and was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. They repeated their position but conceded that if other considerations than military had priority, then the proposed agreement was considered adequate to safeguard American security.[125]

On October 22, 1946, the day before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly, the SWNCC Secretariat proposed to forward this reply to the ad hoc committee "for preparation of a statement of the diverse views of the three departments and the JCS for transmission to the President for final resolution by him."[126]

However, on this very same day, President Truman at the request of the Secretary of State (Byrnes) called a conference of the State, War and Navy Secretaries to decide whether or not to place the former Japanese mandated islands under a United Nations strategic trusteeship. The Secretary of State did not want to delay matters any longer and evidently believed that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy plus the Joint

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124. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, U.S.N. (Ret.), Interview with the author, September 4, 1969.

125. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 213.

126. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Captain Dennison to Under Secretary of the Navy, October 22, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59/6 file.

Chiefs of Staff could make their views known to the President orally.

Admiral Nimitz was also present at this conference, as was Admiral Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operations, still argued the Joint Chiefs of Staff's consistent policy at this meeting with the President. According to Forrestal's diary entry, Admiral Nimitz stated that, "sovereignty of the ex-Japanese mandates should be taken by the U.S., that the ultimate security of the U.S. depends in major part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean, that these islands are part of the complex essential to that control, and that the concept of trusteeship is inapplicable here because these islands do not represent any colonial problem nor is there economic advantage accruing to the U.S. through their ownership."[127]

Secretary of State Byrnes later wrote in his book his account of the conference as follows:

> The State and War departments felt that, since Japan had received these islands under a mandate from the League of Nations, our rights were not superior to those delegated by the League and that therefore, if possible, the United Nations should declare them a strategic area to be administered by us under a United Nations trusteeship agreement. We pointed out that at San Francisco the United States delegation, by direction of President Roosevelt, had been a strong advocate of the trusteeship system. We argued that we could not properly adopt a policy that would show a lack of confidence in the system we had urged upon the United Nations. Japan had violated her mandate

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127. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 214.

> and therefore we could seek a decision from the United Nations on these mandated islands, while those islands that belonged to the Japanese, such as the Ryukyus, would have to await disposition by the peace conference.128

It would be surprising if the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, supported this view. The War Department had consistently backed the Navy in the long struggle for American absolute control over the islands. Byrnes' comment refers to the "War Department" and not to Secretary Patterson personally. Yet, Secretary Patterson was the only representative of the War Department present at this meeting. Unfortunately, there has not yet been located any account by Mr. Patterson or the War Department of this conference or any other evidence to support or refute Byrnes' statement.

President Truman's memoirs are slightly confusing on this, perhaps because he does not directly mention this particular conference. He states:

> In earlier meetings with Cabinet members on the question of trusteeships, I found that the State Department held views that differed from those of the War and Navy Departments. I listened carefully to both points of view. In the end I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of the security of the bases. But I also saw the validity of the ideal for which the State Department was contending - that the United Nations should not be barred from the local territories beyond the bases, if at any time the United Nations should want to look into social and economic conditions on these islands. The United States would never emulate the policy of Japan in the areas that were given her under mandate by the League of Nations. We thus assured full protection to our nation

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128. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 219.

> against a future Pacific aggressor and, at the same time, laid the foundation for future self-government of the island people.... I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. America fought her own war of liberation against colonialism, and we shall always regard with sympathy and understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage.... I still believed in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of "self-determination.'[129]

None of the other recorders of the discussion mention President Truman's talking about not barring the United Nations from local territories beyond the bases. The trusteeship agreement, as finally concluded, gave the United States the right to close any area for security reasons. This had been one of the four points stressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the President was talking of an earlier conference on this matter or of Okinawa or was giving oral instructions to the military not to close off any area more than necessary while still obtaining the right to do so in the agreement with the United Nations.

Mr. Truman wrote his memoirs after leaving office and may have overlooked the terms of the final trusteeship agreement in the writing of his memoirs. This could explain the slight inconsistency. Mr. Truman was "a devoted admirer of both Wilson and Roosevelt, a staunch anti-colonialist, and probably not a great admirer of the military."[130] During the first years of his Presidency, he stressed the United

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129. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp. 274-275.

130. Mr. James F. Green, Interview and letter to the author, September 8, 1970.

Nations and the high principles of de-colonialism and self-determination. He was also inclined to follow the policies and commitments made by President Roosevelt because of his lack of experience and the overwhelming, often hectic, events requiring decisions and action during his initial years in office.

This October 22, 1946, conference occurred just prior to the 1946 elections, at the same time as the controversy over the meat-ration controls, and under the pressure of preparing for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. Additionally, President Truman was deeply involved in the military unification struggle with Forrestal and the Navy bucking him and the other services over some of the points of the unification plan. Also, American relations with the Soviet Union were rapidly deteriorating. To his credit, President Truman made a firm decision on whether to annex the former mandated islands or place them under the trusteeship system. This contrasted Roosevelt's lack of any clear-cut command decision on this question.

In August of 1945 and January of 1946, President Truman had made hasty decisions relating to this subject prior to hearing all sides of the issue. This time all sides, except for the fact that Interior played no part in the drafting of the trusteeship agreement or the Presidential conference, were heard; and a binding decision was made.

President Truman's firm decision was to submit the islands to the United Nations as a strategic trusteeship with the United States as sole administrator under the terms of the

agreement drafted by the SWNCC subcommittee.

Secretary Forrestal, by the time of this conference, had accepted the idea of a strategic trusteeship. At the conference, his main concern was that the State Department negotiators might compromise and accept an arrangement that would jeopardize the security of the United States. Secretary Byrnes assured him that no changes in the draft agreement would be accepted without the approval of the President or the Secretary of State. Forrestal then stated that he was satisfied.[131]

Forrestal was also reassured by Byrnes on his fear that a subordinate of Byrnes or a delegate to the United Nations might leak an opinion to the press to the effect that "the intransigence of the military was blocking the good intentions of the State Department."[132] Forrestal was very sensitive to the public opinion trend toward disarmament and the belief in the thesis that the military was running American foreign policy.[133]

Admiral Leahy was very dissatisfied with the Presidential decision. In his unpublished diaries (on restricted access at the Library of Congress), one finds his reaction to the decision and his belief in the underlying reason for it as follows:

> decision was made to accept a United States trusteeship over these islands on terms acceptable to the United States. In view of public announcements previously made by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, it did not appear possible to take any other action. I cannot escape a fear that sometime in the distant

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131. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 219-220 and Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 213, 215, and 216.

132. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 213.

133. Ibid.

> future this decision will permit possible enemies to obtain positions in the Pacific that will require great expenditures of life and treasure to retake.[134] [Emphasis added]

Admiral Leahy believed that the previous sweeping statements of national policy (Atlantic Charter, United Nations Declaration, and Cairo Declaration, among others, which were enunciated primarily for war-time propaganda purposes) had backed the American government "into a corner" at the time of a crucial decision. One will never know exactly the main reason for the Presidential decision to submit the former Japanese mandated islands to a strategic trusteeship--whether it was President Truman's anti-colonialist sentiments, Secretary Byrnes' legal and foreign prestige viewpoints, or Admiral Leahy's belief that, because of previous statements, no other option was open. The decision, in all probability, rested on a blend of all of these forces.

Unfortunately, Admiral Nimitz' papers are not yet open; but the general feeling of Admiral Leahy and Admiral Nimitz was probably described by Benjamin Gerig, one of the State Department's strong trusteeship advocates, when he talked with John D. Hickerson about "a meeting with the Admirals [not named].... The Admirals were over-ruled. They left with their tails between their legs."[135]

The President made the unequivocal public announcement on November 6, 1946, that the United States was prepared to

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134. Library of Congress, Leahy papers (diary), Vol. 12, October 22, 1946, p. 86.

135. Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Interview with the author, June 19, 1969.

place under trusteeship the former Japanese mandated islands.[136]

Concurrently, the United States Government made public the draft trusteeship agreement.[137] It also circulated the draft agreement for information to the other members of the Security Council (Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom) and to New Zealand and the Philippines. This transmission was to fulfill the requirements of Article 79 of the Charter (states directly concerned) by obtaining the agreement of "all members of the United Nations which, in the view of the Government of the United States, may have special interest in these islands ..."[138]

Press reaction was, on the whole, favorable; with the usual small number of vocal dissenters. For example, The New York Times criticized the plan as constituting virtual annexation.[139]

To wrap things up, the State Department member of the SWNCC ad hoc subcommittee proposed about December 3, 1946, that no further action be taken with respect to the various papers produced by the subcommittee "since events have overtaken the

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136. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15 (November 17, 1946), p. 889.

137. Ibid. This was the draft produced by SWNCC. See: Appendix O for a copy of this draft trusteeship agreement.

138. U. S. Department of State, Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, Publication 2784, Far Eastern Series 20 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), Statement by U. S. Representative on Security Council, February 26, 1947.

139. The New York Times, November 10, 1946. See also: Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic, Vol. 116, No. 11 (March 17, 1947).

problem set forth."[140] The War Department member concurred but noted that the question "of which former Japanese Islands, other than the Japanese Mandates, are to be proposed as trusteeships has not been resolved."[141]

The ad hoc subcommittee had, indeed, been appointed to prepare draft trusteeships for all of the ex-Japanese islands, not just for the former Japanese mandated islands. However, the question of the Ryukyus and the Bonin-Volcanoes was allowed to drop pending the peace treaty with Japan.

Thus, 1946 ended with two of the three phases of this issue (the postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands) settled. The phase dealing with the drafting of the trusteeship system had ended in June 1945 with its inclusion in the United Nations Charter. The phase dealing with the decision whether to annex the islands or to submit them for trusteeship had ended on October 22, 1946, in favor of a strategic trusteeship with terms acceptable to the United States.

The third phase--which governmental department would administer the islands--had narrowed down to a choice between the Navy and Interior Departments. At the end of 1946, this controversy was quiescent because of the State Department's delaying tactics and Secretary of the Interior Krug's agreeing with State that the status of the islands should be settled before deciding which department would have the civil administration responsibility.

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140. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Captain Dennison to the Under Secretary of the Navy, December 5, 1946, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59 files.

141. Ibid.

Let arms yield to the toga; let the military yield to the civil power.
Cedant arma togae (Motto of Wyoming)

Cicero: Orationes
Philippicae, c. 60 B.C.

In all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power.

Virginia Declaration of
Rights June 12, 1776

Policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, not the reverse. The subordination of the military view to the political is, therefore, the only thing possible.

von Clausewitz:
On War, 1832

I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual word of mine, reflecting the tone which was once so traditional in the Navy ... that "political questions belong rather to the statesman than to the military man." I find these words in my old lectures, but I very soon learned better.

Mahan: Naval Strategy,
1911

CHAPTER FOUR

ACCEPTANCE OF THE TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT AND TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATION FROM NAVY TO INTERIOR

On February 17, 1947, Warren R. Austin, United States Representative on the Security Council, forwarded the draft trusteeship agreement to Secretary General Trygve Lie requesting that "this matter be placed on the agenda of the Security Council at an early date."[1] None of the governments to which the draft had been submitted earlier had voiced any major exceptions to either the United States request for appointment as sole administering authority of the islands or to the draft agreement. No other member of the United Nations asserted any claim for trusteeship of the islands.[2]

The other member nations of the United Nations also realized the political fact of life that if the draft agreement should be amended in a way unacceptable to the United States, then the United States could merely veto the agreement and continue occupying the islands under the status quo. In fact, this point had been implied by Dean Acheson in his January 22, 1946, press conference when he had stated that if any of the five permanent members of the Security Council should refuse a strategic trusteeship agreement, the result

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1. United Nations, Security Council, Document S/281, February 17, 1947.

2. U. S. Department of State, Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, Publication 2784, Far Eastern Series 20 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947) Statement by U. S. Representative on Security Council, February 26, 1947, pp. 19-20.

would be to maintain the status quo.

This point evidently was also made by John Foster Dulles and, indirectly, made by Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana. On the House floor February 3, 1947, Representative Mansfield commented on an investigative trip he had made to the Pacific Islands as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee with a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee. At the conclusion of his comments, he inserted into the Congressional Record the results of an investigation dealing with the present and future status of trusteeship for the former mandated islands. This investigative report mentioned Dean Acheson's January 22, 1946, statement. It also stated (based on a report in the Christian Science Monitor of November 8, 1946) that John Foster Dulles had "pointed out to the Trusteeship Committee of the [United Nations] General Assembly on November 7, 1946, if a trusteeship agreement is rejected by the United Nations, the dependent territory still continues under the present controlling power. This would mean that the Pacific islands would still be under direct United States control, even if the Security Council rejected the American draft plan."[3]

The authorship of this investigative report is not indicated. Probably the report was written either by a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the subcommittee of the

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3. U. S. Congressional Record, House, Statement by Representative Mike Mansfield, February 3, 1947, 80th Cong., 1 sess., February 3, 1947, pp. 807-811.

House Naval Affairs Committee or by someone on Representative Mansfield's staff. The important fact is that the report was inserted into the Congressional Record by Representative Mansfield just prior to the formal submission of the draft trusteeship agreement to the United Nations by the United States.

Dean Acheson's press statement, John Foster Dulles' reported comment at the United Nations, and Mike Mansfield's indirect endorsement of the investigative report were all available to the other governments for their consideration during the time that they were developing their positions in respect to the American draft trusteeship agreement which had been circulated on November 6, 1946. The other governments could not fail to realize that if the former mandated islands were ever to be placed under the trusteeship system, it would have to be on terms acceptable to the United States.

Mr. Austin formally submitted the trusteeship plan to the Security Council on February 26, 1947, together with article-by-article explanatory comments and a general statement.[4] Further consideration of the trusteeship proposal was deferred by the Security Council until March 7, 1947, while negotiations proceeded informally among the members for minor changes in the agreement.

The minor changes were proposed by the Soviet Union and

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4. U. S. Department of State, Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, Publication 2784, Far Eastern Series 20 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 3-20. Also: United Nations, Security Council, U. S. Delegation Document US/S/119 of February 26, 1947.

discussed within the American Government by the State, War, and Navy Departments via SWNCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff via SWNCC's liaison with the JSSC.

The Department of the Interior attempted to be included and requested that it have representation at the United Nations via an adviser or observer and also desired that the intra-governmental discussions on the changes be conducted within the "interdepartmental Non-Self-Governing Territories Committee."[5] Presumably, the Interior Department was referring to the Four Secretaries' Committee, with its appointed subcommittee, which would indicate one more attempt by Interior to get these organs functioning. Interior evidently did not get the requested representation at the United Nations; and although Mr. Gerig of State had seemed favorable to the second request at the time it was made, there is no evidence that the Interior Department participated in any intra-governmental discussions on the strategic trusteeship agreement.

The changes requested by the Soviet Union were to delete the words, "as an integral part of the United States" from Article 3 and to amend Article 6 to refer to the territory's development "towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," rather than merely reading development

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5. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, memorandum to Arnold from Beecroft, February 27, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

"towards self-government."[6]

These changes were discussed by the SWNCC ad hoc subcommittee between February 28 and March 4, 1947. Under Secretary of the Navy Sullivan objected to the amendment about independence, and Captain Dennison tried to convince the State Department members (Cohen, Hickerson, Gross, and Gerig) on this point. The latter were "unanimous in opposition."[7] Captain Dennison reported their position to Forrestal who advised that, in view of the State Department's attitude, the Navy Department should concede the point.[8]

Mr. James F. Green believes that the reason for the State Department's acceptance of the Soviet amendments probably was because the United States had "fought hard against 'as an integral part' and for 'independence' [in previously approved trusteeships in the General Assembly] on general principles, and it was thus hoist on its own petard later."[9]

The Security Council accepted the trusteeship agreement with the two amendments on April 2, 1947. As previously described, the agreement gave the United States wide powers, including full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction, the right of fortification, and the right to

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6. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Trusteeship for the Territory of the Pacific Islands," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16 (May 4, 1947), pp. 783-792.

7. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Captain Dennison to Under Secretary of the Navy, March 4, 1947, Declassified 1970, SWNCC 59 file.

8. Ibid.

9. James F. Green, Interview and letter to the author, September 8, 1970.

close areas for security reasons.[10]

As soon as the Security Council approved the United States' draft trusteeship agreement, the Interior Department started to move, once again, to achieve its goal of administering the islands. Secretary Krug had laid the groundwork for this new initiative by personally visiting American Samoa, Guam, and the island of Kwajalein (which is in the mandated islands) during the months of February and March 1947. He submitted an eleven-page report of his "inspection tour" to the President on May 12, 1947, in which he stated:

> In keeping with our basic philosophy of government, we should establish civil government for civil populations under our flag in time of peace....
>
> I recommend further that the United States, in accepting trusteeship of the former Japanese mandated islands from the United Nations, do so with a declaration of intention to establish civilian administration throughout the area at the earliest possible moment. The Congress should then be called upon to define the civil rights and political status of the islanders in their new relationship to the United States. In my opinion it is vital that by act of Congress we guarantee these people the maximum degree practical of the civil liberties and basic freedoms enjoyed by United States citizens....
>
> There is no question in my mind about the strategic importance of the islands and their value to the United States as forward outposts of defense. The Army, the Navy and the Air Forces must be assured free access to all of the islands at all times and must be allowed to set aside and exclusively control such islands or parts

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10. United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 1665, and United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 8, No. 123, "Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands," See also: Harold Karen Jacobson, "Our 'Colonial' Problem in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 56-66. See Appendix O for a copy of the trusteeship agreement.

> of islands and their surrounding waters as are necessary to the establishment and maintenance of military and naval installations. The armed forces, of course, must have exclusive jurisdiction over military bases and reservations. I do not agree, however, with the belief that civilian administration of that portion of the islands which are not a part of the military bases is incompatible with effective provision for national defense.... To commit ourselves to a course of action requiring permanent military administration of the affairs of the Pacific islanders in time of peace would imply an admission of a non-existent weakness in our basic principles of government.... I fully concur in the belief that by actually practicing democracy in the Pacific the United States can best overcome the non-democratic philosophies of government which today are bidding for control of the whole of Asia.[11]

This report continued in the same line of reasoning and gave examples of civil governments continuing in Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands during the war and of the military control of Hawaii, smoothly expanding and later contracting, during and after the war-time emergency. Krug argued for civilian government, not only of the former Japanese mandated islands, but also for Guam and American Samoa. More than half of the report was a call for civilian government rather than a report of existing conditions in the islands.

Krug did not think there had been any "misgovernment" under naval government but based his belief on "consideration of the fundamental principles which are basic to our democracy."[12]

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11. Library of Congress, Report to the President: Pacific Island Inspection Tour of J. A. Krug, February - March 1947, (no date on report itself), Krug papers.

12. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Krug to W. M. McBridge, Post Commander, VFW, Post 404, Guam, April 7, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Pacific Gen. Pt. 2.

He evidently did not see the distinction between military government and civil government administered by military personnel. The question of granting civil rights and degrees of self-government was not one of which agency was the administrator but of the instructions set forth by Congress and the President. Krug did admit that an Organic Act would be needed from Congress to establish these civil rights but, continually, in all his discussions on this subject, interchanged the term "civil government" with "civilian government."

To lay further groundwork for his initiative, Krug encouraged the holding of a round-table discussion on the subject of civil government for Pacific islands by the American Political Science Association in March 1947. He referred to the fact that "a similar suggestion was made to the Association over a year ago and that a round-table discussion, largely on the international aspects of the island problem, was held during the Association's annual meetings in March 1946."[13]

With this groundwork being laid and the formal approval of the Security Council given to the strategic trusteeship, the Interior Department made its first outright move toward obtaining civil administration of the Pacific islands since the previous May. On April 17, 1947, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Davidson wrote the following memorandum to Secretary Krug:

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13. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Krug to Luther Gulick, Institute of Public Administration, March 19, 1947. This letter was drafted by Eric Beecroft, RG 48, 9-0-7, Admin. Ser. Pt. 3.

> You wanted this note to remind you to talk to Under Secretary of State Acheson about civilian administration of the island possessions. As I understand it, the lower echelons of the State Department favor civilian administration, but the group between this and the Secretariat are opposed and rather friendly to military control. I would assume that Acheson would be definitely in favor of civilian administration but would like to have the assurance that we will carry the ball on this point.[14]

Roy E. James, who had relieved Eric Beecroft as head of the Pacific Branch of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, wrote a background memorandum to his superiors reviewing developments of the previous year concerning the Four Secretaries' Committee and the Security Council's action. He then concluded with a piece of information that definitely set Krug to action. James stated, "we have informal information from a confidential source that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has been meeting of late to draw up a form of interim administration for the islands and that their proposal will be placed before the President in a few days."[15]

Secretary Krug wrote to Secretary of State George C. Marshall on May 3, 1947, requesting, now that the status of the former Japanese mandated islands had been determined, that the President's Four Secretaries' Committee meet to work out a mutually satisfactory policy for the administration of all the Pacific islands.[16] On May 12, 1947, Krug sent a letter

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14. Library of Congress, Davidson to Krug, April 17, 1947, Krug papers.

15. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum of information by Roy E. James, May 1, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

16. Library of Congress, Krug to Marshall, May 3, 1947, Krug papers.

to the President submitting his report of the Pacific tour (copy to State, War, and Navy) and requesting that it be released to the press.[17]

Meanwhile, the President had received a copy of a Guamanian Congress Joint Resolution petitioning the United States Congress to grant American citizenship to Guamanians and to enact an organic law for the Guamanian Government. President Truman mentioned this petition in a memorandum to the Secretary of State on May 7, 1947, and recalled his appointment of the Four Secretaries' Committee in October 1945 with its report being postponed pending a determination of the status of Japanese islands. He now stated he understood that "in the meantime some of the departments represented on the committee have been giving study to the problems involved."[18] It is not known whether Krug had planted this memorandum in the White House or whether he did not approach President Truman until he sent his letter dated May 12, 1947. The main point is that pressure was being put on the State Department to call a meeting of the Four Secretaries' Committee to reconsider the problem of administration of the Pacific islands.

On May 14, 1947, probably as a result of Krug's letter of May 12, President Truman sent the following memorandum urging action to the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior:

> Almost two years ago I asked the Department of State, War, Navy and Interior to

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17. Harry S. Truman Library, Krug to President, May 12, 1947, Official file 85-L.

18. Library of Congress, President to Secretary of State, May 7, 1947, Krug papers.

> make recommendations to me for the purpose of implementing a Civil Government in the Pacific Islands which we then held and which we proposed to take over.
>
> I have a memorandum from the Secretary of the Interior [possibly the proposed plan of February 22, 1946, or Krug's report of his tour]. I have no report from the Cabinet Committee and no further information on the subject, except a recommendation which was published in the Sunday New York Times [sic] by a Civilian Committee, which the Navy had asked to make a survey. I'd like very much to have the Cabinet Committee get together and coordinate a plan to present to me.
>
> It is particularly necessary that we implement a Civil Government in Guam, at least with the privileges that are now obtained in Puerto Rico, and a survey should be made of all the other islands which we have under our control for the purpose of giving the native populations the best Civil Government possible.[19]

This searing memorandum was, however, unnecessary to the starting of consideration of this problem by the Four Secretaries' Committee. Secretary Marshall had written to Secretary Krug that very same day in response to Krug's letter of May 3, 1947, suggesting a meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior after the Cabinet meeting on Friday, May 16.[20] While the President's memorandum was, therefore, unnecessary in that respect, it did place increased pressure on the four Secretaries to arrive at a joint plan expeditiously; and it did indicate that the President desired civil governments in the islands. The President's memorandum takes a far

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19. Harry S. Truman Library, President to Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Interior, May 14, 1947, Official file 85-L.

20. Library of Congress, Marshall to Krug, May 14, 1947, Krug papers.

sharper tone than his earlier, May 7, memorandum to the Secretary of State. The concern over the Guamanian petition combined with Secretary Krug's letter evidently produced this sharper tone.

Secretary Marshall's letter indicated that the meeting time was satisfactory to the Secretaries of War and Navy and included a list of five recommendations concerning this matter that SWNCC had just submitted to its three departments. It is interesting to note that SWNCC had been working on the problem of administration of all of the American controlled Pacific islands during the early months of 1947. Interior had only learned of this work via a "confidential source" about May 1, 1947. The SWNCC subcommittee was so far along on its task that the five recommendations had been submitted to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on May 9, 1947. This fact, plus the fact that Marshall cleared the proposed meeting with the Secretaries of War and Navy prior to suggesting it to Interior, is indicative of the success of SWNCC and of the development of the field of politico-military relations in general. The President's directive of October 20, 1945, appointing the Four Secretaries' (State, War, Navy, and Interior) Committee to work on this matter had been completely ignored or frustrated by the three-member departments of SWNCC.

After May 1947, however, Interior was not to be denied entry into discussions on this matter. This change was because the status of the mandated islands had been established, because of President Truman's strong memorandum and because Interior managed to insert the word "civilian" in

the SWNCC recommendations. Prior to describing this last action of Interior's, the five recommendations submitted by SWNCC on May 9, 1947, and transmitted to Interior by Marshall on May 14 should be listed as follows:

(a) That separate organic legislation for Guam and American Samoa granting citizenship, a bill of rights, legislative powers to island representatives and an independent judiciary, should be drafted by the Navy Department and introduced in Congress as soon as possible.
(b) That organic legislation for the Trust Territory, to be drafted by the Department of State, should be introduced in Congress as soon as possible after the trusteeship agreement enters into force.
(c) That these laws should authorize the President to determine which agency or agencies of the U. S. Government should have permanent administrative responsibility therein.
(d) That the Navy Department should continue to have administrative responsibility for the islands on an interim basis pending determination of the agency or agencies to be given responsibility.
(e) That pursuant to this, an Executive Order be issued upon approval by Congress of the trusteeship agreement, terminating military government in the Trust Territory and delegating civil administration to the Navy Department on an interim basis.[21]

These civil rights and measures of self-government were the points that Krug, in his report to the President, had argued so forcefully as expressing the basic philosophy of the American Government. Krug, however, intertwined them with "civilian" administration. Perhaps he felt that military personnel in uniform could not provide for these rights. However, this argument is weakened by the fact that he found no misgovernment

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21. Ibid.

by the Navy and later attempted, successfully in many cases, to induce the naval administrators to leave the naval service and work in their same positions for Interior after the islands were transferred from the Navy to Interior. These officers had been trained at The School of Naval Administration (SONA) at Stanford University. A good description of this school and its graduates is given in Dorothy E. Richard, CDR, U.S.N.R., United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Volume II, pp. 147-173).

The Interior Department had only two days to prepare for the May 16 meeting. Using the five points listed in Marshall's letter (the SWNCC subcommittee recommendations) as a basis for discussion, a position paper was developed for Secretary Krug. The position paper listed several "basic premises." The most pertinent ones are quoted as follows:

> (1) There should be civil governments for civilian populations under the American flag in time of peace.
>
> (2) Such civil governments must be founded on Organic Acts, which are in effect constitutions, wherein the Congress of the United States prescribes the form of government for the area concerned. That government must be a democratic form in which the local inhabitants will participate to the greatest extent possible....
>
> (5) The right and power of the armed forces of the United States to take, use, and exclusively occupy for military purposes such land areas and harbor and anchorage facilities as are needed in the interest of national defense, must be confirmed and safeguarded.
>
> (6) Administrative responsibility and the functions of territorial and dependent area administration for all dependent areas of the United States, including the Pacific Island Trust Territory, must

be centralized in one office or agency of the Federal Government. That office must be given a status of sufficient importance in the structure of government to give power and effect to its policies and to give it access to the highest councils of government. If placed in one of the Departments, it will have access to the President at Cabinet level and can treat with other Departments on a position of equality. If made a separate and independent bureau or office, steps should be taken to ensure it position of such stature as to enable it to effectively look [sic] after the interests of the peoples for whom it must speak in the councils of our government.

(7) The Department of the Interior has long experience and a working knowledge with respect to dependent areas of the United States which it has gained in the handling of the affairs of U. S. territories and island possessions. If Guam, Samoa and the Trust Territory are not placed in the Division of Territories of Interior, then the Division of Territories of Interior should be combined with such new office or agency as may be established for the administration of territorial affairs. The Division's record in developing and fostering the territories on the road to self-government or statehood combined with its small budget suggest that the first alternative be followed (combine all areas in the Division of Territories).[22]

The reasons stated in this position paper for granting Interior the administrative responsibility for the Pacific islands seem much more logical than the earlier reasons given by Ickes and Krug ("military" government vs. "civilian" government). These logical arguments of experience and consolidation were solid arguments for Secretary Krug to take with him

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22. Library of Congress, Suggestion Position for State-War-Navy-Interior Conversations, undated and unsigned, Krug papers.

to the Four Secretaries' Committee meeting.

The position paper suggested two goals for Krug to attempt to achieve at the meeting. These two goals related to the five points listed in Marshall's letter. When point (d) of the list (recommending that the Navy Department should continue to have administrative responsibility on an interim basis) was brought up for discussion, Krug was to "agree that the Navy Department continue to have administrative responsibility for the trust territory on an interim basis pending determination of the agency to be given permanent responsibility PROVIDED the interim is precisely and definitely defined either as a definite period of years (1-2-3-5) or as 'an interim period not to exceed ___ years.' (In the case of Guam and American Samoa which have been American possessions for almost 50 years, an interim, if agreed upon at all, should not be more than one year)."[23] [Emphasis in original]

The other goal Krug was to achieve at the meeting was to make his agreement to point (e) of the SWNCC recommendations (recommending that an Executive Order should be issued terminating military government in the Trust Territory and delegating civil administration to the Navy Department on an interim basis) conditional "on the acceptance of the proviso stated in (d) above, re the fixing of the number of years to be considered as constituting the 'interim period.'"[24]

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23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

The results of the May 16, 1947, meeting and subsequent meetings were reported to the President on June 18, 1947, in a memorandum from Secretary of State Marshall. A summary of the conclusions reached at thatmeeting have also been located attached to an Interior Department internal memorandum dated July 15, 1947. Excerpts from these two documents will be quoted below. These documents, however, do not describe the actual discussions at the May 16 meeting during which the critical decisions were made. Fortunately, Secretary Krug evidently had transcripts made of his more important telephone conversations. At 11:55 a.m. on May 16, 1947, just after he returned from the meeting, Krug called his Assistant Secretary Girard Davidson to inform him of what had occurred at the meeting.

This transcript of the telephone call is the only document available that covers the actual discussions at this critical meeting. Therefore, only one side of the story, i.e., Interior's, is known. The motivations that led Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Secretary of State Marshall, and Secretary of War Patterson to agree to the decisions are, therefore, conjectured. These motivations will be speculated upon later.

The five points of the SWNCC recommendations were discussed in order. On the first point concerning organic legislation for Guam and American Samoa, agreement was reached with the modification that amendments would be attached to existing bills before Congress, rather than the submission of new bills. The second point (recommending that the State Department draft organic legislation for the Trust Territory and that this

legislation should be introduced in Congress as soon as possible after the trusteeship agreement enters into force) was accepted with the proviso that the State Department would give Interior a chance to look at the proposals for the bill on the Trust Territory. It was agreed then that the President would decide on the permanent administrative agency for Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory.

Then point (d) (Navy Department to continue to have interim administrative responsibility on an interim basis) came up for discussion. Krug described the critical decision to Davidson as follows:

> On (d), question there of interim responsibility in the Navy Department. All agreed subject to the provision that we discussed this morning that at earliest practical date the President would place in the hands of a civilian agency the civilian government functions relating to these ideas. They agreed to that. They squawked and creaked, particularly Forrestal, but Marshall seemed to think it was a sound thing to do. They all agreed to it.[25]

Krug and Davidson, evidently that very morning prior to the meeting, had agreed to push for including the word "civilian" in the fourth point. The last point (e) (recommending the termination of military government and delegation of civil administration to the Navy Department on an interim basis by means of an Executive Order after Congress approved the trusteeship agreement) was then approved subject to the conditions of the revised point (d).

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25. Library of Congress, telephone transcript, Krug to Davidson, May 16, 1947, Krug papers.

David then asked Krug, "that is earliest practicable date. You didn't discuss time?" Krug replied:

> Yes, we did. In the opinion of the Navy any move to take out Navy control while major construction program under way in Guam would be fatal thing. Thing they were worried about mostly is difficulty of Guamanian laborers. I suggest [sic] at the end of the year, but both Army and Navy were very adamant it would be too soon. Finally decided this group could decide as to date. I was very pleased. Finally they all seemed to understand desirability of ultimate civilian control. Patterson thought it ought to be in Interior Department rather than a new one.[26]

Later in the telephone conversation Krug stated, "I brought up at the end without being too cantankerous, my feeling about the way they have operated in this deal."[27] Then, he continued with the portion of the telephone conversation quoted in Chapter Three (pp. 188-189) about Patterson's recounting Byrnes' strained relations with Ickes being a factor in the failure of the Four Secretaries' Committee to meet. The telephone conversation then continued:

> Krug: Difficulty arose over feeling of all three of them [Marshall, Forrestal, and Patterson]. One thing we have to keep in mind in our dealings on these matters is that military people are just full of instances where civilian government has worked bad in time of emergency. Marshall can cite you chapter and verse ... [of] all kinds of instances in the Hawaiian Islands in the early days where civilian governors balked the defense effort.... [Krug then repeated some of Marshall's instances.]
>
> I know and realize the problems we are up against and I would be the last one to say our jurisdictional desires and sincere interest in civil rights endanger the country

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26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

> in time of war. It seems to me some way should be worked out to get things they need. They said as long as you [Krug] are Secretary of the Interior we aren't worried about it but how do we know he [Ickes] won't be back in the future.
>
> Davidson: Maybe we can work out some language that will protect them on that.
>
> Krug: That is one reason I don't want James on that job. He is too vindictive on the subject. [Referring to Roy E. James, Head of the Pacific Branch, Division of Territories and Island Possessions.][28]

This, then, is the sole available account of the meeting on May 16, 1947, between the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior. Another document entitled, "Conclusions Reached by the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior on May 16, 1947 On the Administration of the Pacific Islands" was located attached to an Interior memorandum of July 15, 1947. This document listed six points as conclusions "incorporating modifications suggested by Secretary Krug and agreed to in principle by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy."[29]

The first point listed was, as Krug described it, amendments to existing bills before Congress but added that these amendments would be "agreed upon between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior. Such legislation would become effective immediately except for the transfer of jurisdiction to a civilian agency which would be accomplished at a

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28. Ibid.

29. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Document titled "Conclusions Reached by the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior on May 16, 1947, on the Administration of the Pacific Islands," attached to memorandum from Roy E. James to Robert E. Day, July 15, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

later date."[30]

The second point, concerning organic legis ation for the Trust Territory, was unchanged from the original SWNCC recommendation. No mention was made of any agreement for State granting Interior a chance to look at the proposals for this bill.

The third point was the same as the original SWNCC recommendation; Krug having approved it. The fourth point, however, was very different from that described by Secretary Krug in his telephone conversation. It was listed on this document as follows:

> d. That the Navy Department should continue to have administrative responsibility for the islands [referring to all of the Pacific islands: Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory] on an interim basis pending the determination of the agency to be given permanent responsibility, provided that wherever there is a significant civilian population the civilian government of these islands will be headed up in a civilian department of the government, at the earliest practicable date, to be determined by the President.[31]

The fifth point was as described by Krug in the telephone conversation with Davidson; and the new sixth point stated that the four Departments, in commenting on the legislation to effect the foregoing, would withdraw any previous comments made to the Bureau of the Budget.

Therefore, the two versions differ slightly in their interpretations regarding conclusions reached at this meeting. The Interior document was attached to a memorandum written by

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30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

Mr. James on July 15, 1947. In the memorandum, Mr. James referred to the attached document as being a copy of a letter that the Secretary of State transmitted to the President on June 18, 1947, containing a summary of the May 16 discussion of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior. However, the letter that Secretary of State Marshall sent to the President on June 18, 1947, has been located; and it differs from the document attached to the James memorandum.

The Marshall letter was enclosed in a letter that the President sent to Senator Vandenberg, President of the Senate pro tempore, on June 19, 1947. President Truman forwarded Marshall's letter to the Senate for its information and for its inclusion in the Congressional Record. Therefore, an accurate copy of Marshall's report to the President is available.

Marshall's report differs in minor details from the two accounts given above of the decisions reached at the May 16, 1947, meeting. The differences are probably due to further revision of the points by the four Secretaries. Marshall reported to the President that several meetings of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior had been held on this matter. The report then lists five points of agreement which are quoted as follows:

> 1. Separate organic legislation for Guam to provide civil government and to grant citizenship, a bill of rights, and legislative powers to Guamanians should be enacted this session. In recent hearings on such organic legislation the Departments have recommended the transfer of administration from the Navy Department to a civilian agency

designated by the President at the earliest practicable date, the exact date to be determined by the President.

2. Organic legislation for American Samoa, providing civil government and granting citizenship, a bill or rights, and legislative powers should be prepared by the Navy and Interior Departments and presented to the next session of Congress.

3. Suggestions for organic legislation for those Pacific islands placed under United States trusteeship are in preparation by the Department of State for presentation to Congress, provided favorable congressional action is taken on the trusteeship agreement to be shortly presented for approval.

4. The Navy Department should continue to have administrative responsibility for Guam and American Samoa on an interim basis pending the transfer to a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date, such date to be determined by the President. With respect to the trust territory, a similar transfer should be effected by the President at the earliest practicable date.

5. Provided Congress acts favorably on the trusteeship agreement, an Executive order should be issued when the agreement enters into force terminating military government in the trust territory and delegating civil administration to the Navy Department on an interim basis, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 4.[32] [Emphasis added]

This was the official report sent to the President. There is no reference to "significant civilian population" being the criteria for having the "civilian government ... headed up in a civilian department of the government ..." Secretary Krug's telephone conversation gives an account of the flavor of the meeting and the way in which he interpreted the decisions reached at that meeting. Probably the document attached to the James memorandum which summarized the conclusions was the

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32. U. S. Congressional Record, Senate, Marshall to the President, June 18, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st sess., June 19, 1947, p. 7434.

one mentioned in the following memorandum from J. E. Fobes, of the Bureau of the Budget, to Charles Murphy, of the White House, dated May 23, 1947:

> A draft memorandum prepared by General Marshall summarizing the conversation held by the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Interior on May 16 has been revised after suggestions by Interior. It will be considered at a second meeting of the four Secretaries on Monday, May 26, and presumably will then go to the President.[33]

At the later meetings, the four Secretaries would have arrived at a common interpretation which was presented by Marshall to the President. It must be remembered that Admiral Nimitz, the Chief of Naval Operations at this time, had a deep belief that only one agency should administer the Micronesian islands. He had once even recommended the Department of the Interior for the job, if the Army continued to demand the administration of certain of the Micronesian islands. He surely would have argued for naval administration if he had been present at the meeting; yet, if he saw the interpretation of the decisions which lists the "significant civilian population" criteria, he would have probably insisted that there be only one agency for all of the islands, whether or not they had large populations.

One hypothesis that would logically explain the differences of the three documents concerning the point about "civilian agency" would be as follows. Secretary Krug probably

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33. The Harry S. Truman Library, J. E. Fobes, Bureau of the Budget, to Charles Murphy, White House, May 23, 1947, Official files 85-L.

laid great stress on the island peoples, their government, rights, and political advancement. He also probably recognized that the military should have jurisdiction over their bases--almost all of which were in caretaker status at that time. These points were in his briefing paper as Interior's premises on the subject.

On the other side, various military leaders, as long ago as the Brownell-Sullivan Report of January 6, 1946, had recognized that the Ryukyus should be administered by Interior because of the islands' large population. Marshall, Forrestal, and Patterson may well have been ignorant of Admiral Nimitz' feelings about having only one agency administer the former mandated islands for military reasons. They may, therefore, have agreed with Krug that a civilian agency should administer the islands that possessed a large population. These would be Guam, American Samoa and, in their opinion, only Saipan in the former mandated islands. They would have interpreted the agreement as meaning that all of the Pacific islands, except those with large populations, would have their administering agency (military or civilian) determined by the President with the proviso that heavily populated islands should go to a civilian agency.

Krug would have seen this agreement from the other side, i.e., the understanding that all of the islands, except for military bases, would be under civilian administration. This, indeed, was the situation in Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico.

Later, Admiral Nimitz may have persuaded Forrestal that only one agency should administer all the islands. Possibly

Krug, finding out about the different interpretations when the summary was distributed, persuaded the others to his interpretation.

The main point is that a critical decision was made, either at the May 16 meeting or shortly thereafter, in terms of specifying that the agency having permanent administrative responsibility for the former Japanese mandated islands would be a civilian agency designated by the President.

Secretary of State Marshall seems to have supported Krug on the "civilian agency" point even with his low opinion of the record of civilian governments in time of emergencies. Secretary of War Patterson, perhaps with the Ryukyus Islands especially in mind, seems to have objected at first but then agreed and even mentioned that Interior should have the job rather than a new agency. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal's agreement to the proposal is unexplainable, particularly in light of the strong stand he and the Navy had consistently maintained throughout. Moreover, no governmental bureaucracy willingly relinquishes its scope of jurisdiction; indeed, it usually attempts to increase its scope of jurisdiction as Interior was attempting to do. This decision to transfer administrative authority to a civilian agency not only applied to the Trust Territory but, also, to islands that had been under naval administration for over fifty years, i.e., Guam and American Samoa. Unfortunately, Forrestal's diaries do not mention the May 16 meeting or this decision or, for that matter, any following meetings on this subject.

After the May 16, 1947, meeting, the struggle was over

for all practical purposes. There were a few rear-guard actions by the Navy, but the Interior Department maintained undisputed command of the situation.

* * *

One factor that may have influenced Forrestal's decision to accept the ultimate transfer of administrative responsibility to a civilian agency was the Congressional opinion on this matter. On December 21, 1946, the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the House Naval Affairs Committee, which had called for dominant, outright control of the Micronesian islands in their 1945 report, submitted a supplemental report after a tour of the Pacific. The report praised the naval government in Micronesia in glowing terms; however, it also made the following recommendation:

> This committee feels that it is desirable for the future to have a civil administration over the islands of the Pacific. Our Navy, as a professional military organization, should not be saddled with the expense and responsibility of administering this far-flung panorama of islands. The Navy should only be concerned with strategic bases and their maintenance upon a basis of mutuality and security of the territory under our guidance.[34]

Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana reported on his Far Eastern and Pacific trip to the House on February 3, 1947, as follows:

> I would prefer to have the United States assume complete and undisputed control of

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34. U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of Pacific Bases, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Supplemental Report dated December 21, 1946, p. 8.

> the mandates....
>
> If, however, it does become necessary to create a trusteeship for these islands, I would favor the proposals made by our State Department and President Truman ... [the draft strategic trusteeship agreement had been announced]
>
> The question of government is bound to be an important consideration. For a long time I have studied the possibility of civil government for the mandates, but, desirable though that would be, I have come to the conclusion that the only way they could be governed for the present would be by the Navy on the same basis as Guam and Samoa are administered. Personally, I would rather have a civil administration over the mandates, but, in view of practical and realistic considerations, I am forced to the conclusion that the Navy would be the best administrator. It would have the best and only means of maintaining liaison between the various islands and it would have the only trained personnel to carry out the job of administration. Stanford University, which has the task of training military government men for administration of the islands, has done an outstanding job in this respect, and both it and the Navy are to be complimented for the initiative shown and the progress already made....
>
> I should like to repeat, in conclusion, that my own personal opinion is that civil administration would be best for the mandates. This, however, is impractical at this time, due to the circumstances mentioned. It is necessary, though, that the eventual change over to civilian control be given a thorough study by the Navy Department so that recommendations can be made at the appropriate time to achieve this goal.[35]

Here, again, was the intertwining of the concepts of civil government with civilian government. Forrestal's one letter to the press (The New York Times, September 24, 1946) had tried to emphasize the distinction between "civil" and "civilian"

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35. U. S. Congressional Record, House, Statement by Representative Mike Mansfield, February 3, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st sess., February 3, 1947, pp. 807-811.

government and the fact that the Navy had a good record in the civil government of Guam and American Samoa, even with the lack of any organic act (or guidance from Congress) as to civil rights and development toward self-government. Perhaps Forrestal was just tired of the whole controversy at the time of the May 16 decision. He had the more important controversy of the military services' unification issue demanding his time. Secretary Marshall's support for the inclusion of the "civilian agency" term may have been the final factor that tipped Forrestal into acceptance of the proposal.

There is only one indication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's position on this matter. In a letter from Secretary Krug to Representative Robert T. Secrest dated March 10, 1949, Krug refers to the decision that the islands' administration should be transferred to a civilian agency at the earliest practicable date. He then added, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that they had no objection to this recommendation from a military point of view."[36] After this time (May-June 1947), the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not involved in this matter, it being mainly one of consultations between the Navy and Interior Departments.

The President, in his forwarding letter to the Senate on June 19, 1947, gave his approval to Secretary of State Marshall's report of the agreements reached by the Four Secretaries' Committee dated only the day before. The President also mentioned

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36. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Krug to Secrest, March 10, 1949, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 3.

his appointment of the Four Secretaries' Committee on October 20, 1945, the fact that it had seemed advisable to postpone any final recommendations until after the status of the former mandated islands had been determined, and the fact that he had asked the committee to resume its consideration after the Security Council had approved the draft trusteeship agreement. He then stated that the report of the Committee (Marshall's June 18 letter) would be of interest to the Congress " in connection with its consideration of legislation to provide civilian government for these islands."[37] The President concluded his letter to the Senate with the following comment:

> I hope that the Congress will approve legislation for the purposes indicated in the enclosed report and that such legislation will provide for the full enjoyment of civil rights and for the greatest practicable measure of self-government.[38]

By this action of sending Marshall's report of the agreements reached by the Four Secretaries' Committee to the Senate for its information and for its inclusion in the Congressional Record and by his comments in the forwarding letter, President Truman not only indicated his approval of the agreements reached by the Four Secretaries' Committee but also made them public.

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37. U. S. Congressional Record, Senate, President to Senator Vandenberg, June 19, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st sess., June 19, 1947, p. 7434.

38. Ibid.

The strategic trusteeship agreement was formally introduced to Congress on July 3, 1947, in the form of a joint resolution authorizing the President to approve it. The State Department had pondered over the correct procedure to obtain Congressional approval of the trusteeship agreement, whether by Congressional Joint Resolution or by the treaty procedure in the Senate, and had decided upon the joint resolution format.

Admiral Nimitz appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 7, 1947, and recommended the approval of the trusteeship agreement. Admiral Nimitz emphasized in his comments the strategic importance of the islands to the security of the United States. He talked of the future when he stated:

> It is felt that the relationship of the territory of the Pacific to our own security will assume a far more vital character in the future. The development of new long-range weapons of tremendous destructive potential requires that we be prepared for the future, although it is difficult to foresee at this time what the strategic and tactical uses of these new weapons will eventually be. We feel that we must maintain our hard won control over the area in order that we may deny to any future enemy access to the Western Hemisphere by way of the Central Pacific.[39]

Admiral Nimitz recommended the approval of the agreement in order to resolve the "present uncertain status of the territory."[40] No mention was made by him of the long, and sometimes

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39. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Statement by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, CNO, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 7, 1947, CNO files (SC) A14-7EF.

40. Ibid.

bitter controversy between the annexationists and the officials who wanted to submit the islands to trusteeship. No mention was made by him to the effect that he had always favored annexation.

In a statement submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 7, 1947, Secretary Forrestal gave his assent to the trusteeship agreement. He also stressed the strategic importance of the islands while omitting any reference to either the annexation option or the question of which agency would administer the islands.[41]

This, then, was a case of the military establishment, both its military and civilian parts, supporting a Presidential decision before Congress. Secretary Forrestal had been agreeable to trusteeship at the October 22, 1946, Presidential meeting, but Admiral Nimitz was definitely opposed to it. Thus, for Admiral Nimitz, the perennial civil-military question arose. To what extent is the Congress entitled to the straightforward views of the uniformed military leaders when those officers differ with the civilian leadership in the Executive Branch of the Government? Congress maintains it has the right to receive such testimony and has even passed laws supposedly protecting those governmental officials, military and civilian, who testify before its committees.

For example, the National Security Act of 1947 (passed on July 25, 1947), which was being considered by Congress at the time of Admiral Nimitz' testimony on the trusteeship agreement, specifically states that nothing in the Act would prevent

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41. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Statement by Secretary Forrestal before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 7, 1947, CNO files (SC) A14/EF.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff from having direct access to Congress. However, while the law states that the officers have the right to testify before the Congress, there is no indication that the officers have the duty to do so. As a practical matter, the uniformed officers have been indoctrinated in the concept that the "civilian control of the military" emanates mainly from the President (the Commander-in-Chief) and his subordinates within the Executive Branch. With an inate sense of respect for authority, and a desire, as Marshall phrased it, to be a member of the team, it is extremely difficult for an uniformed military leader to appeal to the Congress for assistance in a policy dispute between him and his superiors within the Executive Branch. Admiral Nimitz certainly could not have been worried about his career; therefore, the other factors must have influenced his decision to let the past be past and not to attempt, once more, to obtain the annexation of the former mandated islands.

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On July 18, 1947, Congress passed the joint resolution authorizing the President to approve the trusteeship agreement. The President signed the trusteeship agreement on the same day.[42]

The same day as the ratification of the trusteeship agreement, July 18, 1947, military government of the islands was terminated by Executive Order No. 9875, which also appointed

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42. Public Law 204, 80th Congress, 1st session.

the Navy Department as interim administrator pending the transfer to a civilian department or agency.

One incident occurred over the drafting of this Executive Order. The original draft had been developed within the SWNCC subcommittee and made no mention of the word "civilian."[43] On July 15, 1947, Secretary Krug wrote a letter to Secretary Marshall mentioning this omission and requesting that the word "civilian" be inserted before the words "department or agency."[44] He also noticed that neither the draft Executive Order or the proposed draft release placed any limitation on the duration of the interim period of naval administration. The public statement draft did, however, contain the words "at the earliest practicable date." Secretary Krug, therefore, requested that "a statement that such period will not exceed one year or eighteen months would be helpful in connection with planning, which the civilian agency must necessarily undertake in advance of the actual transfer."[45]

Following the signing of this letter, Roy E. James, Chief of the Pacific Branch of Interior's Division of Territories and Island Possessions, telephoned Captain Jennings, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Island Governments, on the matter. Captain Jennings told James, that while he could not speak

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43. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, SWNCC 364/1. May 9, 1947, Declassified October 21, 1969, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

44. Library of Congress, Krug to Marshall, July 15, 1947, Krug papers.

45. Ibid.

for Secretary Forrestal, it was his opinion that the Navy Department probably would not agree to the insertion of the word "civilian" as suggested by Interior.[46]

On that same day, however, Secretary Marshall agreed with the request to insert the word "civilian" and persuaded Secretary Forrestal to accept it.[47] The final draft of the Executive Order reflects this change.

Krug's second request--to fix a maximum time within which the transfer of administrative responsibility for the trust territory should be effected--did not fare so well. The Executive Order did not mention any time-frame for the transfer, but the President's public statement did include the words "at the earliest practicable date." Marshall and Forrestal evidently felt this statement was sufficient, and the drafts were not changed in this respect.

Secretary of State Marshall answered Krug's letter on August 5, 1947, stating that the fixing of a maximum time for the transfer of administration "should, in the view of this Department, be considered by the four Secretaries in conjunction with the recommendations which should be made to the President as to the designation of the civilian agency which should have permanent administrative responsibility for the trust territory."[48]

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46. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, James to Robert E. Day, July 15, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

47. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Day to Krug, July 15, 1947, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 2.

48. Library of Congress, Marshall to Krug, August 5, 1947, Krug papers.

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By the end of November 1947, the State Department had prepared a draft organic legislation for the Trust Territory and submitted it for comments to Interior and Navy.[49] James P. Davis, Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Interior Department, felt that the draft was inadequate both in terms of organizing a government, and in taking into account the diversity among the island groups that made up the Trust Territory. He indicated in a memorandum that the Navy had parallel adverse comments on the State Department draft.[50]

Because of these adverse comments, a series of interdepartmental conferences were required to revise the draft to meet everyone's suggestions. The resultant draft organic legislation, dated January 14, 1948, was submitted by the State Department to the Bureau of the Budget, which in turn, submitted some question to the Department of Justice.[51]

While the proposed organic act was in the Bureau of the Budget, the President made his determination as to which civilian agency would have the permanent administrative

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49. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum from Irwin W. Silverman, Chief Counsel, to Under Secretary Chapman, November 20, 1947, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.

50. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum from Davis to Secretary of the Interior, December 1, 1947, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.

51. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum on status of Pacific Island legislation, February 2, 1948, and memorandum from Davis to Secretary of the Interior, April 15, 1948, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.

responsibility for the Trust Territory, Guam, and American Samoa. On February 11, 1948, the President wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Interior (copy to the Secretary of the Navy) which stated:

> It is my intention, upon approval of organic acts for the aforementioned islands [Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory], to designate the Department of the Interior as the civilian agency with general supervision over civil administration of those islands. Assumption by the Department of such responsibility, of course, will await transfer from the Department of the Navy which should be effected at the earliest practicable date after approval of the organic acts. Designation of the Department of the Interior will be without prejudice to study and determination, based upon further study of long-range plans for administration of United States territories and possessions.[52]

The President made reference to his letter to the Congress on June 19, 1947, transmitting the Secretary of State's June 18 letter indicating the agreements reached by the Four Secretaries' Committee, It, therefore, would appear that the President never formally sent a letter directly to the four Secretaries approving their decisions but, rather, only communicated his approval indirectly by means of his letter to the Congress. The President informed the Secretary of the Interior that he was advising him of the intention to designate Interior in order that Interior could "expedite preparatory planning for an orderly transition to civil government and for speedy achievement of the aims of this Government with respect to its territories

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52. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, President to Secretary of the Interior, February 11, 1948, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.

as expressed in the aforesaid communication to the Congress and in the recent Message on the State of the Union."[53] It would also appear, therefore, that there was no direct communication from the President to the Department of the Interior stating what the policy and aims of the Government should be in the territories and island possessions. Using letters to the Congress and the State of the Union message as a means of communication within the Executive Branch is a very interesting concept, to say the least. Various governmental policies are often made by means of Presidential letters to Congress and the State of the Union Message. These means, however, should not be utilized to communicate policies to members of one's "own team," i.e., from the President to his subordinates within the Executive Branch. While this procedure is not recommended, in reality it does take place.

Furthermore, this decision by the President to designate Interior as the administering agency was not the result, as far as can be determined, of any consultation between the departments concerned (State, Interior, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force).[54] Nor was it a result of any suggestion by Interior. It appears to have originated purely from the President's Executive Office. It, of course, is the logical decision based on the assumption that a civilian agency would administer the islands. The choice could only be between Interior or some newly created agency. In his letter of February 11, 1948,

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53. Ibid.

54. By the National Security Act of 1947, the Department of Defense was created with its sub-departments of the Army (formerly the War Department), Air Force (formerly the Army Air Corps), and the Navy.

President Truman even kept open the option of an eventual new agency to govern territories and island possessions contingent on future study and determination of long-range plans.

* * *

In April 1948, the President received petitions from Guam and American Samoa asking that the Navy remain in control. He sent these petitions to Mr. David Stowe, evidently on his staff, asking that Stowe get all the interested agencies together and report what should be done.[55] At the resultant meeting, Mr. Stowe asked Captain Jennings "who held the gun while the natives signed [the petitions]."[56] Jennings protested that both resolutions were entirely spontaneous, based on the apprehension of the islanders that the new system would involve disruption of their customs and way of living. Then the question of the various organic legislative acts was raised.

It was the impression of all present (representatives of State, Interior, Navy, and Budget were present) that the Congressional Committees would desire to make a personal investigation of conditions in the islands before passing on the legislation. They, therefore, agreed that passage of the legislation was unlikely during the current Congressional

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55. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum from Davis to Secretary of the Interior, April 15, 1943, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman, Division of Territories.

56. Ibid.

session, although the draft legislation should be submitted as soon as possible anyway.

The President's letter of February 11, 1948, to Interior was mentioned; and it was decided that, in view of the legislation situation, there was no urgency in making any decisions as to steps to be taken implementing that letter.[57]

The draft legislation for the Trust Territory was finally introduced in the Congress on May 21, 1948, as S.J. RES. 221 and was referred to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House Sub-Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs of the House Public Lands Committee.

On the same day, legislation (H. CON. RES. 129) was introduced to establish a Senate-House joint committee to study the question of organic legislation for Guam, American Samoa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This committee was subsequently established while the organic bill for the Trust Territory was retained in the committees.

The Joint Investigating Committee included Senators Cordon (Chairman), O'Mahoney, Wiley and Malone plus Representatives Crawford and Fulton. This committee planned to depart from San Francisco on November 29, 1948, and return about December 20, 1948.

At an informal meeting of this committee on July 2, 1948, the question of organic legislation was discussed with Benjamin Gerig and Emil J. Sady of the State Department's Division of Dependent Areas; Captains Jennings, P. G. Hale, and Hammack of the Navy; and Rex Lee and James P. Davis of Interior.

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57. Ibid.

Mr. Davis reported to the Secretary of the Interior that Captain Jennings, "ignoring entirely the recommendation of the four Secretaries to the President, made last spring, that a civilian government be organized for all three of the areas, ... presented an argument for the continuation of Naval administration [of the Trust Territory]."[58]

Mr. Davis reported that he had pointed out that Interior's position rested "entirely on the joint recommendation of the four Secretaries and the President's letter of February 11,.... I mentioned also our traditional responsibility for matters affecting the territories and possessions."[59]

Senator Wiley indicated at that meeting a "strong inclination to leave the Navy in control."[60] Therefore, Davis recommended that the Secretary of the Interior or the Under Secretary attend the next meeting of the joint committee and "state as strongly as possible the case for civilian administration under other than a military department."[61]

Nothing came of this attempt by Captain Jennings to influence the Senate-House Joint Committee; and, in fact, the committee never went on the scheduled investigation trip to the Pacific. On October 28, 1948, Senator Cordon informed Secretary Krug that "in view of the apparent inability of any member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to leave the

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58. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Davis to Secretary of the Interior, July 2, 1948, RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

United States during November and December, I regret that it has been necessary to postpone the investigation indefinitely."[62]

Meanwhile, between July 2, 1948, and August 11, 1948, Emil J. Sady moved to Interior from the State Department and relieved Roy E. James as Chief of the Pacific Branch of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions. Sady had been a strong advocate of civilian administration of all territories while in the State Department and now assumed the leadership within Interior for the transfer planning.

Access to all files, reports and other information concerning Guam, American Samoa and the Trust Territory was granted Mr. Sady by Acting Secretary of the Navy W. John Kenney on August 24, 1948, in response to a request from Secretary Krug.[63] Additionally, Captain P. G. Hale, now the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Island Governments, was directed to render Mr. Sady "assistance to the fullest extent in developing plans for further administration."[64]

In September 1948, the Editor of the Honolulu Star Bulletin, Riley Allen, wrote to Emil P. Sady stressing that Interior should be certain it was fully ready to assume the

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62. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Senator Guy Cordon to Krug, October 28, 1948, RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.

63. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, Acting Secretary Chapman to Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, August 11, 1948, RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.

64. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of Naval Operations, August 24, 1948, ser. 949P22, CNO files, OP-22.

administration of the various Pacific islands before doing so.[65] Spurred by this letter, Secretary Krug wrote to his subordinate James P. Davis impressing upon him the importance of making sure that Interior did not take over the administrative responsibilities until it was fully prepared to assume them. Secretary Krug then continued in his letter to Davis to expound on what he considered the essential priorities involved in the planning and timing of the transfer of that responsibility:

> My own very vivid impression of Navy administration in Guam and Samoa is a very good one. Other than the fact that some of the men were in uniform, it was hard for me to imagine how the administration would be any better under Interior Department supervision. I know this sounds like heresy, but I cannot honestly say that our administration of Alaska, Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands is on a par from the point of view of taking care of the needs of the population than that now being provided by the Navy in Guam and Samoa.
>
> I fully appreciate the ideological factor and also the general psychology in the islands, in this country and throughout the work [sic], which derives from what some might consider as military government in the Pacific Islands. However, regardless of the importance of these factors, the first essential is to improve the general economy of the people and provide adequate health and educational facilities. When all that is assured, they will be well on their way to becoming good democrats with or without Navy administration.[66]

This letter no doubt disturbed Davis and Sady. James P. Davis replied to Secretary Krug, stating that his assistant,

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65. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Riley Allen to Emil J. Sady, September 15, 1948, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.

66. Library of Congress, Krug to James P. Davis, Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, October 11, 1948, Krug papers.

Sady, was "the only person we have available for this job, and he must at the same time handle matters relating to Hawaii, Canton and Enderbury (for which details of the joint administration are being worked out with the British), and other Pacific islands."[67] He then stressed the need for obtaining more funding and assistants to prepare for the transfer.

Special Assistant Dale sent a copy of Krug's letter to his superior, Under Secretary Chapman, with the following note:

> Attached is a letter from the Secretary to Director Davis regarding the civilian administration of the Pacific Islands. Its tenor is very discouraging to those of us who would like to push early civilian administration and would be wonderful propaganda to the Navy if it could get hold of it. Territories was preparing a detailed letter to the Secretary on the necessity of civilian administration last week, and hoped to get it off to him on Friday.[68]

This lack of funds and personnel within Interior compared unfavorably with the funds, resources, and personnel available within the Navy. For example, Sady's counterpart in the Navy, Captain Hale, had a large number of assistants in Washington, as well as the support of the actual staffs currently administrating the civil governments of the Trust Territory, Guam, and American Samoa. The naval personnel concerned with the islands' civil governments were largely officers performing their military obligation in this manner after receiving special training for these governmental duties.

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67. Library of Congress, Davis to Krug, October 15, 1948, Krug papers.

68. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Note to Chapman from Special Assistant Dale, October 18, 1948, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.

Mr. Sady decided to conduct a preliminary study "of the present organization of government in the three island areas and the problems involved in the transfer of responsibility" during the months of November 1948 - January 1949.[69] The Navy agreed to provide him with air transportation west of Honolulu, and Sady went to Captain Hale's office on November 9, 1948, for a farewell talk.

At this meeting, Captain Hale informed Sady that, while the military recognized the need for a smooth transfer which would require transportation and other logistic support by them for some time after the transfer, there "would be pressure from Naval Operations to release for naval duty most of the civil government personnel shortly after the transfer is effected."[70] Sady reported this to Rex Lee and continued:

> In this connection, Captain Hale pointed out that the Interior Department has had about eight months to plan for the assumption of this responsibility. He gave me the impression that the Navy would not be unhappy if Interior was shown to be negligent or inept in the matter of planning for the transfer.... This points up the need for funds and authority to get a planning staff set up in this Branch. I urge that every effort be made, through a deficiency appropriation or otherwise, to obtain funds for this purpose as soon as possible.[71]

The Navy's side of Sady's visit was described by Captain W. J. Germershausen, an assistant of Captain Hale as follows:

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69. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chapman to Sullivan, November 2, 1948, CNO files, OP-22.

70. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum from Sady to Lee, November 9, 1948, RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.

71. Ibid.

> Prior to departure from Washington for the Pacific, Mr. Sady visited this office and talked to the various officers in regard to the islands to be visited. His manner was insulting and insinuated that the present administration is incompetent and that he intended to indulge in political discussions with the natives. In talking to me, he asked for the names of various leaders to whom he should go for discussion in Samoa. He particularly asked for the names of what he termed 'the hellers'. I pressed for a definition of 'hellers' but could not elicit a clearcut answer though I concluded he meant those who were opposed to Naval Administration.[72]

Mr. Sady did go to the Pacific, and he did talk to the "hellers." He also attempted to convince many of the naval officers in administrative positions to leave the Navy and join Interior to continue in their same positions. Especially in American Samoa, but also in the Trust Territory, Sady talked to mass meetings and to local leaders stating that they would be better administered under Interior than they would be under the Navy.

As he left Guam, Sady issued a press statement that particularly disturbed Captain Hale's office. It stated in part:

> I have discovered that contrary to reports on the mainland there is no opposition in the field to the recommendations of the four secretaries or to the President's policy with respect to the transfer. Not a single officer has expressed the view that the transfer should not be made and almost everyone of the sixty or seventy

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72. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Germershausen to Hale, January 11, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.

> officers with whom I have talked expressed the view that a transfer can and should be made.[73]

The naval Governor wrote to Captain Hale's office that the officers in the government had been interviewed; and they all "denied even having been approached on the subject by Sady."[74] Captain Germershausen reported that Sady was making little "preliminary study of the present organization," spending most of his time selling the Interior Department to the island peoples.[75]

The reports from the islands became so disturbing to Captain Hale's office that a letter was drafted for Acting Secretary of the Navy John T. Koehler, addressed to Secretary of the Interior Krug, concerning the political situation in American Samoa as a result of Sady's contacts. For example, the Samoan legislature, the Fono, had been so upset with Sady's talks with the "hellers" that it, therefore, passed a unanimous resolution, shortly after Sady left, calling for a continuation of naval administration.[76] Secretary Krug replied to Koehler's letter stating that there had evidently been a misunderstanding and that Sady had met with the "majority" leaders in the islands as well as with those that reflected

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73. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Sady press statement on Guam, dispatch 170525Z, December 17, 1948, RG 126, 9-0-48, Islands Pacific Planning Pt. 1.

74. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Germershausen to Hale, January 11, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.

75. Ibid.

76. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Koehler to Krug, April 7, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.

a "minority" viewpoint.[77]

The incidents and letters described above illustrate the sense of distrust and formality that existed at this time between the Navy and Interior officers handling the problem of the administrative transfer. Captain Hale and Emil P. Sady were to continue in their respective positions throughout much of the transfer process. They worked together, and the job was accomplished; but there was no sense of friendly cooperation between their two offices.

Mr. Sady, besides worrying about the attitudes of several Congressmen and his counterparts in the Navy, had to worry about the State Department's attitude. An undated memorandum from Mr. Davis to Under Secretary of the Interior Chapman, written between October 15, 1948, and May 14, 1949, states that it had been learned that the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department "is taking the Navy's side on the transfer proposal. This Office wants a delay in the transfer 'because of the situation in China and in Southeast Asia.'"[78] Later, on June 17, 1949, Davis reported that he had learned "from a reliable source" that Francis B. Sayre, U. S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council, had written a letter to the Under Secretary of State recommending that the State Department oppose the transfer of administrative responsibility for

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77. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Krug to Sullivan, April 26, 1949, CNO files, Op-22.

78. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Davis to Chapman, undated, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.

the Trust Territory to Interior.[79] Sayre had recently visited the Trust Territory and opposed the transfer. Sayre's position, according to Davis, was based on his "lack of confidence in this Department -- an outgrowth of his relations with Interior when he was U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines."[80] Further action by Sayre in this matter will be discussed below.

The Interior Department did, however, receive a tremendous boost when President Truman signed a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Interior (copy to Navy) on May 14, 1949, in which he directed that the transfer of the three island groups proceed regardless of the status of pending legislation. He set the deadline of September 1, 1949, for the Secretary of the Interior to submit plans to him for the transfers. President Truman also mentioned that he preferred that "Guam should be transferred within the next year, and American Samoa and the Trust Territory within the next two or three years."[81]

This Presidential letter had its origin in the delays in the Congress over the enactment of the organic legislation. In fact, the Congress to this day has never passed an organic act for the Trust Territory. It also had its origin in the Interior Department the previous December. Davis submitted draft letters to Under Secretary Chapman on December 16, 1948, for the President's signature which stated the same points as

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79. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Davis to Chapman, June 17, 1949, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 3.

80. Ibid.

81. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, May 14, 1949, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories. See: Appendix P for a copy of this document.

were in the actual Presidential letter of May 14, 1949.[82] The only difference between the draft letters (addressed to State, Navy, and Interior) and the final Presidential letter is that the drafts set a transfer deadline of July 1, 1950, for all three island groups and contained no deadline for the submission of the transfer plans.

Davis mentioned in his covering memorandum to Under Secretary Chapman that Chapman "might want to talk to the President about them [the draft letters] and leave them with him when next you see him"[83] A shorthand note in the margin of this memorandum stated,"hold for further discussion."[84] Therefore, it appears that these drafts of December 1948 were held for a while and then submitted to the President resulting in the Presidential letter of May 14, 1949.

This Presidential deadline produced the desired action. On July 21, 1949, a memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Interior and the Navy Department which set forth the proposed time schedule and plan for effecting the administrative transfer of Guam was sent to the President.[85] The date of July 1, 1950, was set for the Guam transfer.

Meanwhile, discussions between Sady and Captain Hale proceeded to develop a similar memorandum of understanding

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82. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Davis to Chapman, December 16, 1948, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman - Territories.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chapman to President, July 21, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.

on the transfer of American Samoa and the Trust Territory.

Captain Hale and Mr. Sady held a conference with their assistants about August 27, 1949, to set a date for the transfer of administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory and American Samoa. The date selected was July 1, 1951, for both the Trust Territory and American Samoa.[86]

The two memoranda of understanding were drafted by Captain Hale and Emil J. Sady and submitted to their respective superiors on August 29, 1949. These memoranda were approved by Under Secretary Chapman of Interior and Acting Secretary of the Navy John T. Koehler and submitted to the President on August 31, 1949, the same day that Interior received Koehler's approval.[87]

On September 23, 1949, the President approved these memoranda of understanding between Interior and Navy which set forth time schedules and plans for effecting the transfer of administrative responsibility for American Samoa and the Trust Territory.[88] The President specifically approved the July 1, 1951, date.

The Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, transmitted these memoranda of understanding to all Navy Department

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86. The main factor involved in setting the date was the problem of sea and air transportation in the Trust Territory.

87. U. S. National Archives, Office of Territories, Assistant Secretary William E. Warne to President, August 23, 1949, RG 48, Islands Pacific Gen. Pt. 3.

88. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, President to Secretary of the Navy, September 23, 1949, CNO files, OP-22. See: Appendix Q for a copy of the Navy/Interior memorandum of understanding on the Trust Territory.

Bureaus and Offices on October 7, 1949,[89] for guidance purposes. From this date, serious steps were taken to effect the transfer of the various Pacific islands.

Relations between Sady and Hale must have improved somewhat during the summer and fall of 1949. When Captain Hale received orders to other naval duty in February 1950, Sady drafted a letter of appreciation concerning Captain Hale which Mr. Chapman signed and sent to the Secretary of the Navy. It stated in part:

> Officers in this Department who have been closely associated with Captain Hale during the past eighteen months, ... have asked me to convey to you an expression of their high regard for Captain Hale and their genuine regret that he is leaving Washington.
>
> Largely due to Captain Hale's efforts, outstanding ability, frankness, mature understanding, and loyal adherence to policies established by higher authority, the President's program with respect to the islands has gone forward efficiently and harmoniously. Naval interests and policies have marked his course in dealing with this Department. At the same time, his rich sense of humor, warmth, cooperative spirit, and determination to get things done have won him the respect and affection of his colleagues in this Department.[90]

Captain Hale must have been surprised to see this letter in his official file. The words should not be taken at face value, but they do indicate an improvement in the relationship

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89. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary of the Navy to All Bureaus and Offices, October 7, 1949, CNO files, OP-22.

90. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Chapman to Matthews, February 27, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

between the Navy's Office of Island Governments and Interior's Division of Territories and Island Possessions. The comment about Captain Hale's loyalty to policies established by higher authority is interesting in light of what happened shortly after Captain Hale was transferred.

Early in March 1950, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Koehler requested a personal memorandum from Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific and High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, "giving reasons why Navy might wish to retain the Trust Territory indefinitely, necessitating, of course, a reversal of the present Presidential directive."[91] This statement was contained in a message reporting on a conference with Mr. Koehler. The originator of the message and the exact date is unknown, but it is very important in relation to what action followed. The message continued:

> Koehler says he is on record as favoring such a solution with Mr. Pace of BUBUD [Bureau of the Budget] as result of conference in which he and Ambassador Sayre (mostly the latter) plead the Navy's case. Koehler said he was surprised to learn later that CNO was opposed to retention of Navy control beyond cut off date and asked CNO for an official statement of position in the matter. He stated that his decision whether to approach President or not through proper channels will be made after receipt and study of Adm Radford's memo (as HICOM) [High Commissioner of the Trust Territory] and CNO's statement. In this connection Sec'y of Labor Tobin assured me in Boston Saturday that he would be glad to champion Navy control of the Trust Territory with the

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91. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, message concerning transfer of Trust Territory, undated and unsigned, evidently transmitted in early March 1950, CNO files, OP-22.

> President at any time.... Have informed Mr. Koehler of Mr. Tobin's offer which he will use if Navy decides to ask for reconsideration.[92]

Admiral Radford's and the Chief of Naval Operations' statements have not been located, but they evidently were such to convince Mr. Koehler to attempt to reverse the Presidential directive.

On March 15, 1950, the Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, wrote the President proposing that the date of July 1, 1951, for the Trust Territory transfer be considered tentative. He stated that some of the problems, including those of transportation, needed to be studied and resolved. He then stated:

> Although the Department of the Navy agrees that it should relinquish responsibility for the civil administration of all Pacific Islands at the earliest practical date, it is felt that this important transfer should not be effected until it has become clearly apparent that all problems concerned therewith will be completely and satisfactorily resolved.[93]

This letter was sent directly to the President with a copy being sent to Interior for its information. James P. Davis informed Secretary Chapman (who had relieved Krug) that "The Navy boys are out of bounds on this one. They did not discuss the proposed delay with us until after the letter to the President had been signed. They allege no logical

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92. Ibid.

93. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Matthews to the President, March 15, 1950, CNO files, OP-22. Also: The Harry S. Truman Library, Official files, 85-L.

reasons for delay. The Transportation Survey is now in full progress. I think we should insist at least on awaiting result of that survey before agreeing to any modification of the schedule."[94]

Admiral Robert L. Dennison, now Naval Aide to the President, transmitted the Navy letter to Interior on March 28, 1950, stating that the President desired Secretary Chapman's views on the Secretary of the Navy's proposal.[95] Secretary Krug asked Davis to prepare a letter for him to the President along the lines of Davis' memorandum cited above. The resultant letter was signed by Chapman on April 5, 1950, which stressed that the transfer date should be maintained since all plans and budget requests were based on that date.[96]

The President evidently refused to reconsider the transfer date since there is no indication to the contrary. No reply by the President is in the files.

On June 1, 1950, the Interior and Navy Departments submitted a plan to the President for the establishment of civilian sea and air transportation services in the Trust Territory. This plan was to have been submitted by May 1, 1950, in accordance with the Interior/Navy memorandum of understanding. The plan provided that contracts were to be negotiated with a

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94. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Davis to Chapman, March 21, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

95. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Dennison to Secretary of the Interior, March 28, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

96. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Chapman to President, April 5, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

commercial shipping line and a commercial air line using government ships and planes in providing the necessary transportation services under civilian administration. President Truman approved this plan on June 6, 1950. In his approval, the President noted that the plan included a provision that "should it be apparent prior to 1 November 1950 that a civilian transportation service cannot supply essential requirements in the Trust Territory by 1 July 1951, a report of this fact will be made to me, together with a recommendation of a date subsequent to 1 July 1951 for the transfer of administrative responsibility of the Trust Territory."[97]

This provision of the plan was, therefore, the compromise between the Navy and the Interior positions which had been sent to the President in March and April.

With the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, a new situation developed in the Pacific in regard to the transfer of Guam and the Trust Territory. The Secretary of the Navy requested that the transfer of Guam be delayed "until the situation in the Western Pacific has stabilized."[98] The President, on June 30, 1950, had already postponed the transfer of Guam for one month because of some minor problems involved in the transfer. The Secretary of the Interior wrote to the President requesting that Guam's transfer not be delayed

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97. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, President to Secretaries of the Navy and Interior, June 6, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

98. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Chapman to Mr. Lawton, July 25, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

any longer.[99] The President reaffirmed the August 1, 1950, date; and Guam was transferred on that date in spite of the Korean situation.

Secretary Matthews was still attempting to delay the Trust Territory transfer date. He testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee at hearings in support of a request for funds to replace the naval sea and air transportation system in the Trust Territory with civilian transportation services by July 1, 1951. In his testimony, Secretary Matthews stated that the Navy should retain control of the Trust Territory "in this critical period" and referred to his "being overruled" on a request for postponement of the Guam transfer.[100] This testimony was released just after Christmas 1950 and was the subject of a United Press news release.[101] However, no action came as a result of his testimony.

The memorandum of understanding called for Interior to nominate a civilian High Commissioner for the Trust Territory who should be appointed by the President on or about July 1, 1950, a year before the transfer. Interior delayed in making the nomination; and in late August 1950, Secretary Matthews had asked Interior if they wanted to postpone the transfer proceedings in light of the long delay. Interior finally nominated former Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, and he was

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99. Ibid.

100. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, Dan H. Wheller, Acting Director of Office of Territories, to Secretary of the Interior, December 29, 1950, RG 48, 9-0-7, Islands Gen. Pt. 4.

101. Ibid.

appointed by the President on January 3, 1951.

The delay in the appointment of the civilian High Commissioner had retarded agreement negotiations between the two departments; but after January 1951, rapid progress was made in drafting a general transfer agreement between the Interior and Navy Departments. The transfer agreement defined the relationship between the two departments in the Trust Territory after the transfer date. It covered such matters as transfer of property, communications, transportation, security, and personnel. Additionally, after January 1951, steps were taken to replace naval officers and enlisted men engaged in government duties in the Trust Territory with qualified civilians.[102]

During the spring of 1951, the Interior and Navy Departments independently proceeded to draft proposed Executive Orders for the transfer of administrative authority. On April 27, 1951, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, directed that the security control of the Trust Territory be placed in the Navy Department by the Executive Order. Accordingly, Captain T. F. Darden, the replacement of Captain Hale, had his staff draft an Executive Order which included a statement that the Secretary of the Navy would be responsible for the security of the Trust Territory after the transfer and could take action, as he deemed necessary, to discharge this responsibility.

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102. Similar negotiations and steps were taken in respect to American Samoa, and the administration transfer occurred on July 1, 1951.

Another statement was included which provided that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of State would have the joint authority to close any areas within the Trust Territory for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the United Nations Charter (providing for receiving petitions and reports and making periodic visits) would be applicable to such closed areas.[103] This second provision had been included in Executive Order 9875 of July 18, 1947, which had appointed the Navy Department as the interim administrator of the civil government of the Trust Territory pending its transfer to a civilian department or agency.

This Navy version of an Executive Order was submitted by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy's Judge Advocate General's Office for processing. A redraft of the Executive Order containing no substantive changes was prepared and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 28 and approved by him on June 5.[104]

Meanwhile, without the Navy's knowledge, the Interior Department submitted its version of a proposed Executive Order to the Bureau of the Budget on May 25, 1951. Under President Truman's administrative procedure, the proposed Executive Order (as well as all proposed legislation) had to pass through the Bureau of the Budget.

The draft Executive Order submitted by the Interior

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103. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chief of Naval Operations to Judge Advocate General, May 11, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

104. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain Darden to Admiral Hartman, June 27, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

Department did not provide for the security control of the Trust Territory being retained by the Navy. It placed the authority to close areas with the President; and neither the Executive Order nor the proposed transfer agreement, which was drafted jointly by the Navy and Interior, provided for the general responsibility for the security of the Trust Territory.[105]

On June 5, 1951, the Bureau of the Budget submitted Interior's version of the Executive Order to the Navy for comment before being submitted to the President. It was on this date that the Navy learned of Interior's proposed Executive Order, its provisions and the fact that it had been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget two weeks before. It was immediately after learning these facts that the Chief of Naval Operations approved the Navy version of an Executive Order.[106]

The Secretary of the Navy was briefed on the situation on June 11, and he telephoned Secretary of the Interior Chapman on the issue on June 13, 1951. Secretary Matthews told Secretary Chapman of the two proposals concerning the security of the Trust Territory that the Navy desired and requested that the Executive Order proposed by Interior be changed accordingly.[107] Secretary Chapman answered by letter on the same

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105. Ibid.

106. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Chief of Naval Operations to Judge Advocate General, June 5, 1951, and Chief of Naval Operations (signed by Admiral Hartman) to Judge Advocate General, June 11, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

107. U. S. Classified Archives Office, Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy, June 13, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

day refuting the Navy's arguments for the changes.[108] Secretary Matthews then wrote a long letter to Secretary Chapman on June 20, 1951, detailing in writing the two changes requested by the Navy.[109] A copy of this letter later found its way into the President's official files. It was possibly used in a later briefing of the President by his naval aide, Admiral Dennison.

The Secretary of the Interior never replied to Secretary Matthews' letter of June 20. While awaiting a reply, Secretary Matthews retained the Navy version of the Executive Order in his office. Meanwhile, the Navy's Judge Advocate General's office orally informed the Bureau of the Budget of the two changes requested by the Navy and received assurances that the Bureau of the Budget would await the Navy version of the Executive Order before taking action.[110]

On June 27, Mr. Roger Jones of the Bureau of the Budget called Mr. G. L. Russell of the Navy's Office of the Judge Advocate General with some bad news for the Navy. Mr. Jones informed Mr. Russell that the Bureau was going ahead with the processing of the Executive Order submitted by Interior without waiting for the written views of the Navy Department. He stated that the Bureau was recommending that the President accept Interior's

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108. Ibid.

109. The Harry S. Truman Library, Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, June 20, 1951, Official file 85-L.

110. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain Darden to Admiral Hartman, June 27, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

draft. The Bureau, according to Mr. Jones, considered the first change proposed by the Navy (responsibility for security) to be a question of organization; and granting that the President would have to decide it, the Bureau agreed with Interior that the Navy should have no more authority than it had in other territories. As for the second requested change (authority for closing areas), Mr. Jones said that the President had stated that he wanted the Executive Order to reserve that authority to himself.[111]

Mr. Jones continued his remarks by saying that the draft Executive Order was currently in the Department of Justice for clearance, and that it should reach the White House late that day or early the next morning. He finished by stating that Mr. Murphy of the Bureau of the Budget, who knew of the current status, would handle the Executive Order; and if the Navy had any further representations to make, they should be made to him.

Needless to say, this turn of events, only four days before the transfer date, disturbed Captain Darden. He immediately sent a memorandum to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for Administration, Admiral Hartman, which included a chronology of the events concerning the steps taken within the Navy to present its views on this matter. He ended the memorandum with a recommendation that Admiral Hartman arrange for the Chief of Naval Operations to ask Secretary Matthews

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111. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, G. L. Russell to the Secretary of the Navy, June 27, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

to authorize representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Judge Advocate General to appear before Mr. Murphy of the Bureau of the Budget to present the Navy's case. Captain Darden also requested that Admiral Dennison, the Naval Aide to the President, be briefed on the subject and that either the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary make an appointment with Mr. Murphy.[112]

To solve the problem, Admiral Dennison personally briefed the President on the matter and determined that the President preferred that any security provisions be covered in the transfer agreement and that President Truman desired the authority to close areas to rest solely with the President.[113]

The security changes--giving the Navy control over all alien entry into the Trust Territory among other security measures--were made in the transfer agreement. The Navy did not, however, get the broad sweeping statement concerning its authority in terms of security that it had desired. The Executive Order was left as Interior had desired--leaving the President as the sole authorizing official in determining closed areas.

The Executive Order, No. 10265 of June 29, 1951, transferring the administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from the Department of the Navy to the

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112. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain Darden to Admiral Hartman, June 27, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

113. U. S., Naval Classified Archives, Admiral Hartman to Chief of Naval Operations, July 4, 1951, CNO files, OP-22.

Department of the Interior, was signed by the President and became effective on July 1, 1951.[114]

The transfer agreement, with its technical details concerning security, communications, transportation, personnel and transfer of property, became effective on the same day.

Thus, the third and final phase of the total issue as it had evolved in the period covered in this study came to a close. The postwar disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands had finally been made--six years after the end of the war.[115]

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114. See: Appendix R for a copy of this Executive Order.

115. An interesting side note is that nineteen Japanese servicemen who had been marooned on Anatahan Island in the Marianas for seven years surrendered on June 30, 1951. They had refused to believe repeated leaflets and loudspeaker announcements that the war was over. Life, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July 16, 1951), p. 21.

God and the soldier we adore,
In time of danger, not before.
The danger over, and all wrongs righted,
God is forgotten, the soldier slighted.

Unknown author quoted
by Winston Churchill

The influence of military professionals in American society between 1946 and 1955 was significantly less than it had been during World War II. Nonetheless, it was still at an unprecedented level in the absence of total war. The extent to which professional military officers assumed nonmilitary roles in government, industry, and politics, and developed affiliations with nonmilitary groups was a new phenomenon in American history. Military officers wielded far greater power in the United States during this period than they did in any other major country.

Samuel P. Huntington:
The Soldier and the State:
1959

CHAPTER FIVE

EPILOGUE

Because the decision-making process concerning the post-war disposition of the former mandated islands was basically a conflict between officials that took a "pragmatic" view which stressed the optimizing of national security and those officials that took an "international" view which stressed the long-range visionary goals, it is of interest to show how the arrangements worked out. To judge the wisdom of the decisions concerning the postwar disposition of the former mandated islands, it is necessary to study not only the manner in which they were made but, also, the manner in which the decisions bore the test of time.

The conflict between the Department of the Navy and Interior over the administration of the Trust Territory did not end with the transfer of administrative responsibility on July 1, 1951. There was a basic conflict between security and civil development considerations during the early 1950's. The existence of the Communist regime in China, the tense relations with the Soviet Union, the Korean War, the alleged utilization of Saipan by the Central Intelligence Agency for training Nationalist Chinese and Tibetan military personnel, and the utilization of Eniwetok Atoll on November 6, 1952, for the first Hydrogen bomb explosion--all created conflicts between the Department of Defense and the Interior Department during the period 1951-1953.

In a report to Admiral Radford the Commander in Chief of the Pacific (and former High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, 1949-1951, who became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953), Commander L. G. Findley of the Navy Department analyzed the deteriorated situation and, without labeling it as such, described the consequences of the lack of what Admiral Nimitz had advocated be obtained at all costs, i.e., unity of command. Commander Findley's report did not use the phrase "unity of command" and stressed too much the importance of the public airings of the conflicts between Interior and Navy. The following segment of the Findley report, however, clearly supports the Author's contention that the lack of any "unity of command" made the civil government arrangements inadequate when new threats to national security required that priority be given to certain Central Intelligence Agency projects:

> Because of the differing nature of the missions of the agencies (Navy and Interior) and the manner in which the missions were independently executed, certain areas of conflict were bound to develop. The military agency had been stripped of its civil government functions and had no voice in certain policies which conflicted in varying degrees with security considerations. The civilian agency, on the other hand, had aspirations for future civil development in which security consideration played no part since there was no directed responsibility in that field. When the inevitable conflicts occurred, the United States security considerations were sometimes branded as military obstacles to a free development of the area.[1]

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1. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, L. G. Findley to Admiral Radford, "A Review of U. S. Administration in the Pacific", February 4, 1953, OP-61 files.

Without stating any reasons, President Truman, by Executive Order 10408 executed on November 10, 1952, ordered that the administration of that portion of the Trust Territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan be transferred from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy. This transfer was effective on January 1, 1953. The previous decision that a civilian agency would administer the Trust Territory did not remain intact for very long.

Other islands in the Trust Territory were transferred to Naval administration by Executive Order 10470 executed by President Eisenhower on July 17, 1953. This Executive Order modified the earlier one of November 10, 1952, to provide that all of the Northern Mariana Islands of the Trust Territory, with the exception of the Island of Rota, would be transferred to the Navy. The transfer was effective on July 17, 1953, although the detailed Navy/Interior transfer agreement was not promulgated until December 4, 1953.[2] Needless to say, the multiple transfers--first from the Navy to Interior and, later, from Interior back to the Navy--were not conducive to efficient administration and development of the islands.

The groundwork for this latter transfer had been prepared by the Findley report of February 1953, quoted above, which set forth an argument for a return of all of the islands of the Trust Territory, as well as Guam and American Samoa, to military administration. This report had been prepared with

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2. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, OPNAV 5430, OP-215, Ser. 4661P21, December 4, 1953, enclosing and promulgating the Navy/Interior Transfer Agreement for the Northern Mariana Islands, less Rota, OP-61 files.

the assistance of LCDR. Dorothy E. Richard and LCDR. C. E. Herrick.

The report stressed the "great harm to the United States" resulting from the public airing of conflicts between the military services and Interior because of "the propaganda value of this type of dissention" which provided "fuel for the Communist press who call the United States an imperialistic, aggressive, war-like nation."[3] The report, however, did not specify whether both sides were participating in the public airing of the conflicts. It merely cited the case of the Secretary of the Interior protesting to the press when Saipan and Tinian were re-transferred to Navy administration as an example of the public airing of conflicts.

The report then stated that "in light of international events in the Far East it is apparent that the hopes for a quiet Pacific Ocean Area must be laid aside for the present. It is time to do first things first. It is imperative that the essential nature of the Pacific Islands be recognized and that their administration be tied in with national security which is, after all, the primary reason for the United States to hold the islands."[4] This statement comes closer, in the opinion of the Author, to the main reason for the breakdown of the previous arrangements, i.e., the inadequacy of the "split-control" system of administration to contend with

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3. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, L. G. Findley to Admiral Radford, "A Review of U. S. Administration in the Pacific," February 4, 1953, OP-61 files.

4. Ibid.

certain consequences (secret projects) of "international events in the Far East."

The Findley report then proposed three advantages to having the Secretary of Defense designated as the administering authority for Guam, the Trust Territory, and American Samoa as follows:

> First, the public airing of differences which is inherent in the present split-control situation would be obviated. There would be no distracting factors in the single aim to strengthen this country's defenses. Civil government would be continued in orderly fashion but long-range visionary ideals would fall into their proper places.
>
> Second, the Defense Department has the only government reservoir of trained personnel.... There would be no desperate, hit-or-miss recruitment program by the Navy [because of Navy's supply of trained personnel, i.e., the graduates of the Navy's school on island administration at Stanford University].
>
> It would not make a particle of difference if the Secretary of Defense, in administering the islands, put all the personnel, military as well as civilian, into civilian clothes for their tours of duty. It might even make the Secretary of Defense supervision more understandable to those who may retain mis-conceptions concerning the true nature of former Naval civil government.
>
> Third, there will be no need for a new governmental organization to be built in order to carry out the island administration duties. There is no need for a new Bureau of External Affairs as has sometimes been suggested. The Secretary of Defense has only to turn the operating details over to the Navy in order to find the needed personnel and logistic support.[5]

This is an interesting document for its exposition of the naval viewpoint. No documents have been located that explain

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5. Ibid.

the discussions within the Government leading to President Truman's decision to re-transfer Tinian and Saipan and to President Eisenhower's decision to re-transfer the rest of the Northern Marianas, less Rota. Primarily, because no documents concerning the reasons for the transfers were found in the files, this Author suspects that the main reason was the desire of the Central Intelligence Agency to utilize Saipan for training various clandestine forces. Such training has not been confirmed by any Governmental source; but various former officers and officials, as well as many inhabitants of Saipan, have reported that Nationalist Chinese and Tibetan troops were trained on Saipan by the Central Intelligence Agency during the early 1950's.

Of course, the specific act alleged above would have been only a reflection of the total security atmosphere concerning the Western Pacific at that time. The ANZUS Treaty had been signed on September 1, 1951. Developments in Indo-China, China, and Korea were foreboding. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were experiencing insurrections. In other words, the postwar Pacific was not the peaceful area envisaged by the "internationalists." There was no great-power collaboration. The arrangements concerning the Trust Territory, i.e., civil government administered by a civilian agency with "split-control" over military projects, proved inadequate when faced with the security problems and atmosphere of the early 1950's. The emphasis at that time was to contain Communism at all costs. When, as this Author believes, the Central Intelligence Agency desired the utilization of Saipan

for clandestine projects, the Government realized that the "split-control" arrangement would have to be ended in regard to the area directly concerned. The "split-control" arrangement had already given rise to conflicts between the military agencies and the Interior Department--some of which evidently were aired publicly. The Central Intelligence Agency would have required complete control over the area of its project and the best protection possible against public discussion of its activities.

The security atmosphere concerning the Western Pacific did not, in itself, dictate the re-transfer of the Marianas. Otherwise, they would probably have been re-transferred earlier, or never transferred to Interior in the first place. The Secretary of the Navy had attempted to postpone the transfer because of the Korean situation but had failed. Additionally, why were the Mariana Islands the only ones re-transferred? The unofficial reports indicate that the Central Intelligence Agency commenced the secret training project in 1953. This timing, plus the fact that no documents have been located concerning the motivation behind the re-transfers and the complete lack of any public statements concerning the reasoning for them, tends to make one suspect that the Central Intelligence Agency's project was the decisive factor behind the transfers of the Mariana Islands from Interior control to Navy control. The "split-control" system was inadequate in the face of this special requirement, and the principle of

"unity of command" had to be adopted.[6]

* * *

The United States Congress, while never enacting an organic act for the Trust Territory, did pass an act in 1954 (68 Statute 330; 48 U.S.C. 1681) providing for Presidential control of the Trust Territory's government, including the authority to designate the administrative agency or agencies of the islands. This law merely formalized the powers that the President had exercised de facto since the islands had been captured. No bill of rights or self-government provisions were included in this Congressional Act.

Because of the close social, economic, cultural, biological and geographical ties between Guam (whose islanders became American citizens in 1950) and the rest of the Marianas, the people of the Marianas desired from the very beginning to separate from the Trust Territory to be joined with Guam. As early as June 12, 1950, the people of the Northern Marianas petitioned the United Nations for their incorporation with the United States as a possession or as a territory--preferably as a territory. They declared at that time that they wanted to someday be considered a part of the United States and receive American citizenship.[7]

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6. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Interview with the Author, June 29, 1969. In this interview, the Admiral stated he could not remember the facts concerning these re-transfers. At the time of the interview, he was in the process of writing his memoirs and had not yet reviewed his files on this matter.

7. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.10/5, June 12, 1950.

By various petitions and unofficial plebiscites over the years, the islanders of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory stressed, as they still do, their desire to separate from the rest of the Trust Territory and to join in a union with Guam.[8]

The split administration (Navy administration of the Marianas with Interior administering the rest of the Trust Territory) was criticized by the United Nations Visiting Missions as encouraging these separatist tendencies. These Missions believed that there could be no question of the Mariana Islands being separated from the rest of the Trust Territory while the Trusteeship Agreement was still in force. They also believed that the separatist tendencies were hindering the development of the territory as a whole, towards political development, a sense of "Micronesian" identity, and centralized leadership.[9] As the journalist Robert Trumbull has

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8. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Documents: T/PET.10/31, November 5, 1959; T/PET.10/2.4, July 31, 1963; T/PET.10/2.6, March 19, 1964; Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1964, T/1620, May 18, 1964, pp. 155-159; T/PET.10/L.9, September 29, 1964; T/PET.10/L.10, October 25, 1965; and T/PET.10/L.11, January 20, 1966. See also: United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Reports on Pacific Affairs, 1965 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 99; and United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1970, Document T/1707, May 19, 1970, pp 136 ff.

9. These opinions were stated in the Visiting Mission reports of 1959, 1962, 1964, 1967 and 1970. See: United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1970, Document T/1707, May 19, 1970, pp. 128 ff. See also: Whitney T. Perkins, Denial of Empire: The United States and Its Dependencies (Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1962), p. 324 and David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1964), pp. 123-124.

phrased it, the lack of unity among the islanders hinders the "building [of] an administration staff by Micronesians and greatly limits the rate of progress toward self-government beyond a local level.[10]

The Kennedy Administration, as a result of its own policy to attempt to develop a sense of unity within the Trust Territory, was against such separatist tendencies as were most clearly evidenced in the Northern Marianas. As a result of this policy, re-enforced by the United Nations' criticism of the "split" administration for encouraging such separatist tendencies, the Kennedy Administration decided to transfer the Northern Marianas back to Interior.

During the session of June 1961, after appropriate clearances had been obtained by the State Department, the Trusteeship Council was advised by the High Commissioner that "the Departments concerned are agreed in principle that the administration of the Territory should be unified. The detailed steps for bringing about this unified administration are now in process of being worked out."[11] The Departments of the Navy and Interior worked on the drafting of an appropriate

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10. Robert Trumbull, Paradise In Trust: A Report On Americans In Micronesia, 1946-1958 (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1959), p. 109. Adding to the problem is the fact that the Mariana Islands are more economically advanced than the other areas of the Trust Territory and the fact that the Chamorros (three-fourths of the population of the Mariana Islands District) are probably the most politically advanced of all the islanders.

11. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, D. Otis Beasley, to Director of the Bureau of the Budget, David E. Bell, February 26, 1962, OP-61 files.

Executive Order. The work was timed so that the President could sign the Executive Order prior to May 31, 1962, the scheduled opening date of the next Trusteeship Council session.

On May 7, 1962, the President signed Executive Order 11021 which transferred the civil administration of the Northern Marianas back to the Interior Department. The effective date of this Executive Order was July 1, 1962. Another detailed transfer agreement had to be negotiated between the Navy and Interior. This time, the initial draft was prepared jointly between Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Marianas (the civil governor of those islands under naval administration) and the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. A number of points of difference were noted for resolution on the departmental level in Washington. These points were not settled until shortly after the July 1, 1962, turn-over.[12]

Meanwhile, President Kennedy, by National Security Memorandum No. 145 of April 18, 1962, established a Trust Territory Task Force under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr., with the responsibility, among other things, of revising procedures regarding entry of non-citizens and foreign flag vessels into all but designated defense areas of the Trust Territory. This task force included officers from the State, Defense, and Interior Departments.[13]

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12. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Chief of Naval Operations' distributed letter, ser. 281P09B2, July 2, 1962, OP-61 files.

13. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), October 10, 1962, OP-61 files.

Under the "split-control" arrangements then in force, the Navy exercised control over alien persons and ships entering the Trust Territory. This task force was directed to revise these procedures in order to relax the entry controls.

Although the White House issued a press release on August 23, 1962, concerning the relaxation of entry controls for the Trust Territory, no substantive work was done on this matter until October 10, 1962. On this date, Mr. John A. Carver, Jr., proposed to his task force that an agreement be reached permitting the High Commissioner to exercise primary control over the entry of aliens. The agreement would provide that the High Commissioner would advise the Department of the Navy with respect to aliens or foreign vessels, other than alien tourists intending to remain in the Trust Territory thirty days or less, which he intended to allow to enter the Trust Territory and would give "due consideration to objections, if any, on the part of the Navy."[14]

On November 14, 1962, a meeting was held between Interior and Navy representatives to consider this matter of control over alien entry into the Trust Territory.[15] It was agreed at this meeting that all alien entry applications would first be made to the High Commissioner, with the Navy having an opportunity to express its disapproval of each application.

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14. Ibid.

15. Present at this meeting were the following: John Kirwan, Assistant Director; Ruth Van Cleve, Assistant Solicitor; Chester Needham, Plans and Programs Officer (members of the Interior Department's Office of Territories) and Commander C. E. Herrick of the Navy Department.

If the Navy should object to the issuance of an entry authorization or request the revocation of an entry authorization, the High Commissioner would refrain from issuing such authorization or revoke the authorization as the case might be. If the High Commissioner felt that he could not agree, he could refer the matter to the department level in Washington.[16] These points were incorporated into an amendment to the Navy/Interior Transfer Agreement of July 2, 1962, and took effect on July 1, 1963.[17]

These relaxed procedures did not apply to any areas designated as defense areas. These were areas closed for security reasons by the President and, therefore, not open to the United Nations Visiting Missions and not subject to the annual report to the United Nations. In 1963, two areas were so designated: the Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls. These areas were controlled solely by the Department of the Navy with respect to entry by all individuals, vessels and aircraft.[18]

In 1966, it became apparent that many aliens (mainly Japanese) were entering the Trust Territory for the purpose

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16. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Memorandum for the Record by C. E.Herrick, November 14, 1962, OP-61 files.

17. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Letter to Distribution List, ser. 294P09B2, June 27, 1963, OP-61 files.

18. Bikini Atoll was utilized for atomic bomb experimental explosions on July 1 and July 25, 1946. Eniwetok Atoll was utilized for the first hydrogen bomb explosion on November 6, 1952. At present, Eniwetok and Kwajalein Atolls are designated as closed areas, being utilized for ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile testing. These two areas are now under the exclusive control of the Department of Defense, with the Army utilizing Kwajalein and the Air Force utilizing Eniwetok.

of tourism. The agreement of 1963 had not provided the exception for tourists remaining within the Trust Territory for thirty days or less, as had been originally requested by Interior. This time it was the Navy that requested the further relaxation of entry controls. The right of objections had, in fact, never been utilized by the Navy. The Navy's Politico-Military Policy Division desired to do its share in encouraging the development of tourism in the Trust Territory. This office, therefore, recommended that the procedures be modified to eliminate the requirement for the High Commissioner to refer any request to the Department of the Navy for entry of alien personnel, ships or aircraft into the Trust Territory. However, "should the Navy come into the possession of adverse information concerning the entry of a non-U.S. individual, ship or plane into TERPACIS [the Trust Territory] and request the revocation of an entry authorization, the High Commissioner shall give regard to such objection."[19] This procedure, of course, would not apply to the areas designated as closed defense areas.

This initial offer of the Navy was discussed and modified; and the final result was an agreement effective August 1, 1968, eliminating the requirement for the High Commissioner to provide the Navy with the data on alien entry prior to issuing entry authorizations in those cases of "alien individuals who

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19. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Memorandum for the Director, Politico-Military Policy Division, ser. 3456P09B2, November 14, 1966, OP-61 files.

possess a valid U. S. visa and seek admission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for a period of 30 days or less for the purpose of tourism."[20]

Even with the transfer of the Northern Mariana Islands back to the Interior Department, debate over which agency should administer the Trust Territory continued. Indeed, as late as 1966, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs attempted to float the proposal that the State Department assume responsibility for administering the Trust Territory.[21] He circulated this proposal "for clearance" to the Pentagon and the Peace Corps for six months before confronting the Interior Department. He even had his own candidate for the office of High Commissioner who was at that time the Peace Corps Director for the Western Pacific region.

In an April 1969 Foreign Affairs article, an expert on Pacific affairs, Philip W. Quigg, suggested that the White House directly administer the Trust Territory.[22] Such proposals could easily be adopted since the President, by the stroke of his pen, can still transfer administrative agencies

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20. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Agreement on Alien Entry into the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, August 1, 1968, OP-61 files.

21. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Territories in Mid-Century," paper presented at the Conference of the History of the Territories, National Archives and Research Service, Washington, D. C., November 3-4, 1969, unpublished, pp. 59-60. Also: Robert R. Robbins, "Remarks Before the House of Representatives, Congress of Micronesia," January 18, 1971, unpublished, p. 3.

22. Philip W. Quigg, "Coming of Age In Micronesia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1969), pp. 504-505.

by Executive Order. Congress has yet to pass any organic act for the Trust Territory.

The military agencies, particularly the Navy, have assisted the Interior Department in the Trust Territory in many various ways since 1968. In early 1969, the Department of the Interior asked the Department of Defense to assign mobile construction teams to the Trust Territory in an effort to construct projects requested by the local legislatures and to develop a trained corps of permanent residents capable of carrying out self-improvement programs.[23] The Navy sent its first thirteen-man teams to the islands in June 1969. At present, the Army has one team in the Marshalls District; the Air Force has one in the Marianas; and the Navy has two in Ponape, one in Palau, and one in the District of Yap. Additionally, the Trust Territory has received the highest priority designation for the receipt of surplus military equipment in the Far East which is suitable for civilian use, e.g., radios and construction materials. The Navy provides sealift support for this equipment from Viet-Nam and Okinawa to the Trust Territory. The Navy provided six landing craft type vessels (LCU) on a long-term loan basis to the Trust Territory in 1970. Other examples of recent support are the training of Micronesians at the Naval Construction Training School at Port Hueneme, California, and the presence in the islands of unexploded ordnance demolition teams to remove or destroy old ordnance left over from World

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23. Navy Times, March 11, 1970.

War II. The military is also currently supporting bills before Congress to increase the appropriations for the Trust Territory, to settle Japanese war claims, to combat the Seastar "Crown of Thorns" (Acanthaster Planci) which is destroying many of the coral reefs, and to promote the tuna fishing industry.

The motivation behind this increase in military support for the Trust Territory in the past two or three years can be easily understood. One reason for this increased support is a purely altruistic one--that of helping in the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. Another factor in the motivation is that of national security. Security, after all, is the mission of the Department of Defense. The military agencies have become increasingly concerned over the recent trend in thinking of the Micronesian political leaders. The increased support, hopefully, will serve to improve the image of the United States in the Trust Territory (as well as the image of the American military services) and to, thereby, help to ensure that the future political status that the Micronesians choose will be one compatible with American security interests.

The movement toward self-government began as soon as the United States started to administer the islands. Local self-governing bodies were first created. Later, elected district legislatures evolved from advisory bodies whose members were appointed by the District Administrators. Next, a Council of Micronesia, whose members were elected by the district legislatures, was created by the American administration.

Finally, the Congress of Micronesia was created by Interior Department Order No. 2882 on September 28, 1964. The first territorial-wide elections were held on January 19, 1965; and the first meeting of the Congress was held in July 1965. This Congress has helped to create some sense of unity within the Territory--if from nothing else than the mere fact of initiating the first real communications between the peoples of the islands. The process of evolution of the Congress provided experiences of working together for common purposes. The growth and transformation of these bodies was due in large measure to the wishes, desires and cooperation of the Micronexians with adivce being provided by the administrators.[24]

In response to a request by the Congress of Micronesia, President Johnson asked the United States Congress in August 1967 to establish a study commission to assess all the factors bearing on the political future of the Trust Territory. The President also asked that Congress specify that the Micronesians should express their wishes "as soon as possible, and not later than June 30, 1972, on the future status of the Trust Territory."[25] The Senate struck out the reference to the date and passed the resolution; but the House failed the

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24. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (August 16, 1965), Statement of Mr. Barley Olter, Representative, Congress of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 28, 1965, p. 296. See: Norman Meller, The Congress of Micronesia: Development of the Legislative Process in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969). Note: Secretary of the Interior Order No. 2882 as amended was superceded by Order No. 2918 of September 27, 1968.

25. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57 (September 18, 1967), Presidential letter to Congress with Text of Proposed Joint Resolution Concerning Future of Pacific Islands Trust Territory, August 21, 1967, pp. 363.364.

measure, and no such status commission has yet been established nor has any commitment been made to a date for an act of self-determination.[26]

Meanwhile, the Congress of Micronesia established its own status commission on August 8, 1967, to study "the range of possibilities and alternatives as may be open to Micronesians with respect to their choice of political status."[27] This Status Commission met with United States Congressional subcommittees touring the islands.

The Status Commission also retained a New Zealand political science professor, John W. Davidson, as an adviser and studied the political development of Guam, Fiji, Cook Islands, Puerto Rico, Philippines, and Western Samoa.

The Status Commission filed its report in July 1969. Its recommendation was:

> that the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be constituted as a self-governing state and that this Micronesian state -- internally self-governing and with Micronesian control of all its branches, including the executive -- negotiate entry into free association with the United States.[28]

Ten Micronesian political leaders came to Washington for three weeks in October 1969 to consult with the Government on this vital issue. In May of 1970, the United States Government

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26. Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., Desk Officer, Pacific Islands, State Department, Interview with the Author, March 21, 1969.

27. Congress of Micronesia, Interim Report of the Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, July 1968, p. 4.

28. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, July 1969.

sent a negotiating team, comprised of representatives of the Defense and Interior Departments, to the islands with an offer of a commonwealth status similar to that of Puerto Rico.

The Congress of Micronesia was represented in these negotiations by its Political Status Delegation, which had replaced the Future Political Status Commission. The Micronesians insisted throughout the negotiations on their concept of "free association" and the matter now rests at that point.

The United States Government (the President, the Departments of State, Defense, and Interior, plus various members of Congress) are concerned about the definition that the Congress of Micronesia gives to the term "free association." The Micronesian Political Status Delegation, in its report on the 1970 negotiations, stated that there were four basic principles and legal rights that it considered inherent to the nature of "free association." These four points were listed as follows:

> (a) That sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia and their duly constituted government;
>
> (b) That the people of Micronesia possess the right of self-determination and may therefore choose independence or self-government in free association with any nation or organization of nations;
>
> (c) That the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution and to amend, change or revoke any consitution or governmental plan at any time; and
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> (d) That free association should be in the form of a revocable compact, terminable unilaterally by either party.[29]

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29. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Political Status Delegation, 3rd Cong., 3rd regular sess., July 1970, p. 11. Note: The population of the Trust Territory is now, 1970, approximately 100,000.

By these terms, the United States Government would have no right of eminent domain and no guarantee that the Micronesian constitution would provide for the basic civil rights that are contained in the American Constitution's Bill of Rights.

Strategically, the islands are still of vast importance even in this nuclear age of inter-continental ballistic missiles. As in 1945, their main strategic value to the United States is in their denial to any potential enemy. Over ninety-eight percent of all material sent to the war in Southeast Asia goes by ship. The sea and air lanes to Southeast Asia, Asia and to Australia--not to mention the protection of the American citizens of Guam--would, once again, be threatened if a potentially hostile power gained a foothold in these Central Pacific islands.

Also, of strategic importance is the value of the islands in the positive sense. The United States Government desires to continue to maintain the ability to monitor and control the sea and air space over the Central Pacific Ocean. These islands contribute greatly to that ability. Additionally, the islands could provide future training bases and logistic areas for American armed forces. After the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, many, if not most, of the military facilities on that island will have to find new locations in the Central Pacific. American military facilities are also being closed or reduced in Japan and the Philippines. Guam is already saturated with military installations. American commitments to South Korea, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines

will continue under the Nixon Doctrine. Also, American involvement in Southeast Asia will more than likely continue for some time to come. American military installations in the Central and Western Pacific areas will, therefore, still be required.

The Micronesian Islands are the logical fall-back position for such installations. It is, therefore, desirable for the United States to obtain a stabilized, permanent political association with Micronesia. The present intention of the United States Government is to negotiate some agreement with the Congress of Micronesia that provides for full self-government within a permanent, unrevokable association with the United States. This agreement would then be voted upon in a general plebiscite under the observation of United Nations representatives. When the agreement had been accepted by the population as a whole and, also, by the United States Congress, the United States and Micronesia would declare that the Trusteeship was ended.

The emergence of nationalism among many Asian and African peoples has been coupled with national aspirations for political independence and neutrality vis-a-vis the big-power blocs. It is, therefore, advisable to consider Micronesia's emerging, incipient sense of nationalism and national aspirations in order to arrive at practical policies whereby the United States can assist, guide, and influence these aspirations in order to achieve an eventual political outcome truly in the best interests of both the Micronesians and the United States.

Nationalism has various definitions, with Hans Kohn's

definition being the classic example:

> Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare.[30]

Does an emergence of nationalism necessarily result in a demand for a politically independent nation-state, or can a sense of nationality be satisfied and compatable with only local autonomy and local self-government? What if a nationality evolves which has a sense of nationalism; yet, realizes that political independence is impossible or impracticable due to a lack of natural resources, population, education or a modern economy? What political aspirations develop when the political development of a people outreaches their economic, social and educational development? All of these questions pertain particularly to Micronesia.

The politically-aware people in Micronesia are looking at Asia and Africa and asking themselves the following questions: Is the preferred government really independence no matter how bad it might be? Which is better: economic growth, personal liberties, governmental stability but without political independence; or a stagnant economy, restricted personal liberties, governmental instability but with political independence? Should the old culture and social system be

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30. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1944), p. 16.

preserved at the expense of rapid economic development? Although many aspiring peoples tend to overlook these questions, the Micronesian leaders are definitely asking themselves these questions.[31]

The Micronesian leaders are also trying to judge whether or not their strategic importance to the United States will remain into the far future. For if the "free association" is revokable, there is no guarantee that the United States would continue to remain interested in them if the strategic value of the islands is diminished because of some radical change in weapon technology or global political situation.

The Micronesian answers to these questions are vitally important, not only for the Micronesians, but, also, for the United States.

* * *

To conclude the epilogue, the international legal aspects of the strategic trusteeship should be mentioned.

As early as July 1943, the legal questions involved in terminating Japan's mandate and the proper procedures to transfer the former-mandated islands to another administrator had been studied within the State Department. The question of the location of sovereignty in a mandate had not been settled by the League of Nations or by any consensus among jurists. A

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31. For examples of this self-questioning, see the statements made by the Micronesians before the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the United Nations Visiting Missions Reports, the reports of the Future Political Status Commission, and the report of the Political Status Delegation.

number of theories had been advanced: one, that the sovereignty lay in the League of Nations; another, that the attributes of sovereignty had been divided, possibly, among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the League of Nations, and the Mandatory.[32]

The State Department's official position during the postwar planning of 1943 was that the sovereignty of these islands resided in the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan) and that Japan and Italy would, in the peace treaties ending World War II, renounce any rights still theirs in the islands. Legally, the United States, United Kingdom, and France could then terminate the mandate and transfer the islands' administration to the United States. For "political reasons," it was recommended in 1944 that at an appropriate time, the League of Nations should formally transfer all of its powers in respect to mandates to the United Nations Organization. The new United Nations would then formally terminate the Japanese mandate and assign the islands' administration to the United States. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States would be included, of course, in the United Nations agreement.[33]

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32. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of State, Hornbeck to Grey, May 9, 1944, quoting a memorandum "Japan's Mandated Islands: Legal Problems" (T-345, July 8, 1943) by Blakeslee, RG 890, 890.0146/13 #1.

33. U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of State, Hornbeck to Secretary of State, April 28, 1944, quoting a memorandum by Dr. Quincy Wright entitled "How May the Status of Mandated Territories be Altered," RG 890, 890.0146/11.

It is clear from the course of events that this second method was utilized. Legally, the United States Government's position--never publicly stated but approved by Secretary Hull--was that sovereignty of the mandated islands resided in the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers since 1919.[34] However, for political reasons, the mandate was terminated; and the islands' administering authority was transferred by means of actions by the League of Nations and the new United Nations. By following the political course, the United States compromised its legal position that sovereignty lay with the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The League of Nations assembly met and dissolved itself on April 18, 1946, transferring all its powers, including those in respect to mandates, to the United Nations. Then, the United Nations Security Council (which included three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers: United States, United Kingdom, and France) approved the strategic trusteeship agreement on April 2, 1947. This agreement stated that the United Nations Charter provided that trusteeship could be applied to mandated areas and that Japan, as a result of World War II, had ceased to exercise any authority in the mandate.

Italy, in its peace treaty signed February 10, 1947 (Section VIII, Article 40 of the Treaty, TIAS 1648), renounced any rights in the former mandated islands as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I. Additionally, Japan formally stipulated in its peace treaty signed September 8,

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34. Ibid.

1951 (Chapter II, Article 2 (d) of the Treaty, TIAS 2490) that it renounced any rights in the former mandate. The United States had included these provisions in the peace treaties to cover any possible legal question on the matter.

The question of the location of sovereignty still is unresolved. Some jurists would maintain that it now resides in the United Nations Security Council, based on the action of the League of Nations in 1946, and the fact that the trusteeship agreement cannot be changed without the approval of the Security Council. Other jurists would state that the sovereignty now resides in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, based on the fact that sovereignty had never passed from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the League of Nations. This had been the State Department's position during World War II and might still be maintained, although the United States may have compromised this position by utilizing the League of Nations and the United Nations as described above. Other jurists would say that the sovereignty resides in the islanders themselves, especially after they hold an election which grants them full self-government. Other jurists would say that no state holds sovereignty over the islands since it "fell between the cracks" during World War II; and that the islands are, therefore, technically terra nullis until sovereignty is asserted by some power or is assumed by the islanders, themselves, when they eventually achieve full self-government.

The question of the location of sovereignty is probably an academic one at the present time; although, it could raise

problems in the future if any nation chooses to raise the question when the United States and Micronesia attempt to terminate the Strategic Trusteeship. The Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian members of the United Nations might, indeed, raise the question--depending on which methods the United States uses in the attempt to terminate the Strategic Trusteeship and on the degree of Micronesian self-government achieved at the time. The Soviet Union might also use the question of sovereignty as a pretext for opposing the termination of the trusteeship in order to put a colonial albatross around the neck of the United States.

When I say that officers today must go far beyond the official curriculum, I say it, not because I do not believe in the traditional relationship between the civilian and the military, but you must be more than the servants of national policy. You must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development of national policy.

John F. Kennedy: To
the graduating class,
U. S. Naval Academy,
June 1961

The pathway of man's journey through the ages is littered with the wreckage of nations, which, in their hour of glory, forgot their dependence on the sea.

Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle USMC
Speech in Philadelphia,
October 28, 1961

Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security.

John F. Kennedy: To all
hands, U.S.S. Kitty Hawk,
June, 1963

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The decision-making process within the American Government that led to the placing of the former mandated islands under a United Nations strategic trusteeship with the United States as the sole administering authority, and to the selection of the Interior Department as the agency responsible for the administration of the islands, has been traced. An attempt has been made to let the facts speak for themselves and to present them objectively. Conclusions concerning these facts, however, depend on one's proclivities, background, and philosophy. On this issue, as on many other problems of national policy and operations, "where one stands depends on where one sits."

Every Secretary of State and every scholar now recognizes that foreign policy and military policy are interwoven and must be coordinated in order to effectively achieve national policy. In fact, it is now very difficult to isolate the field of "foreign policy" and "military policy" because so many policy problems contain overlapping and intertwining military and political policy aspects. This recognition was lacking, particularly by the State Department, at the commencement of this particular issue in 1942.

Flowing from the premise that military considerations must be taken into account in formulating foreign policy, is the premise that the military establishment must, therefore, be represented at the working-level by means of formal liaison

committees as well as by informal consultations. Such arrangements have developed over the past twenty-five years. There is currently a great degree of collaboration between the military establishment and the State Department. Such collaboration was very limited in 1942.

The planning within the State Department on a trusteeship plan was never coordinated with the military point of view until President Roosevelt, on December 15, 1944, directed the State Department to work with the military agencies in formulating a policy acceptable to the Departments of the Navy, War, and State. Prior to this time, the military agencies, chiefly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had merely commented from the sidelines or resorted to blocking tactics such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff's actions just prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.

The Service Secretaries were unaware of what was happening on this issue until early 1945. Not until the spring of 1945, when SWNCC and the Three Secretaries' Meetings were effectively in operation, did Forrestal see a trusteeship plan; and, then, he could not believe that it was a serious document. Civilian control and influence by the Service Secretaries on this issue, as well as on most matters of strategy, were virtually non-existent until after the death of President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt thrust the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the decision-making arena and limited the Service Secretaries to dealing only with administrative matters. Thus, until the spring of 1945, an effective civil-military relationship

within the Executive Branch on this issue was non-existent. However, after the spring of 1945, the Service Secretaries asserted themselves via the SWNCC machinery on the question of the postwar disposition of the mandated islands; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's role in the decision-making process dwindled. In fact, when the question of which governmental agency should administer the Trust Territory came under active consideration, the Service Secretaries were the sole representatives of the military establishment in the decision-making process.

Several conclusions can be reached concerning the first phase of the decision-making dealing with the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. This phase concerned the question of whether the islands should be annexed or included in some form of trusteeship system. This policy debate was clearly a case of conflicting concepts about the correct way to promote world peace and security. On one side, which could be labeled as the liberal or "internationalist" side, were President Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Harold Ickes, Leo Pasvolsky, Benjamin Gerig, and others, who sincerely believed that the only possibility for world peace after World War II would be by great-power collaboration and a strong world organization. They also believed in rapid independence for all dependent people and were determined that the war would bring no territorial spoils.

The State Department planners concerned with drafting a trusteeship plan were "internationalists." They had two original objectives in mind: (1) to develop a trusteeship system guaranteeing eventual self-government to all dependent peoples and to encourage the colonial powers to place their colonies

within that system; and (2) to set an example for emulation by the other powers of: (a) no territorial aggrandizement as a result of the war (with the Soviet Union particularly in mind), (b) faith in and support for the new international organization, and (c) placing of dependent territories within the trusteeship system. To achieve these political objectives, the "internationalists" in general and the State Department international organization experts (Pasvolsky, Gerig, and associates) in particular strongly believed that the former Japanese mandated islands should be included within the proposed trusteeship system.

Self-determination was not at issue in regard to the mandated islands. All participants in the decision-making process agreed that the Micronesians would not be ready for any form of political self-determination for the foreseeable future. When any estimate was given of the time required for the Micronesians to become prepared for self-government, the phrase "not in the foreseeable future" was utilized. The "internationalists" desired that the islands be placed within the trusteeship system, not for any regard for the islanders' future self-government, but to achieve the political goals described above.

The welfare of the Micronesians was, of course, considered to some extent. Yet, there is a disturbing lack of consideration by any of the participants--on both sides of the issue--for the interests of the Micronesians. There is no mention, until the Department of the Interior entered the issue, of any emphasis being placed on Micronesian interests.

None of the participants, including the Department of the Interior, ever expressed any desire to consult with the Micronesians.

On the other side of the first phase of decision-making were those individuals who could be labeled conservative or "pragmatic." The "pragmatists" consisting of some State Department officials as well as the military services and their civilian leaders, such as Forrestal, Stimson, Matthews, and McCloy, had quite a different concept of the means for promoting world peace and security. They had seen the failure of the League of Nations, and they could see the weakness of relying on such a fragile thing as great-power collaboration in the maintenance of international peace and security. They would be willing to give an international organization a chance but not at the cost of any impairment to American national security.

Forrestal expressed the "pragmatic" viewpoint when he stated that if the United States was expected to maintain international peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area after the war, the military services should have the means with which to exercise its authority--namely exclusive control of the strategically located islands.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff only entered into the decision-making process concerning the drafting of the trusteeship system after it was learned that the State Department trusteeship planners intended to include the former mandated islands within the system. As long as the State Department trusteeship planners continued to advocate that the islands be placed within the proposed trusteeship system, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff continued to pressure for changes to the proposed system that would weaken the international supervisory aspects of it. The category of strategic trusteeship was specifically developed and included within the United Nations trusteeship system with the mandated islands in mind. Unfortunately, the idea for this separate category which gave almost unlimited authority to the administrating state was developed after the basic trusteeship plan had been watered down in an attempt to obtain the Joint Chiefs of Staff's acquiescence to the placing of the mandated islands within the trusteeship system.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assisted in their efforts by the British Government, but the conclusion is reached that the main influence on this matter was exerted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, mainly as a result of the controversy over the disposition of the mandated islands, the trusteeship system now embodied within the United Nations Charter shows little resemblance to the early trusteeship plans in the matter of international supervision and authority.

The record seems to indicate that the State Department trusteeship planners misled the Service Secretaries when the State Department on December 30, 1944, stated that because of the other states' interest, it was "inescapable" that the question of international trusteeships would be discussed at the San Francisco Conference and that "in all likelihood" a trusteeship chapter would be included in the United Nations Charter. The record shows that the United States was the initiator and pusher of the trusteeship idea. Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union showed little or no interest in the trusteeship proposals and dependent-area declarations which Secretary Hull repeatedly circulated. If

the United States had stated, as proposed by Stimson and Forrestal, that the question of trusteeships would not be considered at the San Francisco Conference but would be one of the first matters considered by the United Nations, the other nations would surely have acquiesced.

President Roosevelt's long-held position, however, was that a trusteeship system and effective machinery for such a system should be established. He approved the trusteeship plan "in principle" on April 10, 1945, only two days before his death. Even if Forrestal and Stimson had been able to present their views to him on April 19, his decision would more than likely have been the same, i.e., not to postpone any discussion of trusteeships at the charter drafting conference. This conclusion is based on his long-held views, on his approval of the trusteeship plan on the tenth, and on the fact that the Secretary of State had provided the President with a summary of Stimson's and Forrestal's views in his letter submitting the trusteeship plan.

Stimson and Forrestal, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, feared that any discussion of trusteeships prior to the end of the war would necessarily involve questions of specific postwar dispositions of territories and, therefore, possibly produce conflicts between the allies which would hinder the war effort. These fears were proved unfounded.

After the trusteeship system was included in the United Nations Charter, the question whether the mandated islands should be annexed or placed under either a regular trusteeship or a strategic trusteeship had to be settled. With the

political objectives described above in mind, the "internationalists" advocated that the mandated islands be placed under the trusteeship system. They were willing to accept a strategic trusteeship.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reassured that any development of a possible trusteeship agreement would not prejudice their annexationist position, submitted various conditions which they felt should be included in any contemplated trusteeship agreement. Interdepartmental discussions within the framework of SWNCC proceeded on this basis. The Department of the Interior was deliberately left out of any discussions concerning the drafting of a possible trusteeship agreement, as well as the final decision-making Presidential conference on the question. This was, in the opinion of the Author, a pure power play on the part of the other interested departments. The War and Navy Departments were attempting to obtain the administrative authority of the islands, and the State Department did not want any interdepartmental discussions on the question of civil administration prior to the formalization of the status of the islands. Additionally, personal conflicts (between Byrnes and Ickes) evidently played a part in the isolation of the Interior Department. It is unfortunate that the agency which eventually received the administrating authority did not participate in the drafting of the trusteeship agreement.

The final decision was made by President Truman on October 22, 1946, under the pressure of the convening of the United Nations General Assembly the next day. The written

views of the various participants in the drafting of the trusteeship agreement were not ready in time for the conference. However, both sides (annexation versus strategic trusteeship) were presented orally during the Presidential conference.

It is believed that Stimson's argument that the United States could annex the islands with no major opposition and that such approved annexation would not be a case of imperialism because of the economic liability of the islands was never adequately countered by the "internationalists." Stimson's contention has been supported by the fact that the American Army administered the Ryukyus Islands (Okinawa) from 1945-1972 and the Bonin-Volcano Islands (Iwo-Jima) from 1945-1968 without any international supervision and with no domestic or international opposition except from the Japanese public, who would not have been stirred in the case of the former mandated islands. The United States never even transmitted informational reports on these non-self-governing territories to the United Nations nor was the United States ever asked to do so by any member of the United Nations. The American public and world opinion (except for the Japanese) showed no interest in the fact that the United States governed these islands with unlimited control amounting to annexation.

The original objectives of the "internationalists" were not achieved by the placing of the islands under the trusteeship system. No example was set for emulation by the other powers of any faith in and support for the new international organization. The watering down of the trusteeship system

and the inclusion of the islands in the strategic trusteeship category, which gave almost unlimited authority to the administrating state, certainly did not demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the international organization.

Another "internationalist" objective--that of setting an example by having no territorial aggrandizement as a result of the war--had been lost when theUnited States Government agreed at Yalta to support the Soviet Union in the Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. This action by President Roosevelt contravened all of his grand announcements of "no territorial aggrandizement." Certainly no example was set for the Russians when they saw the United States condoning Soviet territorial aggrandizement while publicly professing non-aggrandizement and denying itself sovereignty over the former Japanese mandated islands.

It is believed that the statement of Admiral Leahy in his unpublished account of the October 22, 1946, conference reflected the actual reasoning for the decision not to annex the mandated islands. Admiral Leahy believed that the wartime propaganda statements concerning "no territorial aggrandizement" had closed off the annexation option. The United States Government had boxed itself into a corner. Additionally, the United States had initiated and pushed the trusteeship system against its reluctant allies and had, therefore, boxed itself into a corner in that respect. After pushing the trusteeship idea so hard, it would appear hypocritical for the United States to refuse to utilize it.

This is how the President probably saw the issue during

the conference of October 22, 1946. However, it is still believed that with the proper groundwork laid as proposed by Stimson in the spring of 1945 the United States could have annexed the islands without major opposition.

Another original objective of the "internationalists" was to develop a trusteeship system guaranteeing eventual self-government to all dependent peoples and to encourage the colonial powers to place their colonies within that system. This objective had effectively been lost when Secretary Hull early in the planning state restricted, because of "obvious reasons of political feasibility," the trusteeship plan to former enemy areas, former mandates, and to dependent territories voluntarily placed under the system by the colonial power. Additionally, the trusteeship system was so watered down there was no guarantee of eventual self-government for all dependent peoples.

The United Nations Charter does include a chapter (Chapter XI) concerning non-self-governing territories in general. Article 73 of that Chapter, however, mentions only that the colonial powers should "develop self-government ... according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." There is no guarantee of eventual full self-government.[1]

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1. There is little international supervision of dependent areas in general, i.e., only informational reports submitted voluntarily by the governing powers. Various members of the United Nations are attempting to widen the area of international authority in these matters with little practical success. The provisions of Chapter XI, ironically, were not proposed by the United States at San Francisco, although the idea for a general declaration on dependent territories had been originated and pushed by the United States. This particular proposal had been forgotten by the United States Government when it became embroiled in the controversy over the drafting of a trusteeship system plan.

In regard to the other mandated territories, by the time the United States announced that the Pacific Islands Mandate would be placed under the strategic trusteeship system, trusteeship agreements for most of the other mandates (eventually all of the Class "B" and "C" mandates became trusteeships with the exception of South-West Africa) had already been submitted to the United Nations or at least circulated for inter-governmental comment. Therefore, the placing of the Pacific Islands Mandate under the trusteeship plan did not encourage the placing of other mandates within the trusteeship system. Additionally, no administrating power power has yet to place a non-self-governing territory (other than mandates and the former enemy territory of Italian Somaliland) within the trusteeship system.[2]

In summary, the original objectives of the "internationalists" in regard to the trusteeship system were not obtained. The controversy over the disposition of the mandated islands contributed to the failure to obtain them. The placing of the islands within the trusteeship system, rather than annexing them, did not substantially further the attainment of these objectives.

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2. Eleven territories have been placed under trusteeship. Ten of these were former mandated territories; and one (Somaliland) was detached from Italy by the terms of the Italian peace treaty and placed under trusteeship by an United Nations General Assembly resolution which the parties to the Italian peace treaty had agreed in advance to accept. For special reasons, Australia has administered its dependent territory of Papua and its trust territory of New Guinea jointly. This policy was adopted when it was decided that the two territories would have the same future political status as a single entity. Currently, only two trusteeships remain: the United States administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), the only strategic trusteeship ever in existence, and Australia's Trust Territory of New Guinea.

The second phase of decision-making over the postwar disposition of the mandated islands concerned the selection of the agency to administer the islands. This phase of decision-making was also influenced by the motivations of the "internationalists" and the "pragmatists" as described above. The "pragmatists" desired that the security considerations involved in the strategic location of the islands receive proper attention in the civil administration. Accordingly, the principle of "unity of command" was advocated. The "pragmatists" believed that the administrating agency would need the full authority in dealing with both civil and military matters. There should be, in their opinion, no system of "split-control" by which one agency would handle the civil matters and another agency handle military matters. The "pragmatists" also recognized that the military agencies, particularly the Navy, had more adequate funds, logistic materiel, and trained personnel than any civilian agency which were needed to govern effectively the Trust Territory.

The "internationalists" in this phase were mainly located within the Interior Department. One individual, Emil J. Sady, was a transplant from the State Department's Dependent Areas Office. The "internationalists" believed that any civil government administered by a military agency would inhibit the political development of the peoples. Their connotation of "military" government was a pejorative one. Commander L. G. Findley, a naval officer concerned with the Trust Territory, described in his report of February 4, 1953 (mentioned in the Epilogue Chapter), what this Author believes was the decisive factor that led to the selection of a civilian agency to administer

the Trust Territory. Commander Findley's report stated:

> The concept of government by a military clique is rightly repugnant to the American people. We accept martial law only as a matter of urgent necessity. There is not, nor has there ever been, any similarity between the Navy administration of Pacific islands and the type of military rule which this country abhors. Yet a certain confusion existed about the Navy administration. It was not generally understood that administration by the Navy was truly a civil administration. The personnel engaged in administering the native people were themselves civilians whose wearing of a uniform had begun only a short time before and was a temporary matter. They were especially fitted both by their civilian background and by Navy School training for civil government. Uniforms were only incidental.
>
> Numerous groups investigating island affairs found that the Navy was a benign administrator. No single valid complaint of the violation of civil rights was ever found. Nevertheless, the factor which influenced post-war decisions on Pacific Island administration was the misconception that an administrator in uniform was ipso facto less acceptable than one clad in a civilian suit.[3]

It is interesting to note that, regardless of all the talk during this policy debate on the part of the Interior Department, the civil rights of the Micronesians have yet to be firmly established by any Congressional Act. Their civil rights are completely dependent upon various administrative orders issued by the Interior Department. Even the Congress of Micronesia was established by merely an Interior Department order which, presumably, could be modified or cancelled at will by any Secretary of the Interior.

The Interior Department participants in the controversy

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3. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, L. G. Findley to Admiral Radford, "A Review of U. S. Administration in the Pacific," February 4, 1953, OP-61 files.

over the selection of the administrative agency stressed the fact that the islanders' civil rights should be firmly established by Congressional Organic Act. They protested the fact that the civil government administered by the Navy was "arbitrary," with the inhabitants having no guaranteed civil rights.

The reason that Forrestal agreed to the selection of a "civilian agency" at the May 16, 1947, meeting, or soon thereafter, is unknown. He was occupied by more important matters at the time; yet, he had held definite views on the matter. Commander Findley's report stated that some naval officers, believing that the postwar Pacific area would be peaceful, felt that it was time for the Navy to get out of the business of governing the various Pacific islands. Unfortunately, the report did not mention them by name. Certainly, at the time of this decision (May 1947), Forrestal did not think that the Pacific area would be peaceful.

Mention should be made of President Roosevelt's and President Truman's roles in the issue of the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. President Roosevelt held anti-colonial attitudes and felt that the best means of obtaining freedom for dependent peoples would be via a strong trusteeship system. He also believed in the idea of a postwar global string of internationalized bases. Neither a strong trusteeship system nor a global string of internationalized bases evolved.

Whether by design or by circumstance, President Roosevelt by-passed his Service Secretaries and ignored his Department of State during the war, while relying heavily on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and personal advisers--notably Harry Hopkins.

This situation resulted in a break-down of proper civil-military relations during the war. Not until the spring of 1945, after the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of State, on their own initiative, had established some form of permanent machinery for effective coordination of policies, were they able to reassert themselves in relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

President Roosevelt never made a clear decision on the trusteeship matters brought to his attention. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended annexation of the islands, the President always answered in equivocal terms such as, "we are thinking of doing such and so" or "we intend to do such and so." Even when the final trusteeship plan was presented to him, he approved it "in principle" and did not specifically state that it should be presented at the San Francisco Conference. He read Secretary of State Stettinius' letter detailing the arguments of Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Stimson against discussing the trusteeship question at the San Francisco Conference. However, he did not state definitely whether he rejected those arguments. He merely stated, "I will see your [Stettinius'] representative and that of the Army and Navy on the 19th. That will be time enough."

President Roosevelt's anti-colonial outlook helped to create the controversy. The failure of President Roosevelt to make decisive decisions helped to prolong the controversy. His administrative style of by-passing the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of State, while working mainly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and personal advisers, also helped to prolong the controversy.

Much needless time and effort were spent on the problem of the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. It should have been decided quickly and decisively. Instead, thanks to President Roosevelt's lack of an effective orderly administration, the issue dragged on for years; bitterness developed between State, War, Navy, and Interior Department personnel.

President Truman, on the other hand, believed in making quick decisions. In regard to this issue, his decisions were often too quick! His decision of August 1945 to give the Navy authority to govern the Mariana Islands was hasty and without prior consultations. That decision, moreover, was not disseminated to any agency except the Navy. His next decision to have Navy's authority considered "interim" and to have the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy consider the problem was also made without his consulting those concerned. Interior, in fact, was ignored completely, even though Secretary Ickes sent a letter to the President on the subject the very next day. Both of these decisions were made within a day of the request. Most of President Truman's other decisions concerning the postwar disposition of the mandated islands were just as decisive and quick, often made without prior consultation with all interested parties (see Appendix A for a summary of the decisions). The dissemination of most of the decisions was also faulty.

The prime example of President Truman's decision-making method in matters concerning this particular issue was the January 1946 "debacle" at the time of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly in London. This was when

the President approved, and later recinded, authorization for Secretary of State Byrnes to state that the mandated islands would be offered as a trusteeship--either strategic or non-strategic. In this "debacle," neither President Truman nor Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson followed the "orderly procedure" by which all interested parties were present before the court and by which all decisions were immediately reduced to writing, which Acheson later ascribed so glowingly to President Truman. Also, this "orderly procedure" was not followed in many of the other Presidential decisions concerning this issue.

One matter that should be touched upon is the decision of Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz to take the issue to the public and to their sympathizers in Congress in April 1945. These Admirals spoke out in public for retention of the islands. These were the first public statements on the controversy by American uniformed officers. Prior to this time, the uniformed officers had refrained from making public statements concerning the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. They had previously argued their position solely within the Executive Branch.

The decision of these Admirals to take the issue to the public and to their sympathizers in Congress may be considered by some to have been beyond the limits of responsible military professionalism. This question is often debated in the theoretics of military professionalism, politico-military relations in a democracy, and the proper role of the military in the formulation of foreign policy. The question can be broken

down into two components: the question of access to the Congress and the question of public campaigning.

Under the American constitutional system, the legislative branch must have access to information and testimony from the military leaders. This right has been insisted upon by Congress, and it has been successfully protected. For example, the National Security Act of 1947 states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the right to go to members of the Congress with their viewpoint. It is interesting to note in this regard that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not attempt to set forth their real feelings during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the adoption of the United Nations Charter and, later, on the adoption of the trusteeship agreement. Instead, noncommittal statements were offered to the Senate Committee. The decisions had already been made by the Executive Branch, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff probably felt that it was water over the dam and that events had outrun them.

It is believed that the Admirals were justified in taking their views to the Congress and that they were also justified in making their public statements, although the justification for the latter is not as conclusive as that for the former.

The Admirals spoke out in the absence of any policy decision. This is an entirely different matter than speaking out after a policy decision has been made by the responsible civilian officials as General MacArthur did during the Korean conflict.

The public certainly has a right to know the facts, unless the interests of national security dictate otherwise. In this particular situation, the question was already a matter of public speculation and debate. Additionally, all of the interested foreign governments (especially the United Kingdom and

the Soviet Union) had already been officially notified (at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and during the months prior to the San Francisco Conference) by the State Department that this policy debate was occurring within the American Government; and for that reason, no American trusteeship paper was ready for discussion.

National security interests certainly did not dictate withholding the facts surrounding this policy debate from the public. More informed Congressional and public debates could have been developed as an aid in formulating the policy as well as preparing the public for the probable outcome. Instead, the debates were often based on speculation and steeped in polemics. The Admiral's public statements attempted to present some of the facts concerning the question of the postwar disposition of the mandated islands to the Congress and to the public.

In Chapter One, a speech by Admiral King was quoted in which he listed the national policies in effect at that time. These policies can be summarized as follows:

(1) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the United States, its territories, possessions, leased areas, and trustee territories.

(2) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other American states.

(3) Maintenance of the territorial integrity, security, and political independence of the Philippine Islands.

(4) Participation in, and full support of, the United Nations.

(5) Enforcement, in collaboration with our Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated enemy states.

(6) Maintenance of the United States in the best possible relative position with respect to potential enemy powers, ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States at home.

Utilizing these national policies (or national security policies) as a yardstick, it is possible to evaluate the wisdom of the decisions made concerning the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. The three main decisions, of course, were (1) to draft and include a trusteeship system in the United Nations Charter; (2) to place the former Japanese mandated islands under a United Nations strategic trusteeship; and (3) to have the Trust Territory administered by the Department of the Interior.

These decisions definitely furthered the national policy of supporting the United Nations; although, not to the extent that the "internationalists" desired. The controversy over the disposition of the mandated islands caused the resultant trusteeship system to be a weak one in terms of international supervision.

However, the matter of priorities is involved. The other national policies stressed the maintenance of the maximum national security position for the United States and for its commitments to other states. If the original concepts of trusteeship had been included in the United Nations Charter, and if the mandated islands had been included under such a trusteeship system, the policy concerning the support for the United Nations would have been more closely followed to the detriment of the other national policies. The trusteeship system that

evolved from this policy controversy was a compromise which supported all of the national policies to some extent. In this respect, the decisions to draft and include a trusteeship system in the United Nations Charter and to place the mandated islands under a strategic trusteeship could be described as wise ones.

Balancing this evaluation, however, is the view from the Micronesians' side of the coin. The welfare of the Micronesians, in the opinion of this Author, could have been advanced far more if the islands had been annexed by the United States. As a trust territory, the islands are neither fish nor fowl. They are neither "foreign" territory nor "American" territory in respect of American laws as well as American interest. They are too "foreign" to benefit from certain domestic programs, yet not "foreign" enough to share in American foreign aid efforts. For example, import-export duties are exacted for all materials going between the islands and the United States, thus, hindering the islands' development. Psychologically, there has been a lack of attention placed on the islands' economic development since their future political status is unknown. Only with the advent of the Nixon Administration have the Micronesians been implicitly told that the United States desires a closer association with them in the future. Annexation would have solved the question of the future political status, permitted American investment, eliminated trade barriers and permitted the application of several governmental domestic aid programs.

Another consideration in evaluating the wisdom of the decision to place the islands under a strategic trusteeship

is the fact that the future political status of the islands is once again in question. The islands still have strategic value to the United States. The United States is in danger of losing this strategic asset just at a time when the islands may be required for military bases. If the islands had been annexed just after World War II, this current problem would not exist. However, at the time of the decision, no one realized that the Micronesians would become ripe for self-government in only twenty-five years. The policy-makers could not have foreseen the rapid postwar movement toward de-colonialization, much less the rapid advancement toward a capability for self-government by the Micronesians. The policy-makers thought that the question of terminating the trusteeship agreement would not arise "in the foreseeable future." They may be criticized for this lack of foresight, but it must be remembered that everyone at that time felt the same way.

The decision to select the Department of the Interior as the administrating agency for the Trust Territory was, in the opinion of this Author, unwise. The administrative arrangements did not remain intact for very long. The security problems of the Pacific area were evident to many of the policy-makers at the time that the decision was made. They should have foreseen the conflicts arising from the "split-control" arrangements as a result of the international tensions in the Pacific area. They soon were forced to re-transfer the Northern Mariana Islands from Interior to the Navy, probably because of the need for clandestine projects derived from the

international security problems of the region.

The naval administration of the islands from the time they were conquered until they were transferred to Interior was a credit to the United States and to the advancement of civil and political rights for the Micronesians. The inhabitants of the Northern Mariana Islands, under naval administration until July 1962 (except for a brief period in the early 1950's when they were under Interior administration), made rapid economic, educational, and political progress. The naval administration was progressive, orderly and made a good impression.[4] The Navy also had the personnel and materiel resources necessary for the effective administration and development of the Trust

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4. After a protracted period of learning by bitter experience, the Army's administration of the Ryukyus (Okinawa) became exemplary in providing for the civil rights and internal self-government of the inhabitants. The civil government established by Presidential Executive Order is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense. The High Commissioner (who has always been an active-service Army officer) is designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Secretary of State and with the approval of the President. The government system is quasi-parliamentary. The legislative power is vested in a popularly elected body. Its authority extends to all subjects of legislation of domestic application. The executive power of the government is vested in a chief executive who is a Ryukyuan appointed by the High Commissioner after consultation with representatives of the legislative body (from the majority party or parties). The chief executive has general supervision and control of all executive agencies and instrumentalities of the government. In fact, this governmental system which was established by the Department of Defense was recommended by one former State Department official, David W. Wainhouse, as a possible model for the ultimate constitutional status for Micronesia. See: David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1964), p. 128-129.

Territory. The Interior Department has always had to scramble for the bare minimum of resources.

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One myth that has been accepted by many as true is that the "military" had "undue influence" in the decision-making process concerned with the postwar disposition of the mandated islands. The facts brought out in this study demonstrate that there was no "undue influence" either by the military services or by the military establishment. The issue was not one between the military services or the military establishment and the civilian agencies. There were many officers in the State Department who were "pragmatists." Evidently, there were some naval officers who favored transferring the islands' civil government to a civilian agency. The civilian leaders of the military agencies were "pragmatists." The issue was not one between the "military" and the "civilians."

Furthermore, the "pragmatists" did not have "undue influence" in the decision-making process on this issue. The "pragmatist" positions and views did not predominate. They were considered, and they influenced greatly the formulation of the trusteeship system, but they did not predominate. The "pragmatists" lost on the major decisions. A trusteeship system <u>was</u> discussed at San Francisco, although such discussions had been blocked from the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. A trusteeship system, albeit considerably different from the original conceptions of the "internationalists," <u>was</u> included within the United Nations Charter. The former mandated islands

were not annexed. Instead, the islands were placed under a strategic trusteeship--a goal which had been accepted by the "internationalists" as early as February 1945. Finally, the civil government of the Trust Territory was transferred from the Navy to a civilian agency--the Department of the Interior.

Neither the "pragmatists" nor the uniformed military services nor the military establishment had "undue influence." In fact, just as good a case could be presented to the effect that the "internationalists" had "undue influence" in this decision-making process. However, while the "internationalists" may have predominated when the major decisions are considered, this is not the same as their having "undue influence." They certainly did not achieve their original goals.

This Author believes that the final outcome represented a compromise between the "pragmatists" and the "internationalists." All positions presented by all of the participants (both "pragmatists" and "internationalists") were critically scrutinized; and none was accepted without substantial challenge.

The Departments of State and Defense are the Cabinet departments most concerned for the requirements of national safety and survival. And today, perhaps the most important issues of national security are joint State-Defense issues, requiring joint action by the two departments. These range from the overriding need to properly relate military means to foreign policy ends, through the development and execution of military aid projects, and arms control planning and negotiation.

Senator Henry Jackson,
statement on the State-
Defense Officer Exchange
Program, 1969.

Over the last two decades our increased recognition of the close connection between diplomacy and military power has brought our two Departments into daily contact and has made our officers ever more mindful of the problems of their allied profession. There are now few activities in the Department of State which in one way or another do not involve working with the Department of Defense. Overall, these relationships have become increasingly effective, and yet at the very heart of our national security concerns where military affairs and foreign affairs combine to make our grand strategy, there is more to be done. The central problems of national security require the attention of men experienced in both diplomatic and military affairs.

Secretary of State Christian
A. Herter, letter to Secre-
tary of Defense Artemus L.
Gates, June 21, 1960.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

National Security Act
of 1947

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MAJOR EVENTS

1522 - Magellan discovers Guam and the intrusion of Europeans begins.

1899 - Spain sells the Marianas (less Guam), Marshalls, and Carolines to Germany. Guam is ceded to the United States.

1916 - Japan occupies the islands as a result of World War I.

1920 - Japan obtains the islands as a Class "C" Mandate under the League of Nations.

1938 - Establishment of the first coordination machinery for military and foreign policies: The Standing Liaison Committee.

August:
Atlantic Charter proclaimed.

1941 - December 7:
Attack on Pearl Harbor.

1942 - January 1, 2:
United Nations Declaration signed.

February:
Joint Chiefs of Staff organized.

January-July:
State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy works out the framework for studies of various postwar problems. State Department planning commences on a postwar international organization and an international trusteeship system.

September 15:
Joint Chiefs of Staff inform the State Department of the necessity of depriving Japan of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands (the Mandate).

November:
State Department plan formulated for a trusteeship system which would include all dependent areas. Secretary Hull restricts it to only those dependent territories taken from the Axis and the mandates of the League of Nations. President Roosevelt approves the tentative plan as modified by Hull.

JSSC established within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1943 - March:
Roosevelt tells British Foreign Secretary Eden that the Japanese mandated islands should be internationalized.

August:
Quebec Conference: State Department draft on dependent areas discussed. Draft includes point that peoples liberated from Japanese rule and unprepared for autonomy should be placed under some form of international trusteeship.

October:
Foreign Ministers' Conference, Moscow: Hull brings up the proposal again. Roosevelt mentions his idea of an internationalized string of bases encircling the globe. The mandated islands to be included in this category.

November:
President approves the policy that the Japanese mandated islands are required for the direct defense of the United States.

December:
Cairo Declaration: United States, United Kingdom, and China declare that they "covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914 ..."

1944 - January:
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of State that "no action should be taken which directly or indirectly would prejudice the ultimate disposition of these islands."

Spring:
State Department produces a revised trusteeship plan. Provision included which would give the international organization's Executive Council authority over any trust territories where fortifications were to be established under the application of international security measures. This was the beginning of the subsequent strategic areas concept in the United Nations Charter.

March:
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox speaks out for annexation of the Japanese mandated islands. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the "Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under the sole sovereignty of the United States."

1944 - May:
Gallup poll indicates 69 percent of the American public desires to "keep" Micronesia (the Mandate).

June:
Joint Chiefs of Staff repeat their position (stated in January and March) to the State Department. They also recommend annexation of the islands to the President.

July 6:
State Department radically revises the trusteeship plan, downgrading the powers of the Trusteeship Council.

July 10:
President informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he is working on the idea that the United Nations will ask the United States to act as Trustee for the Japanese mandated islands. "With this will go the civil authority ... and also the military authority to protect them, i.e., fortifications, etc. It does not necessarily involve a decision on permanent sovereignty."

July 15:
President approves the State Department trusteeship plan of July 6.

July 18:
Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives block any discussion of trusteeships at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.

August-October:
Dumbarton Oaks Conversations: No official discussion of trusteeship plans occurs.

August 3:
Joint Chiefs of Staff's views formally sent to the Secretary of State by General Marshall. Joint Chiefs of Staff desire, from a military point of view, that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements be delayed until after the defeat of Japan.

November 15:
Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky see the President. The President tells them that the principle of international trusteeship should be firmly established with adequate machinery for this purpose. He also directs the State Department, "in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to redouble their efforts in examining the trusteeship proposals further."

1944 - December:

The Three Secretaries (State, War, and Navy) Committee and SWNCC established. SWNCC's purpose is to "reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters of common interest and, under the guidance of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, establish policies on politico-military questions referred to it."

December:

Interior Department becomes interested in obtaining the role of administrator of the islands. Officers in the Navy Department begin to plan for postwar naval administration of the islands.

December 30:

Secretary of State Stettinius writes to Forrestal and Stimson requesting consultation on the trusteeship issue. He invites the Joint Chiefs of Staff, War, and Navy Departments to participate with State in the preparation of a draft proposal on trusteeships. He concedes that it will be possible to separate "the formulation of general principles and of provisions for machinery from consideration of specific territories, the latter subject to be left for future determination."

1945 - January 19:

Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions for their participation in discussions of international trusteeships.

February 2:

Ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization meets. Committee includes representatives of the State, War, Navy, and Interior Departments. The military services are represented by officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

February 8:

Second meeting of the ad hoc committee. Principle of certain essential differentiations between strategic and non-strategic areas for trust purposes developed.

February 4-9:

Yalta Conference: Churchill incident. He obtains the agreement that no discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference.

March 17:

Ad hoc committee produces a trusteeship plan acceptable to State, War, Navy, Interior and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1945 - March 30:
Stimson, Forrestal and McCloy discuss their fears over the trend of thinking on trusteeships and the timing of international discussions on the subject.

April 2:
At Three Secretaries Meeting, Stettinius agrees with Stimson and Forrestal to try to get a postponement of the whole subject of trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference. Stettinius is dissatisfied with the proposed trusteeship plan which, he says, was developed by the ad hoc committee while he was out of Washington.

April 5:
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes writes to Roosevelt urgently recommending against any postponement of the discussions at San Francisco. The President, at a press conference, indicates he wants the islands to be placed under a trusteeship.

Admiral King speaks out in public for retention of the islands. This is the first public statement on the controversy by an American military leader.

April 9:
At Three Secretaries Meeting, Stettinius changes his decision; refuses to propose a postponement. States he will inform the President of the War and Navy views and that he reserved judgment. He tells Forrestal and Stimson that, while his private views accorded with theirs, "he was under orders to the contrary."

Stettinius sends letter to the President describing War and Navy views and enclosing the trusteeship plan. Stimson and Forrestal decide to submit their views directly to the President.

April 10:
Roosevelt cables Stettinius approving the proposed trusteeship plan in principle and setting a date of the nineteenth to meet with State, War, and Navy representatives to discuss their differences.

April 12:
President Roosevelt dies.

April 13:
Stettinius briefs President Truman on this matter and asks for an early conference on the question with all concerned.

1945 - April 16:
High-level State, War, Navy conference: Joint Chiefs of Staff are not represented. Decision is made that the subject of international trusteeships would not be eliminated from discussion at San Francisco.

April 17:
Meeting of Secretaries of State, War, and Navy with the full United States delegation to San Francisco Conference. Decisions of the previous day discussed.

April-June:
San Francisco Conference on International Organization. Trusteeship provisions, almost identical to the United States proposal (developed by the ad hoc Committee), included in the United Nations Charter.

June 23:
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service Secretaries endorse the draft of the United Nations Charter.

July 20:
Truman states enroute to Potsdam that the United States is not fighting for conquest and does not want one piece of territory or one thing of monetary value out of the war.

August 9:
Truman states that the United States, while not wanting territory or profit out of the war, will "maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace."

August 14:
Truman approves naval administration of the Marianas. No consultation was held with the other interested agencies nor were they informed of this decision.

August 19:
Subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee reports that the United States should "take outright" the Japanese mandated islands.

September 2:
Japan surrenders. World War II ends.

September 11:
Truman approves War Department request that his approval for naval administration of the Marianas be considered as granting "interim authority" and that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy be

1945 - (September 11: continued)
directed to study and submit joint recommendations on the type of government to be established on the various Pacific islands.

September 12:
Ickes writes to the President advocating civilian administration of inhabited areas adjacent to strategic bases. He states that in developing plans for the conduct of civil affairs in the new territories, the Departments of State, War, and Navy would be consulted.

September 28:
Acting Secretary of Interior Abe Fortas writes to Truman referring to Interior's discovery that Truman had referred this subject to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. He desires that Interior be included in any such discussions.

October 18:
Ickes writes to Truman suggesting the establishment of a State, War, Navy, Interior group to devise "a detailed plan for interim administration, pending decisions and agreements concerning future disposition and administration of the islands."

October 20:
President appoints the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior as a committee to study "the problem arising from the Administration of the Pacific Islands. This should be done without delay and we should outline a policy which is satisfactory to all four departments." No consultation is made with the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy prior to appointing this committee.

October 25:
Representatives of the four Secretaries meet; appoint a sub-committee to handle the problem.

October-February (1946):
Low point in relations between State and Interior on this issue. State Department delays meeting of the sub-committee. State believes that the political status of the islands should be settled prior to discussions on their civil government.

1946 - January:
"Debacle" revolving around the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly in London. President Truman approves and, later recinds, authorization for Secretary of State Byrnes to state that the mandated islands will be offered as a trusteeship, either strategic or non-strategic. Incident caused by lack of coordination between State, War, and Navy Departments.

1946 - January 30:
Sub-committee meets for first time after Presidential letter to Secretary of State on the ninth urging the Four Secretaries to start consideration of the problem. Interior representative at the meeting is presented with a solid front by State, War, and Navy representatives against any consideration of the problem until after the political status of the Pacific islands is settled.

February 20:
Interior presents a proposal for civilian administration of the Pacific islands under American control to the other three Departments.

March 6:
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy forward the Interior proposal to the President without endorsing it and unanimously recommend to the President that no action be taken "until such time as the status and title of the Pacific Islands concerned should be determined." Interior not informed of this action until June 8.

June 20:
Secretary of the Interior Krug indicates to his officers that this was not "the proper time for pushing civilian control of the Pacific islands."

June 28:
Joint Chiefs of Staff decide to report to the President that they had concluded, after a review of the situation, that "United States sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands is, from the military point of view, necessary to the national defense...."

August 20:
SWNCC agrees to appoint an ad hoc sub-committee to "prepare trusteeship agreements to cover territories formerly mandated to Japan and pre-war Japanese territory." The decision had been preceded by SWNCC studies since March on the implications of various interpretations of articles in the United Nations Charter that pertained to trusteeships. Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the development of a draft trusteeship plan for the mandated islands on several conditions. Mainly, it was to be without prejudice to the Joint Chief's of Staff's position (annexation) and without prejudice to the ultimate decision on what to do with the islands. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth several essential points that should be included in any contemplated trusteeship agreement in order to maximize American security. State, War, and Navy Departments desire a decision on the matter prior to the second

1946 - (August 20: continued)
meeting of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly in November.

October:
Draft trusteeship agreement developed by the SWNCC ad hoc sub-committee which includes the points desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

October 22:
Presidential conference: Based on oral reports, the President decides to submit the mandated islands to strategic trusteeship under terms acceptable to the United States.

November 6:
President Truman announces the decision and makes public the draft trusteeship agreement that had been developed by the SWNCC ad hoc sub-committee.

1947 - February 17:
United States Representative on the Security Council forwards the draft trusteeship agreement to Secretary-General Trygve Lie and requests that it be placed on the Security Council agenda.

February 26:
Draft trusteeship agreement formally submitted to the Security Council.

April 2:
Security Council accepts the trusteeship agreement which had been modified in minor ways from the original draft submitted by the United States.

May 3:
Secretary Krug writes to Secretary of State Marshall requesting, now that the status of the former Japanese mandated islands had been determined, that the President's Four Secretarial Committee meet to work our a mutually satisfactory policy for the administration of all the Pacific islands. Interior had learned about May 1 that SWNCC had been considering the issue for some time.

May 7:
The President writes to Marshall concerning a Guamanian petition and recalls his appointment of the Four Secretarial Committee.

May 12:
Krug writes to the President on the issue after receiving no reply from Marshall.

May 14:
Presidential memorandum to the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior urging action.

1947 - (May 14: continued)
Marshall writes to Krug suggesting May 16 as a meeting date after clearing the date with the other Secretaries.

May 16:
First meeting of the President's Four Secretaries' Committee. Administration of the trust territory by a "civilian agency" accepted either at this meeting or shortly thereafter (depending on participant's interpretation).

June 18:
Marshall reports the results of the May 16 and subsequent meetings to the President. The report includes the decision for "civilian agency" administration of Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

June 19:
President Truman sends Marshall's report to the Senate and states his approval of it. He does not notify the four Secretaries directly that he approved it.

July 7:
Nimitz, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supports approval of the trusteeship agreement. Forrestal, by means of a statement submitted to the Committee, also gives his assent to the agreement.

July 18:
Congress, by Joint Resolution, authorizes the President to approve the trusteeship agreement. The President approves the agreement on the same day. Also, military government of the Trust Territory is terminated and replaced by civil government under interim naval administration by Executive Order.

1948 - February 11:
President, in a letter to the Secretary of the Interior, states that it is his intention to designate Interior as the civilian agency to administer the Trust Territory.

May 21:
Draft legislation for an organic act for the Trust Territory is introduced in Congress (S.J. RES. 221). It is referred to committees. Congress has yet to pass an organic act for the Trust Territory.

1949 - May 14:
President Truman, in a letter to the Secretary of the Interior (with a copy to the Secretary of the Navy), directs that the transfer proceed regardless of the status of pending legislation. He also directs that plans for the transfer are to be

1949 - (May 14: continued)
submitted by September 1, 1949, and that the transfer should take place "within two or three years."

August 31:
Memorandum of understanding between Navy and Interior on the transfer is submitted to the President. July 1, 1951, selected as the transfer date.

September 23:
The President approves the memorandum of understanding.

1951 - January 3:
Former Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah is appointed High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. By the memorandum of understanding, this position was to have been filled by Interior on July 1, 1950. The delay by Interior in nominating a High Commissioner had retarded transfer planning.

July 1:
Responsibility for the administration of the civil government of the Trust Territory is transferred from the Navy to Interior by Executive Order. The detailed transfer agreement between Navy and Interior also becomes effective.

September 8:
Japan, in signing the Peace Treaty, renounces any rights to her former mandated islands.

1952 - November 10:
President Truman, by Executive Order, retransfers Saipan and Tinian from Interior to the Navy for security reasons. The retransfer takes effect on January 1, 1953.

1953 - President Eisenhower retransfers the rest of the Northern Mariana Islands (less Rota) from Interior to Navy effective immediately.

1954 - Congress passes an act providing for Presidential control of the government of the Trust Territory, formalizing what had been the de facto situation since the islands had been captured.

1961 - June:
The High Commissioner informs the United Nations Trusteeship Council that plans are being worked on to unify the administration of the Trust Territory. The Trusteeship Council had been critical of the "split" administration as encouraging "separatist tendencies."

1962 - May 7:
President Kennedy, by Executive Order, transfers the civil administration of the Northern Mariana Islands back to the Department of the Interior. Transfer is effective on July 1, 1962.

July 2:
Interior/Navy agreement to relax Trust Territory entry controls for alien nationals and ships. Agreement is effective on July 1, 1963.

1968 - August 1:
Interior/Navy agreement to relax further the Trust Territory entry controls for alien nationals, ships, and aircraft.

1969 - June:
First thirteen-man construction teams are sent by the Navy to the Trust Territory. In the Spring of 1969, the Secretary of the Interior had requested the Department of Defense to assign mobile construction teams to the Trust Territory to assist in local projects and training goals. As of September 1970, seven teams are in the Trust Territory; one each from the Army and Air Force, and five from the Navy.

July:
Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia submits its report which recommends a status of "free association" with the United States.

1970 - May:
The United States Government offers the Trust Territory commonwealth status, similar to Puerto Rico, in negotiations with the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia.

July:
The Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia submits a report of its negotiations with the United States Government. The report indicates that the Political Status Delegation considers certain conditions and points inherent to the status of "free association" that are unacceptable to the United States Government.

1969 - 1970:
The Department of Defense begins to provide increased assistance to the Department of the Interior in the Trust Territory. Besides the mobile construction teams, surplus military equipment suitable for civilian use, landing craft, formal construction training, sealift and airlift services, and scientific assistance are being provided by the Department of Defense to the Trust Territory.



Racial Boundaries in the South Pacific


MAP SHOWING AREA OF
SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION
COMMISSION BOUNDARY
MILES
Equator
Tropic of Cancer
Honolulu
Hawaii
Midway I.
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
GUAM
MARIANAS
Saipan
ISLANDS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
Yap
Palau
Ponape
Truk
Kusaie
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Nauru I.
Ocean I.
GILBERT ISLANDS
Tarawa
Canton I.
PHOENIX ISLANDS
ELLICE Funafuti ISLANDS
TOKELAU ISLANDS
W. SAMOA
AMERICAN SAMOA
COOK ISLANDS
Niue
TONGA Tongatapu ISLANDS
FIJI Kadavu ISLANDS
Rarotonga
MARQUESAS I. ISLANDS
TUAMOTU ISLANDS
SOCIETY ISLANDS
Tahiti
AUSTRAL ISLANDS
Tropic of Capricorn
Pitcairn I.
Easter I.
Gannet I.
LINE ISLANDS
NEW HEBRIDES
NEW CALEDONIA Noumea
SOLOMON ISLANDS
TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA
PAPUA
Kavieng
Norfolk I.
Lord Howe I.
HERVEY ISLANDS
Auckland
NEW ZEALAND
Wellington
AUSTRALIA
NORTHERN TERRITORY
QUEENSLAND
Cairns
Brisbane
NEW SOUTH WALES
Sydney
VICTORIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA

TRUST. TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS





VICINITY MAP

KURILE IS.
ALEUTIAN IS.
KOREA
JAPAN
CHINA
OKINAWA
MIDWAY IS.
IWO JIMA
20° Lat.
WAKE IS.
GUAM
PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
CAROLINE IS.
GILBERT AND ELLICE IS.
NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON IS.
SAMOA
SANTA CRUZ IS.
FIJI IS.
NEW CALEDONIA
TONGA IS.
AUSTRALIA
Brisbane
NEW ZEALAND
40° Lat
140° Long.
160° Long.
180° Long.
ANTARCTICA
UNITED STATES
HAWAIIAN IS.
MEXICO
PANAMA
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
MARQUESAS IS.
SOCIETY IS.
TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO
COOK IS.
PERU
the
PACIFIC
BASIN
0 50 100 500 1000
Scale of Miles
180° Long.
140° Long.
120° Long.
100° Long.



NAVY—PSC, GUAM

APPENDIX C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY NO. 29

SWNCC 27

15 February 1945

Pages 1 - 15 incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIPS

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a paper submitted by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

WALLACE E. WHITSON

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend to the Secretaries of War and Navy the form of reply to be made jointly to identical letters, dated December 30, 1944, addressed to them by the Secretary of State with respect to international trusteeships.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On December 30, 1944, the Secretary of State sent identical letters to the Secretaries of War and Navy outlining the procedure proposed to be followed in the immediate future with respect to the question of international trusteeships. A copy of that letter was sent to this Committee and is appended hereto as Appendix A.

3. Appendix A was referred by the War and Navy Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The comments of the latter were presented in the form of a recommended draft reply attached to Admiral Leahy's memorandum of January 19, 1945 (Appendix B).

4. It is understood that the Assistant Secretary of War has tentatively determined to recommend to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy that they ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the conclusions represented by Appendix B. For this purpose the Assistant Secretary of War has informally presented to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration a proposed joint letter to Admiral Leahy (Appendix C). The Secretary of the Navy has, contrarily, tentatively determined that the more desirable course to follow might be to reply to the Secretary of State but that the matter might appropriately be considered by this Committee before action is taken. The

Navy member of this Committee accordingly submits for consideration the form of letter appended hereto as Appendix D.

DISCUSSION

5. Both Appendix B and Appendix C address themselves primarily to the matter of initiating a discussion of the subject of international trusteeships in a general conference of all of the United Nations. The Joint Chiefs say that there is no objection to this, provided certain specific reservations as to particular territories are made at the outset. The Secretary of War is believed to be of the view that discussion of the matter in a general conference, especially with preliminary reservations by the United States, will only engender controversies harmful to the immediate prosecution of the war. Accordingly, he would have the Joint Chiefs re-examine their conclusions in the light of this consideration.

6. While the Secretary of State's letter (Appendix A) is prompted by the probability of the discussion of international trusteeships in a general conference, its more immediate concerns are (a) the drafting of proposals which can be agreed upon within this Government prior to any discussions at all, and (b) the preliminary discussion of such proposals, when and if arrived at, not in a general conference, but rather with those three or four of our larger allies whose real responsibility it will be to maintain the peace of the world in the foreseeable future.

7. Appendix D points out that the first of these concerns is of the more immediate significance and that it is premature to endeavor to decide finally what to do about initiating external discussions of any kind until our own position has been

formulated with reasonable care and precision. It urges that the work of drafting proposals satisfactory to ourselves be proceeded with as expeditiously as possible, and that the drafts be submitted to the War and Navy Secretaries and, through them, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. With respect to the matter of discussions after satisfactory proposals have been formulated, it incorporates the War Department's view that a general conference of the United Nations is not a desirable forum for such discussions at this point. It suggests instead that any discussions of this nature be at first confined to ourselves, the British, the Soviets and the Chinese; and that the matter be introduced in a general conference only after general agreement has been reached among the Great Powers.

APPENDIX C

8. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs have indicated their approval of the introduction of the subject of trusteeships into a general conference, it is manifest that they would have no objection to the more limited discussions tentatively envisaged by Appendix D. In any event, Appendix D in effect reserves even the question of embarking upon the restricted discussions until after the task of formulating proposals satisfactory to this Government has been completed. Under these circumstances there seems to be no occasion to ask the Joint Chiefs to reconsider their conclusion at this time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended:

(a) That the Secretaries of War and Navy jointly address a letter to the Secretary of State in the form of Appendix D.

(b) That a copy of such letter be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information.

December 30, 1944

[Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy]

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to a letter to me of August 3, 1944, from General Marshall and to my reply of August 5, 1944, on the subject of international trusteeships.

In deference to the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we were glad to eliminate this topic from the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. However, the topic was raised at Dumbarton Oaks on a number of occasions by the other participants. Briefly summarized, those occasions were substantially as follows:

The Soviet delegation asked why the subject was not being discussed, expressed their desire to discuss it, and, when informed that we considered it wiser to leave the subject for future consideration, asked whether it would be discussed at the general conference or made the subject of a prior exchange of views. They expressed a desire for the latter procedure. The British delegation raised the question and were told that we had under consideration the possibility of exchanging papers on the subject. They said that they were prepared to participate in such an exchange. The Chinese delegation also raised the question, and they, too, expressed a desire to exchange papers on the subject. In none of the above instances was any question raised as to the particular territories which might be

The Honorable

James V. Forrestal,

Secretary of the Navy.

involved. The emphasis was exclusively upon general principles and particularly upon the kind of machinery which might effectively and appropriately be established in conjunction with the international organization.

The question has also been raised many times in public discussion about the Dumbarton Oaks proposals both here and abroad. There has been a considerable amount of criticism that the subject of international trusteeships was ommitted from the proposals.

It is clear, therefore, that we are confronted with the need of re-examining the whole matter from the viewpoint of further procedure. In such consideration as we have so far given it, we have come to the following conclusions:

1. It is inescapable that the question of international trusteeships will have to be discussed at least at the general conference, and that in all likelihood a chapter on general principles and machinery will have to be included in the final charter of the United Nations.

2. It is entirely possible, in dealing with this subject, to separate the formulation of general principles and of provisions for machinery from consideration of specific territories, the latter subject to be left for future determination.

We are now working on a draft proposal for incorporation in the final charter of the United Nations which will be drawn

up at the general conference to be called for that purpose.' This proposal will be limited to expressions of general principles and to provision of appropriate machinery of an international nature. We are giving consideration to the possibility of discussing our proposal with the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments prior to the general conference.

We would very much like to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments participate with us in the preparation of this proposal, and we hope that you will designate representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that purpose. As we are hopeful that the general conference can be held sometime this winter we naturally wish to formulate the proposal as promptly as possible.

I am sending a similar letter to Secretary Stimson.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. (Signed)

APPENDIX C

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

19 January 1945.

EMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: International trusteeships

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached raft letter be dispatched to the Secretary of State in reply o his similar letters to the Secretary of War and the Secre- ary of the Navy, dated 30 December 1944.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Draft Letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State

I have received your letter of 30 December 1944 on the subject of International Trusteeships, setting forth developments concerning this subject since the letters exchanged last August, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State.

In their letter of 3 August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that:

"From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements, particularly as they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan."

The Department of State now proposes that preparations be made to discuss the general principles of International Trusteeships and the appropriate machinery therefor, leaving for future discussions all questions of specific territories. In support of this proposal it is stated:

a. That the Soviets, British and Chinese desire and will press for such discussions.

b. That the question will have to be discussed at the general conference, and that in all likelihood a chapter on general principles and machinery will have to be included in the final charter of the United Nations.

c. That it is entirely possible in dealing with this subject, to separate the formulation of general principles and of provisions for machinery from consideration of specific territories, the latter subject to be left for future determination.

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom I am in agreement, find no objection, from the military point of view, to the proposed discussion of International Trusteeships, provided such discussions:

a. Give full consideration to the future defense needs of the United States.

b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the disposition of any territory under the sovereignty of the United States, or any Japanese territory occupied by United States forces.

c. Consider no agreement that may eventually give to any foreign nation claim to any control of the "Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.

In this connection, it is desired to emphasize that all studies and discussions of this subject should give full consideration to the policy approved by the President 23 November 1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the "Blue Area" described as "Required for the direct defense of the United States....."

The usual military representatives, who are working with the Department of State in connection with the establishment of the International Organization, will be available for work in connection with these discussion.

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

[Proposed letter submitted by the Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration as a Secretary of War and Navy joint letter to Admiral Leahy]

Dear Admiral Leahy:

I have received the proposed form of letter to the Secretary of State on international trusteeship (_____) approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for my signature.

I am convinced of the great importance of the subject in view of our military interest in certain Pacific areas that might be considered for international trusteeship, and because of that importance, I have given careful thought to the proposal and to the possible dangers of presently discussing the matter at a general assembly.

We have not yet any understanding with the major powers as to the role each is to play in guaranteeing the maintenance of peace, that is to say, as to the nature of the responsibility which is implicit in the word "trusteeship". I do not mean that we should postpone all discussion of the subject until after all nations have agreed on peace guarantees, but at least a tentative understanding on the part of the three or four principal nations would appear to be a necessary preliminary, one that would be normal in preparing for an important meeting in business or political life. If we bring up the question of trusteeships without such preliminary discussion, we will open the door to the broadest kind of claims on the part of some powers and we will incur the hostility of others, to whom our interest in the subject may appear suspect. On the other hand, if the

subject of trusteeship is introduced in the context of an agreed responsibility to maintain peace, I believe it will be welcomed by many small nations who might oppose it at the present stage.

I am also extremely doubtful of the possibility of discussing trusteeships without discussing the particular areas for which they are intended, and of the advisability of attempting to do so. It does not appear practicable to consider the machinery or organization of a trust without taking into account the nature of the subject matter. I could readily understand a contention that a form of organization that we favored for a Pacific Island might be entirely inappropriate for areas in other parts of the world. Moreover, as soon as the subject is introduced in a general meeting, each country will naturally consider the problem in the light of the areas in which it is interested; and I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with me that discussion of particular areas at this stage might lead to controversies that would divert us from a united prosecution of the war.

I fear that the difficulties mentioned above will be aggravated if our introduction of the subject is accompanied by a proviso that we will not discuss certain areas in which we are particularly interested. That would in my judgment start the discussions off in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that might well endanger our objective, which would be almost as clearly revealed by this proviso as by a policy of disclosure.

For these reasons I think our Government should not propose a discussion of trusteeship at present and should in fact

make a determined effort to avoid discussion of the subject. We need not fear that this attitude will provoke suspicion since it is based on a realistic ground, the impracticability of discussing the organization and machinery of trusteeship without some common understanding of the obligations of the trustee and without full knowledge of the types and character of the territories to be dealt with.

I realize that these considerations are not solely military and for that reason, may not all have been brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or considered by them. Nevertheless, these considerations bear, in my opinion, so directly on the possibility of attaining objectives of prime military importance that I believe the State Department would be greatly aided by a full expression of opinion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these points.

I have therefore come to the conclusion that I should request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject further in the light of the considerations stated in this letter and accordingly I return the proposed letter to the Secretary of State for that purpose.

APPENDIX C

[Retyped for clarity]

~~TOP SECRET~~

D E C L A S S I F I E D

[Proposed letter submitted by the Navy representative on SWNCC for consideration as a joint letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State]

DRAFT

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of 30 December 1944 on the subject of international trusteeships, setting forth developments in this regard since the letters exchanged last August between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself.

In their letter of 3 August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that:

> "From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements, particularly as they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan."

The Department of State now proposes that preparations be made to discuss the general principles of international trusteeships and the appropriate machinery therefor, leaving for future discussions all questions of specific territories. In support of this proposal it is stated:

a. That the Soviets, British and Chinese desire and will press for such discussions.

b. That the question will have to be discussed at the general conference, and that in all likelihood a chapter on general principles and machinery will have to be included in the final charter of the United Nations.

c. That it is entirely possible in dealing with this subject, to separate the formulation of general principles and of provisions for machinery from consideration of specific territories, the latter subject to be left for future determination.

Upon receipt of your letter, the proposal was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of War and myself. The Joint Chiefs have again considered the matter and have expressed the opinion that there is no objection, from the military point of view, to the proposed discussion of international trusteeships, provided such discussions:

a. Give full consideration to the future defense needs of the United States.

b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the disposition of any territory under the sovereignty of the United States, or any Japanese territory occupied by United States forces.

c. Consider no agreement that may eventually give to any foreign nation claim to any control of the "Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further emphasize the fact that all studies and discussions of this subject should give full consideration to the policy, approved by the President 23 November 1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the "Blue Area" described as "Required for the direct defense of the United States....."

I am advised that, since the receipt of your letter, there has taken place within your Department consideration of draft proposals, for possible discussion by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, relating to the general principles of international trusteeships and the machinery for their effectuation. I further understand that appropriate military and naval representatives are taking part therein.

I am in accord with the desirability of endeavoring to formulate at the earliest possible moment proposals of this character which will recognize the basic military and political factors involved and are satisfactory to this Government as a basis for discussion with the other Dumbarton Oaks powers. As

ou point out, it is not unlikely that we shall be obliged,
ooner or later, to enter into a discussion of this matter with
ther nations, and it is imperative that this Government explore
he subject thoroughly among ourselves before considering it
ith others. I hope, therefore, that this work will proceed
xpeditiously, and this Department stands ready to be of any
ssistance that it can. I assure you that, when it has reached
point where there is a draft--or perhaps alternative drafts--
uitable for submission as a basis for discussion within this
overnment, the Navy Department and, I am sure, the War Depart-
ent and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be glad to supply their
omments and recommendations.

Until this project has advanced to a stage where it is possible to say that this Government has formulated its own position in reasonable detail, it seems to me to be premature to attempt to decide finally whether or not we shall institute discussions with other nations in this regard. If we are able to agree within our own Government upon proposals which we would be willing to discuss with other nations, then in my opinion such discussions should be limited to the four powers which took part in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, and only after full examination and complete agreement among those powers should the subject be opened for consideration by a general conference of the United Nations.

In accordance with the views expressed above, it is suggested that the State Department proceed as promptly as may be with the drafting of its proposed paper on territorial trusteeships for possible discussion with the British, the Soviets, and the Chinese, and request comment thereon from the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

SWNCC 27/1

APPENDIX C

26 February 1945

Pages 16 - 19 incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIPS
Reference: a. SWNCC 27

Note by the Secretaries

By informal action the Committee agreed to forward the attached letter to the Secretary of State in lieu of the one proposed in reference a.

WALLACE E. WHITSON
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

APPENDIX C

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE [from the Chairman of the State, War, Navy, Coordinating Committee

Subject: International Trusteeships

Reference is made to your identical letter of 30 December 1944 to the Secretaries of War and Navy on the subject of international trusteeships, setting forth developments in this regard since the letters exchanged last August between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself.

In their letter of 3 August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that:

> "From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements, particularly as they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan."

The Department of State now proposes that preparations be made to discuss the general principles of international trusteeships and the appropriate machinery therefor, leaving for future discussions all questions of specific territories. In support of this proposal it is stated:

a. That the Soviets, British and Chinese desire and will press for such discussions.

b. That the question will have to be discussed at the general conference, and that in all likelihood a chapter on general principles and machinery will have to be included in the final charter of the United Nations.

c. That it is entirely possible in dealing with this subject, to separate the formulation of general principles and of provisions for machinery from consideration of specific territories, the latter subject to be left for future determination.

Upon receipt of your letter, the proposal was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Joint Chiefs have again considered the matter and have expressed the opinion that there is no objection, from the military point of view, to the proposed discussion of international trusteeships, provided such discussions:

a. Give full consideration to the future defense needs of the United States.

b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the disposition of any territory under the sovereignty of the United States, or any Japanese territory occupied by United States forces.

c. Consider no agreement that may eventually give to any foreign nation claim to any control of the "Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further emphasize the fact that all studies and discussions of this subject should give full consideration to the policy, approved by the President 23 November 1943, that the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the "Blue Area" described as "Required for the direct defense of the United States....."

It is understood that, since the receipt of your letter, there has taken place within the State Department consideration of draft proposals, for possible discussion by the United States,

Great Britain, Russia and China, relating to the general principles of international trusteeships and the machinery for their effectuation. It is further understood that appropriate military and naval representatives are taking part therein.

The Secretaries of War and Navy are in accord with the desirability of endeavoring to formulate at the earliest possible moment proposals of this character which will recognize the basic military and political factors involved and are satisfactory to this Government as a basis for discussion with the other Dumbarton Oaks powers. If there are to be no direct acquisitions of security outposts by the United States or the other principal powers, such proposals should include a type of trusteeship, in respect to all or any part of these areas, which will assure the security interests of the several agreeing nations. As you point out, it is not unlikely that we shall be obliged, sooner or later, to enter into a discussion of this matter with other nations, and it is imperative that this Government explore the subject thoroughly among ourselves before considering it with others. It is hoped, therefore, that this work will proceed expeditiously, and the War and Navy Departments stand ready to be of any assistance that they can. You are assured that, when it has reached a point where there is a draft--or perhaps alternative drafts--suitable for submission as a basis for discussion within this Government, the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will promptly supply their suggestions and recommendations covering the security interests of the country.

Until this project has advanced to a stage where it is possible to say that this Government has formulated its own position in reasonable detail, it seems to be premature to

attempt to decide finally whether or not we shall institute discussions with other nations in this regard. If we are able to agree within our own Government upon proposals which we would be willing to discuss with other nations, then in the opinion of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy such discussions should be limited to the principal powers which took part in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, and only after full examination and complete agreement among those powers should the subject be opened for consideration by a general conference of the United Nations.

In accordance with the views expressed above, it is suggested that the State Department proceed as promptly as may be possible with the drafting of its proposed paper on territorial trusteeships for possible discussion with the principal powers. As soon as this paper is received, arrangements will promptly be made whereby you will receive the views of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(signed)

James Clement Dunn
Chairman

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

[Retyped for clarity]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

DRAFT STATE DEPARTMENT April 2, 1945
File No. A14-7/EF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Draft memorandum from the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy]

At a meeting on April 2 the Secretaries of State, War and Navy agreed that it was not possible to arrive at agreement with respect to any satisfactory draft paper on the subject of trusteeship with a view of presentation for discussion of the subject with sponsoring powers before the San Francisco Conference. The Secretaries of War and Navy feel strongly that the position of this Government with respect to the necessity for retaining complete control over certain strategic areas in the Pacific should be made known unequivocably to other nations and to the world before any discussion even of machinery of principles with respect to a trusteeship system could be entered into. This position was based upon the following considerations:

> The United States has always been the champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific Ocean. This war has been fought and is being fought in that cause against the aggressions of Japan who sought to enslave in her empire the Western and South Western Pacific. Our country is now liberating that ocean from this attack, not only for our own interests, but for the interests of all peace loving nations who are situated or have interest in the Pacific. In this cause, with great loss of American lives and expenditure of American treasure, we have taken from Japan and now have possession of certain islands and atols and still more will shortly be in our hands.
>
> Strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and atols [sic] are vital to any effective military guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Harbor and air fields are as much an integral part of necessary military power as war ships and planes. In order to discharge its responsibilities as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights. The United States policy will be to hold any reserved strategic rights in the interests of the same cause for which we are now fighting -- the cause of international peace and freedom in the Pacific, a cause in which all law-abiding nations in that area have a vital interest.

As you recall, agreement was reached at Yalta that a discussion of a trusteeship system at the San Francisco Conference would be

[Retyped for clarity]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

limited to an exchange of views as to principles and machinery for dealing with the trusteeship question; that the territories which might be included in such a system should be restricted to certain categories and that there should be no discussion of specific territories or areas either at the San Francisco Conference or in the consultations previous to that conference. Preparations for porposals as to a trusteeship system for discussion at the San Francisco Conference were to be conducted in consultation with the other sponsors and the provisional government of France.

I now find it necessary to recommend that the representatives of the other sponsors and the provisional government of France enter into the discussions and consultations already arranged to take place in Washington. When the consultations have begun I feel that we should then inform them that the state of our preparations has not advanced to the point where we are ready to present any definite ideas as to machinery and procedures for a trusteeship system and that we feel that it would very likely not be possible for us to develop this question sufficiently before the opening date of the San Francisco Conference to have agreed proposals ready to lay before that Conference for consideration. We feel that in the event that the agreed proposals have not been arrived at it would be advisable for the nations convened at the Conference to agree that the study and development of this whole question of a trusteeship system should be made one of the first questions to be considered by the proposed United Nations Organization.

ATTACHED NOTE:

Mr. Forrestal

.....

The indented paragraphs* have been added to the State Department draft of the memorandum to the President.

Respectfully,

(initialed)

Mathias F. Correa

*These are from Bundy's draft declaration of policy.

MFC

APPENDIX E

[Retyped for clarity]

~~S•E•C•R•E•T~~

D E C L A S S I F I E D

[Proposed Joint letter to the President from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy]

9 April 45

Dear Mr. President:

The War and Navy Departments are greatly interested in the strategic importance of certain islands in the Pacific and the application thereto of "Arrangements for International Trusteeship:" in the charter of the proposed International Organization. The Secretary of State has conferred with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy about this matter but is not in complete agreement with their views of the action to be taken. In the first place, we urge a postponement of the whole question of trusteeships and our views are stated to you on this point in a separate letter. On the principal question of dealing with these strategic areas, our views are as follows:

The United States has always been the champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific Ocean. It has fought this war in that cause against Japan who has been the aggressor seeking to enslave into its new empire the Southwestern Pacific. We are now liberating that Ocean from this attack, not only for our own selfish interest, but for the interest of all peace-loving nations who are situated or have interests in the Pacific.

[Retyped for clarity]

In this cause, with great loss of American lives, we have conquered and seized and have possession of certain islands and atolls in the Pacific. Japan had taken them originally, partly by fraud. Now that these islands and atolls are passing into our hands, we should through their possession firmly establish our position as an effective champion of the freedom of the Pacific Ocean. In order to discharge its responsibility in respect to freedom in the Pacific, it will be absolutely necessary that the United States have strategic rights in these atolls.

It is, therefore, with misgivings that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have contemplated the establishment of international trusteeships in respect to these islands. They believe it is desirable to retain full control, at least with respect to certain former Japanese-held islands and former Japanese Mandated Islands, accompanied by a declaration on the part of the United States that it will hold these areas in the interests of the same cause for which we are now fighting, the cause of freedom of all law-abiding nations in the Pacific Ocean. We believe that a Declaration of Policy should be made public promptly and before any discussions about trusteeships. We enclose a proposed draft of such a declaration.

APPENDIX F

[Memorandum from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

16 April 1945

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED AUTH. EO 12958, SEC. 3.3(b)(1)(6)(7)(8)(9)
BY 9/c DATE 2/16/96

SECRET

This afternoon there was a conference at the State Department. The following were present:

RECEIVED C.C. FILES
Room 2067
25 AUG 1947
A14-7/EF
Copy No. 1-1
Ref. No.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. - Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson - Secretary of War
James Forrestal - Secretary of the Navy
Joseph C. Grew - Under Secretary of State
James C. Dunn - Assistant Secretary of State
Harvey H. Bundy - Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
Dr. Leo Pasvolsky - Special Assistant to Secretary of State
G. Hayden Raynor - Special Assistant to Secretary of State
Mathias F. Correa, Major, USMCR - Special Assistant to the Secretary of Navy.

At the outset of the meeting it was agreed that there would be no postponement of the discussion of international trusteeships scheduled to take place at the San Francisco Conference.

Next discussed was the question of whether or not the declaration of policy, which is annexed to draft letter of Secretary of State and Secretary of War to the President dated 13 April 1945, should be promulgated at this time as representing the stand of the United States on this question.

Mr. Stettinius urged that it ought not be at this time because of the effect it would have on the other nations participating in the conference. Mr. Stimson indicated that he was inclined to agree with this. It was finally agreed that the declaration of policy would not be put forth at this time but at some future date such a declaration would be promulgated.

A discussion was then had concerning the State Departments proposed alternate statement. It was agreed that such a statement should be promulgated after it had been approved by the President. Considerable discussion was had of the specific language which would be included in such a statement and a draft was finally agreed upon. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Dunn were delegated to set this draft up in proper form for presentation to the President as the recommendation of the State, War and the Navy for his approval. It was not agreed as to how the statement should be promulgated. A suggestion was made that it should be put out in answer to a "planted" question at the press conference of the Secretary of State.

SECRET

The Secretary of the Navy asked the Secretary of State whether or not in the view of the Secretary of State it would embarrass him if the Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the President the expression of their views contained in the draft joint letter of 13 April 1945. The Secretary of State replied that it would at this time and asked that the sending of such a statement be deferred "for a few days." The implication of his statement, although it was not entirely clear, was that he did not wish such a statement to go forward to the President until the San Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it was well under way. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that they acquiesced in his request.

The question was raised as to whether or not the draft on the chapter of trusteeships be proposed by the United States at the San Francisco Conference would include language which would make it clear that the United States by agreeing to the draft or by proposing it did not commit itself to place under trusteeship arrangements any particular territories and that this would be a matter of subsequent agreement.

It was agreed by all present that there would be included in Title I, Section B 1. of the State Department draft, the following language: "It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which specific territories within the foregoing categories should be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms."

The Secretary of the Navy raised the question as to whether or not the United States draft of the chapter on trusteeships should include provisions similar to those contained in the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy revision of the State Department draft which would place the initial negotiation of trusteeship arrangements with respect to strategic areas in the Security Counsel rather than the General Assembly. The Secretary of War indicated that he concurred in the Secretary of the Navy's view that initial negotiations for trusteeship arrangements be made with the Security Counsel. Dr. Pasvolsky indicated dissent - stated that in his view all negotiations should be had with the General Assembly, but finally it was agreed that the negotiations of the original trusteeship arrangements with respect to strategic areas should be made with the Security Counsel rather than the General Assembly, that any alterations of such trusteeship arrangements should not be made without the concurrence of the Security Counsel but that other arrangements concerning strategic areas which had to do solely with welfare could be negotiated with the General Assembly.

Mathias F. Correa

DEPARTMENT OF NAVY

THE SECRETARY

APPENDIX F

[Short memoranda attached to memorandum on meeting held at the State Department on April 16, 1945]

Sec. Navy.
This is a memorandum
of our meeting at State
Dept. today.
Reg 7
Mthe.

17 April 1945

T:

L. DUFFIELD
MAJOR CORREA

Make a tickler on the first paragraph of page 2 -- I want to raise that question again in about two or three weeks.

J.F.

MR. FORRESTAL

TO:

Mr. Forrestal

You asked to be reminded to raise the question again on the first paragraph of page 2.

Respectfully,

Mathias F. Correa

MR. FORRESTAL

APPENDIX G

[Retyped for clarity]

~~S·E·C·R·E·T~~

D E C L A S S I F I E D

[Draft for statement of United States policy prepared by Mr. Henry H. Bundy]

HHB #2 - 4/16/45.

DECLARATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.

The Conference of the United Nations will soon commence at San Francisco. During this conference a possible system of international trusteeships will be discussed and it is of great importance that this country clearly understand the nature of these discussions. It is not proposed at San Francisco to determine the placing of any particular territory under a trusteeship system. All that will be discussed there will be the possible machinery of such a system.

In entering upon these discussions, the United States Government desires to make clear its attitude with respect to certain areas and to recall certain facts of history. The United States has always been the champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific Ocean area. This war has been fought and is being fought in that cause against the aggressions of Japan who sought to enslave in their empire the Western and Southwestern Pacific. Our country is now liberating that Ocean from this attack, not only for ourselves but for the interests of all peaceful nations who are situated or have interests in the Pacific. In this cause, with great loss of

[Retyped for clarity]

American lives and expenditure of American treasure, we have taken from Japan and now have possession of certain islands and atolls and still more will shortly be in our hands.

The United States does not seek annexation of territory or economic wealth but strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and atolls are vital to any effective military guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Harbors and airfields are as much an integral part of necessary military power as war ships or planes. In order to discharge its responsibility as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights and such rights will involve complete control in the case of certain atolls in the Pacific. The United States policy will be to hold any such reserved strategic rights in the interests of the same cause for which we are now fighting -- the cause of international peace and freedom in the Pacific, a cause in which all law-abiding nations in that area have a vital interest.

It will not be the policy of the United States to hold any strategic rights for selfish advantage and the United States will cooperate with the United Nations through such arrangements as may be appropriate to assure the economic and social advancement of the inhabitants of these territories, many of which are very sparsely populated and contain little or nothing of economic value.

APPENDIX G

[Retyped for clarity]

The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable under a trusteeship system to provide, by agreements, for the maintenance of such United States military and strategic rights and control as will be necessary to assure peace and security in the Pacific Ocean or elsewhere in the world.

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DIVISION OF TERRITORIES AND ISLAND POSSESSIONS
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1945

Pacific Islands: Civil Administration

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary. [of the Interior from Edwin G. Arnold, Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions]

1. We shall greatly strengthen our case for retention of strategic bases [illegible]; commit ourselves at once to the principle of civil government of the ad[illegible]nt inhabited areas. This policy would be in line with enlightened inter[illegible]rnal opinion. Civil government of the indigenous peoples would support, [illegible]t undermine, the activities of the defense services. Neither the security [illegible]r the prestige of the United States would be served by a policy of military [illegible]h which would seem more militaristic than that of the old colonial powers, [illegible]ve more militaristic than that of the Japanese themselves, whose South Seas [illegible]rea was staffed largely by regular civil service personnel.

2. From the Navy's point of view, there should be a distinct advantage [illegible]n getting civilian agencies assume responsibility for the conduct of civilian [illegible]ffairs. It would then be much freer from harassment by the public, whose in[illegible]difference to the islands it could no longer count upon as it could in the [illegible]case of Guam and Samoa before the war.

3. Provided the interest of the Army and Navy in military security and in [illegible]the execution of their plans is safeguarded in any civil system that is estab[illegible]lished, they should be able to secure better public support for their defense [illegible]and policing function if they are relieved of the complexities of civil affairs. [illegible]In assuming control of civil affairs in what is now a focal area of international [illegible]public interest, they would find themselves under a constant stream of criticism [illegible]dissecting activities outside of their main responsibility.

4. The safeguards for our security and for the policing function are: [illegible](a) the Army and Navy should control the base areas, as on the mainland; (b) [illegible]they should have liaison with any civilian office on any administrative level [illegible]where joint effort is required; and (c) in the final resort, the armed services [illegible]have an appeal to Washington for decision at the Cabinet or White House level.

5. The comparatively small native population in the Japanese-mandated is[illegible]lands (possibly 60,000 to 70,000, exclusive of Japanese), does not justify an [illegible]exception to the principle of civil government. The islands of the Pacific will [illegible]attract world attention far out of proportion to the numbers of their inhabitants, [illegible]because (a) they have vital strategic significance from the point of view of all [illegible]powers; (b) some are inter-continental stepping stones for influential travellers [illegible]of all nationalities; (c) many of them will have an exotic glamour for casual

urists, business men, collectors, writers, photographers, and honeymooners;) their very separateness and variety will make them objects of great interest missionaries, anthropologists, administrators and traders. Putting the matr in more positive terms, the many small and varied population groups will ovide examples of community organization having an importance and influence r beyond the numbers of inhabitants. Accordingly, it is necessary to pay rticular attention to the character of administration established in the isnds.

6. The necessity for coordination in economic and other civil affairs ong all Pacific areas makes it essential to have a single civilian agency sponsible for these affairs. This will make for economy and for interchange technical and administrative experience. For military purposes, certain eas may be given much more importance than others; but this makes it all the re important to link these closely with the other American-administered areas d with the mainland, in strong and, if possible, prosperous economic and cultral relations. This is a single civilian job. If it is well done, it will ssist the defense forces in creating and maintaining the conditions of peace.

7. It may be necessary to enter into regional arrangements with other wers for administering the affairs of some islands or island groups. This y have to be done, for example, in the Phoenix group, where we already have oint sovereignty with the British over two of the islands (Canton and Enderbury); ssibly in Samoa, where we have problems in common with New Zealand; or in the stralian mandated area, the Solomons and the New Hebrides, where we may be bliged to continue sharing, as during the war, in the responsibilities of dense. Possibly some regional agreement will be needed for the entire Pacific ea. It is too soon to have any clear idea of the scope of such schemes; and ey may not be found necessary or feasible for a long time. If they should e undertaken, however, we must be prepared to match the steady and persistent fforts that would certainly be made by the other cooperating powers whose ivilian representatives would have a trained and more or less permanent interest in the problems of the area.

8. A special problem may arise in the case of the Ryukyu Islands. This ensely-populated group will undoubtedly be regarded as of great importance n Far Eastern military and political strategy by (a) the United States defense ervices, who will undoubtedly continue to regard Okinawa as a site of pivotal alue as a base for air operations; (b) the Chinese for the same reasons—ecause their security would be profoundly affected by the disposition made of kinawa—and on account of ancient historical associations; (c) the inhabitants hemselves, who numbered, in 1940, 839,449 (including 574,579 in the Okinawa refecture); and (d) every nation having an interest in the maintenance of peace n the Far East. Under these circumstances, it will not be surprising if the yukyus, like Korea, are placed for a time under some kind of international rusteeship. If the United States should claim and secure responsibility, ither full or partial, for administration of the Ryukyus, the handling of civil ffairs would be a large and complex undertaking. All of the above-noted reasons or establishing a strictly civilian administration of civil affairs would certainly apply in the case of this thickly-populated area.

9. It must be recognized that a civilian agency of the United States overnment handling civilian affairs can have the same patriotic devotion to

our national security and to the maintenance of conditions of permanent peace as agencies of the defense services. Some occasional friction between military and civilian agencies is bound to arise in the normal course of business. During the war period, it arose very seldom between the armed and unarmed representatives of the United States abroad. It may occasion surprise in the minds of our allies if we out-do, say, the British, in militarizing our territorial government. The British armed services have not only worked with civilian governors but have tolerated a large measure of local self-rule in such vital outposts as Ceylon, Singapore, the Fiji Islands and the Northwest Frontier of India. Our own experience with the loyalty and cooperation of the Filipinos is a testimonial to the far-sightedness of McKinley, Root, Theodore Roosevelt and Taft who wasted little time in establishing civil government after the conquest of the islands. No one is likely to accuse these statesmen of a lack of realism. They were dealing with a population of which a part were still in revolt. Yet, they accepted the recommendation of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, which read as follows:

> "Considering the varieties of the peoples and the friendliness of most of them to the United States, it would be both unjust and impolitic to treat them all alike as unworthy of civil government; and looking to the pacification of those still hostile, the commission believes that no instrumentality would be so effective to that end as the establishment of civil government in the communities which are already friendly." (Report of the Philippine Commission, VOL. I. p. 119).

Eight years later, the beneficial results of civil rule were eloquently reviewed in the Special Report to the President by the Secretary of War, William Howard Taft. (Washington, 1908).

E J Arnold

Edwin G. Arnold,
Director.

APPENDIX I

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

SEP 12 1945

My dear Mr. President:

I believe that we should give immediate attention to the problems of civil administration in newly-occupied areas which may remain, or be placed, under the supervision of the United States. It would be in keeping with the traditions of the American people to devise suitable forms of civil administration, under civilian personnel, for the peace-time government of new overseas territories, with adequate provision being made to protect the security interests of the United States and to enable this Nation to assist effectively in maintaining the conditions of permanent peace.

Although I recognize that it will be some time before decisions can be made concerning either the disposition or the administration of Pacific territories, I have asked the Division of Territories and Island Possessions to make a general study of the problems of the Pacific Islands and to be ready to undertake a more detailed preparation of plans. We ought to draw fully upon expert opinion and upon the practical experience gained by the Department of the Interior which has long been the chief Federal agency responsible for the well-being of indigenous peoples in the territories.

X 95-L

Army or Navy administration of civil affairs has prevailed at various times in the Philippines, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and in all of these cases the responsibility was later transferred to the Department of the Interior. It was only in Guam and Samoa that the Navy retained complete control. By an Executive Order in 1931, President Hoover transferred the control of the Virgin Islands from the Navy Department to the Department of the Interior. In 1934, an Executive Order of President Roosevelt established the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Department of the Interior and transferred to that Division from the War Department the function of supervising Puerto Rican affairs. By Executive Orders of 1936 and 1938, the Department of the Interior was given jurisdiction over Baker, Howland, Jarvis, Canton, and Enderbury Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Finally, under Reorganization Plan Number 2 in 1939, the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department was transferred to the Department of the Interior and consolidated with the Division of Territories and Island Possessions. By this transfer, the Department of the Interior became responsible for supervision of the affairs of the Philippine Islands. The general intention of these administrative changes in the 1930's appears to have been to coordinate the supervision of all territorial affairs under a single civilian agency.

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APPENDIX I

There is every reason to believe that the sound conduct of civil administration in inhabited areas adjacent to strategic bases would support, not handicap, the activities of the defense services. Neither the security nor the prestige of the United States would be served by a policy of military rule; for such a policy would appear more militaristic than that of the old colonial powers, even more militaristic than that of the Japanese themselves whose South Seas Bureau was staffed largely by civilian personnel. The British Army and Navy have not only worked with civilian administrators but have tolerated a large measure of local self-rule in such vital outposts as Ceylon, Singapore, the Fiji Islands, and the Northwest Frontier of India.

Differences of opinion and method may arise in the normal course of business between military and civilian officials, but adequate safeguards can be provided for our military security and for the policing function. These safeguards, I believe, are: (a) strict control of the actual base areas by the defense services, as on the mainland; (b) close liaison and representation of the Army and Navy in any civilian office on any administrative level, where joint effort is required.

To be prepared adequately for the conduct of civil affairs, I believe that you will wish the work of planning to begin at once, without waiting decisions either as to the time required to complete the tasks of military government or as to the particular geographic areas to be administered by the United States.

With your approval, I shall ask the Division of Territories and Island Possessions to draft a detailed report for submission to you as soon as possible. In the preparation of such a report, dealing with the conduct of civil affairs in new territories, I assume that the Departments of State, War, and Navy should be consulted regarding any plans or programs which they may have developed.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September , 1945.

Approved:

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Papers of Harry S. Truman
Official File

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

SEP 28 1945

My dear Mr. President:

After the Secretary wrote his letter to you on September 12 and received your reply of September 13 concerning the conduct of civil affairs in Pacific areas which may remain under United States supervision, I have been informed that you have referred this subject to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.

In considering the future administration of such areas as the Pacific Islands, I am sure it is your intention to draw upon the long experience of the Government of the United States in handling the problems of indigenous peoples, both on the mainland and in overseas areas. The Department of the Interior has dealt with Indian affairs for over one hundred years and is also the Federal Department responsible for the administration of affairs in nearly all inhabited overseas territories of the United States.

By maintaining naval administration of Samoa and Guam, the United States has had the dubious distinction of being the only Pacific power which governs an inhabited colonial area as a mere appurtenance of a military base. This is not, I believe, a distinction which the American people will justify at a time when enlightened opinion, at home and abroad, demands expert attention to the progress of dependent peoples.

I recognize the vital interests of the Department of State and the defense services in determining policies and methods of administration in all areas having strategic importance in international affairs. Indeed, in working out methods of government for such areas, it is advisable to treat the matter as a single United States problem; and I believe that, in the interest of American prestige, we should take into account the fact that world attention will be focused on the dependent areas of the Pacific. If we commit ourselves to the principle of civil government, we strengthen the already strong case we have for retention and control of strategic bases.

The Department of the Interior would like to assist in assuring expert civil government with a view to the ultimate attainment of democratic institutions and economic stability in dependent areas. We should like to contribute fully out of the Department's experience in territorial matters in order to assist in establishing whatever new organization and methods may be needed to protect the over-all interests of the United States and to fulfill the obligations of this Government under the United Nations Charter.

I hope that you will advise the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and Secretary Ickes that you wish the Interior Department to participate in the discussion of this problem. I enclose a draft letter, for your signature, which would accomplish this.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

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Papers of Harry S. Truman
Official File

APPENDIX K

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
OCT 18 3 41 PM '45
THE WHITE HOUSE

OCT 18 1945

My dear Mr. President:

While I was in London, the Acting Secretary wrote a letter to you, dated September 28, 1945, referring again to the problem of Pacific islands administration and proposing that the Department participate in discussion of this problem with the Departments of State, War and Navy.

For the reasons outlined in that letter, as well as in my letter of September 12, I hope that the proposal has your approval. Believing that you will wish to secure all that the various Departments can contribute to a single United States policy, I offer the suggestion that a joint expert group representing the four Departments visit the Pacific islands for the purpose of preparing for you a detailed plan for interim administration, pending decisions and agreements concerning future disposition and administration of the islands. The joint group, I feel, should also submit to you general recommendations looking toward the later administration of those islands which may remain, or be placed, under United States supervision.

I therefore request your approval for the formation of the joint expert group and suggest that the four Departments be notified accordingly.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE

October , 1945.

Approved:

Appoint
State War Navy Dept.

Kenny

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A8-1/FF12
01-jcl

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER MARIANAS

Serial: 003059

21 NOV 1945

SECRET

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on
IsCom GUAM Sec. Serial
007780, dated 8 November
1945.

From: Commander Marianas.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) Commander in Chief, U.S.Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
(2) The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Administration of Guam and other Pacific Islands.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the opinions and recommendations of basic letter.

2. Because of the importance of this subject, the following observations are submitted. They are believed to be sufficiently comprehensive to be read independently of the treatment accorded this subject in the basic letter.

(a) The primary importance of the Islands of the Western Pacific now controlled by the United States lies in their strategic location and value. They constitute not only an outer bastion in our defense system, but, by their military occupation, their value lies in preserving world peace, and preventing the rise of forces which might conspire to upset that peace. The responsibility for control of these Islands rests with the United States alone.

(b) To efficiently discharge this responsibility, control of the Western Pacific Area on the sea and in the air is required. The small size of the land masses involved and their separation by long stretches of ocean not only from one another, but from the Mainland, reduces the problem of their defense and logistic support to that which may be likened to the support needed by an immobile supply and repair ship to support air and surface forces based thereon.

(c) To implement the missions of air and surface forces, the Navy has paramount responsibility. Therefore, to efficiently discharge this responsibility, the Navy must have overall control of the area since sea power guarantees the logistic support of all forces involved.

(d) Military control of these islands is essential as their military value far outweighs their economic value. The economic development and administration of relatively few native inhabitants should be subordinate to the real purpose for which these islands are held.

APPENDIX L

A3-1/[illegible]12
01-jcl

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER MARIANAS

[illegible]rial: 003059

21 NOV 1945

SECRET

Subject: Administration of Guam and other Pacific Islands.

(e) The commercial and/or industrial value and resources of the islands is of little or no relative importance to the welfare of the United States.

(f) The characteristics and nature of the majority of inhabitants on these islands is such that artificial or forced raising of their standard of living to one approaching that of the United States would be detrimental to their best interests and would contribute little to the safety and welfare of the United States. For the most part, they are simple people, requiring few of our modern luxuries for their welfare and happiness.

(g) The Navy's pre-war record in administering island areas, as exemplified by its administration of Guam and American Samoa, has been efficient and economical. Naval Administration has long understood the value of carefully considered advancement of the civilian population. From the Military standpoint a contented, healthy, and loyal native population contributes a strong link in the strength of these islands as bases. This has been demonstrated by the loyalty of the Guamanians in the recent war.

(h) The accomplishments of the Navy Military Government in Guam during the period of a little over a year, since recapture by our forces, is ably set forth by the Island Commander in basic letter. Navy civil administration does not preclude harmonious functioning of other government agencies under Navy overall cognizance. An example of such an arrangement is the present operation of the U. S. Commercial Company (formerly the F.E.A.) in the area, engaged in the development of agriculture, live stock, fisheries, and trade with and by the island natives.

APPENDIX L
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER MARIANAS

A3-1/FF12/
01-jsl

21 NOV 1945

Serial: 003059

A17-1D

SECRET

Subject: Administration of Guam and other Pacific Islands.

(i) The introduction of another independent administrative agency would be uneconomical, necessitating duplication of effort, personnel and added expense to the government.

3. I therefore strongly recommend that Naval control be exercised over all Islands in the Western Pacific now held by the United States.

G. D. MURRAY

Copy to:
IsCom GUAM

APPENDIX M

30 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN: [from Captain L.S. Sabin]

Subject: Report of Meeting of the Presidential ad hoc Subcommittee on civil administration of the Pacific Islands.

1. The subject meeting was held in Room 207, State Department, at 1000 Wednesday, 30 January 1946. Present at the meeting were the following:

Mr. Fred Searls - State Department, Chairman
Brigadier General C. A. Lincoln, War Department
Colonel Reynolds, War Department.
Captain L. S. Sabin, Navy Department
Mr. E. G. Arnold, Interior Department
Mr. Becroft, Interior Department

2. Mr. Searls opened the meeting by stating that in view of the Department of Interior's desire to be "Cannibal Governor of the Cannibal Islands", it seemed appropriate for the representative of the Interior Department to state the position of that Department.

3. Mr. Arnold, representing Interior, stated that the Department of Interior felt that the responsibility for civil administration of dependent peoples was properly a function of that department. As to the Pacific Islands, the Department of Interior desired to assume that responsibility for the good of the peoples of those areas and desired to take over civil administration in those areas as soon as possible. He presented a rough plan of administration by Interior for the consideration of the Subcommittee but pointed out that the plan was only a rough draft and would require considerable polishing.

4. The Subcommittee members read over the plan. Mr. Searls observed that, in his opinion, the plan was more of an administrative procedure by the Department of Interior than it was a recommendation on the basic question before the Subcommittee. He stated that the State Department would not (and he assumed that neither would the War or Navy Departments) presume to tell the Department of Interior how it should administer any area for which they might have the responsibility. Therefore, it did not seem to him that consideration of a plan of administrative proce-

dure was within the terms of reference of the Subcommittee.

5. I agreed with Mr. Searls but pointed out that on the first page of the plan, and only the first page, were a few statements which might be considered pertinent to the question before the Subcommittee.

6. Mr. Arnold said that he thought that the interests of the United States could best be served by having a definite plan of civil administration by which we could let the world know that the United States had taken steps to properly care for its dependent peoples.

7. I inquired from Mr. Arnold whether the Department of Interior wanted to take over civil administration immediately. He answered in the affirmative. I then asked if he didn't think there would be legal and political objections to this in view of the fact that most of the territory under discussion was now being administered by military government as a result of military operations and that if the United States instituted civil government under a civilian agency in areas to which we had not yet received any legal title, would it not be embarrassing to our negotiations on the international political level.

8. Mr. Arnold said that he was not a lawyer but in his opinion there were no legal difficulties and politically it would be helpful.

9. Mr. Searls disagreed with Mr. Arnold and particularly in respect to the former Japanese Mandated Islands. He further said that the State Department was presently engaged in negotiations with various countries as to jurisdiction and base rights in certain areas as a result of recommendations received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that, in his opinion, any abrupt change in present civil administration before an international decision had been reached would certainly not be helpful in those negotiations. He said that this was a fairly definite State Department opinion. He didn't see how we could initiate action on the details of civil administration by this country of areas which, at the present time, we didn't even know that we would ever administer.

10. Mr. Arnold again stressed what he considered the importance of properly taking care of the people and having a definite plan for civil administration. He said it was only natural for the Army and Navy to favor their own interests in areas of military importance and as a result the people were apt to suffer.

11. Mr. Searls then stated that as Chairman of the Subcommittee he could not consider a recommendation for an immediate

change in civil administration unless concrete evidence of such a necessity with specific areas and instances could be produced. He asked Mr. Arnold if he could specify any area or areas in the Pacific in which the present civil administration had resulted in such a bad condition of the people that an immediate need of a change of administration existed.

12. Mr. Arnold said that he was not criticising the present administration by the Army and Navy but he nevertheless could not answer that question because he did not know personally of conditions out there nor did he believe that other civilian agencies could know at firsthand because of the difficultion of getting this information at firsthand.

13. I stated that free access had been given to Mr. Beecroft several months ago to the records of my office in this respect and that the Navy would be glad to make available any information with regard to our civil administration to any civilian agency. I said I was equally sure that the War Department would do likewise.

14. General Lincoln said that the War Department certainly would be equally open to any such request. He added that he couldn't understand the sudden interest in a few thousand people in the Pacific Ocean areas when nobody had offered to relieve the War Department of responsibility for millions and millions of people in other occupied enemy territories.

15. Mr. Arnold then stated, in response to a question from me, that he thought the record of the Navy in civil administration of Guam and Samoa had not been good and said that there has not been any organic act passed by the Congress as evidence of progressive government in those areas.

16. I replied that I could not agree that the Navy's record had not been good in Guam and Samoa and that, in my opinion, the record would show that it had been very good.

17. Mr. Searls then asked General Lincoln and me whether we knew of any maladministration in the Pacific areas at the present time which required immediate change for the good of the native peoples.

18. We both replied in the negative. I mentioned briefly how much the lot of the natives had been improved under naval military government, citing as a few examples health, participation by natives in local government, schools and education, personal hygiene, agriculture, fishing, and so forth.

19. Mr. Arnold said that the Department of Interior had never interfered with the military in any area under its jurisdiction and asked me, off the record, if I could cite one single instance of such interference.

20. I replied in the affirmative and cited the case of Palmyra.

21. Mr. Arnold asked me then if the Navy's position was that it desired to continue responsibility for civil administration during the post-war period rather than turn it over to the Department of Interior.

22. I answered that the Navy recognized the interest and the responsibility of the Department of Interior in the government of dependent peoples in certain areas of comparatively large land mass and large populations. However, the situation in the Pacific islands is different. The areas of the atolls and islands were, in some cases, only a few square miles and the populations extremely small. Military installations on islands of strategic value could not be isolated to one small section of the area as they perhaps could in large land masses, and I felt that in these small areas, questions of strategic consideration and civil administration were indivisible. I stated that the War and Navy Departments were certainly interested in retaining responsibility for civil administration in the island areas during the post-war period.

23. General Lincoln stated, and I agreed, that the War and Navy Departments recognized that the Department of Interior had a strong argument for responsibility of civil administration in the Ryukyus as opposed to the island areas of the Central Pacific.

24. Mr. Searls then stated that the chair would entertain a motion to the effect that the representative of the Department of Interior could submit his plan formally to the Subcommittee for transmission to the Committee of the Four Secretaries but that the Subcommittee would recommend that no action be taken on it until such time as a final settlement on the international level were made as to the status of the islands.

25. The motion was made and seconded. It was carried with one dissenting vote on the part of the Department of Interior. The representative of the Department of Interior stated that he could not agree to a recommendation that nothing be done about it at this time.

26. The meeting adjourned with the understanding that the representative of the Department of Interior would present his finished plan to the Subcommittee in about a week, at which time another meeting of the Subcommittee would be held.

Very respectfully,

L. S. Sabin.

CC: Op00
Op09
Op02
Op30
Op35
Mr. Gellfuss

Interior

February 20, 1946.

Mr. Fred Searls, Jr.,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Searls:

Attached herewith is the proposal of the Department of the Interior concerning administration of the Pacific islands. It is my understanding that, in accordance with the subcommittee's resolution of January 30, this proposal will be turned over at once to the Committee consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy and the Interior, which was appointed by the President on October 20, 1945.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) Edwin G. Arnold

Edwin G. Arnold,
Director.
[Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior]

Enclosure 135
EB:hrd
Rewritten 2/20/46
emw

APPENDIX N

[Retyped for clarity]

February 20, 1946.

MEMORANDUM for Hon. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State
Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War
Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy
Hon. Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of Interior

The following proposal of the Department of the Interior for administration of the Pacific islands is submitted in accordance with the resolution adopted on January 30 by the subcommittee of the committee of four Secretaries which was appointed by the President on October 20, 1945.

1. It is proposed that military government should be replaced by civil government in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services of the United States, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations, subject to any future international agreement as to the status of these islands. The proposal will apply to Guam and American Samoa and to the other islands which are already under United States sovereignty; to all of the Micronesian islands which were formerly under Japanese mandate, including the Marianas, the Palaus, the Carolines and the Marshalls; and to the Ryukyus, the Volcanos [sic], the Izus and the Bonins. It will also apply to any additional Pacific islands which may from time to time be brought under United States administration.

2. The administrative agency for the islands will be the Department of the Interior. Through its Division of Territories and Island possessions, the Department of the Interior is already responsible for administration in nearly all overseas territories of the United States. For over 100 years, the Department has dealt with the problems of indigenous peoples, both on the mainland and overseas. Under its jurisdiction, the Philippine Commonwealth is preparing for independence; Hawaii and Alaska for statehood; Puerto Rico (under the bill supported by the President and the Department) for such status as its voters may choose; and the Virgin Islands for a rapidly increasing measure of self-government. By maintaining Navy rule in Guam and American Samoa for the past 45 years, the United States has had the distinction of being the only power in the Pacific which treats an inhabited area as a mere appurtenance of a military base. This is not a distinction which the American people will justify at a time when enlightened opinion, at home and abroad, demands expert attention to the progress of dependent peoples.

[Retyped for clarity]

3. The Department of the Interior recommends that, even if some delay in transferring jurisdiction is anticipated, the decision to employ civil administration in islands under United States control should be made and announced at once. Such a decision would correct a belief which is prevalent, both at home and abroad, that our military interest in this area tends to ignore the civil rights and the economic welfare of the island inhabitants. The announced intention of this Government to employ civil administration in areas under its supervision will stregthen, not prejudice, our claims for military or administrative responsibility in the Pacific, and it will place this Government in a sound position to insist upon the adoption and maintenance of proper standards of civil administration in areas under the control of other powers.

4. The decision and announcement concerning civil administration will permit immediate steps to be taken by the Department of the Interior to prepare the necessary plans. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent international agreements. Nothing done under an interim civil administration would stand in the way of sound decisions concerning military use or concerning the future disposition of the Pacific islands or concerning trusteeship or other terms under which the islands are to be governed.

5. An immediate decision to replace military by civil government at an early date and to begin planning to that end will have the further advantage of easing the necessary final adjustment which will have to be made by the Departments and the personnel concerned. It would help to remove the impression that exists among civil affairs personnel and island peoples alike that the present island program is a temporary one. It would also help to give a sense of continuing responsibility to those concerned with carrying out the administration of island affairs.

6. American experience in the Micronesian area already strongly suggests that any division of the islands for administrative purposes would multiply the difficulties in the way of economical and efficient government. If the taxpayers of the United States (or those of some other administering power) are to be relieved largely of cost in connection with island affairs and if the islanders are to have the benefit of an adequate control of conditions affecting their welfare, it would be essential to regard Micronesia, including Guam, as a single administrative unit, subdivided only for purposes of local administration. Some of the islands have agricultural, mineral and fish resources which may be used for the maintenance of the population and as a source of taxable revenue.

[Retyped for clarity]

Other islands may be deficit areas which, if left to their own resources, might become a charge upon the budget of the administering power. To treat the whole region as a single unit for the purpose of dealing with the practical and difficult problems of transportation, communication, food distribution, public health, and public finance will provide a sound basis for economical administration.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Military government should be replaced by civil government, with the Department of the Interior as the administering agency, in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations.

2. The decision to adopt civil government should be made and announced at once. The Department of the Interior should then proceed accordingly, with the assistance of other departments concerned, to prepare plans of administration.

3. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent international agencies.

4. In the interest of economical and effective administration, the Micronesian area, including Guam, should be regarded as a single unit, subdivided only for purposes of local administration.

TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMER JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS

Draft proposed by the United States on 17 February 1947, with changes made by the Security Council, when it approved the agreement on 2 April 1947. Words added by the Council are in italics; omitted words are in brackets. Adapted from SCOR, II, Supp. 3; 3 UN Treaty Series, p. 190.

Whereas Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations provides for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent agreements; and

Whereas under Article 77 of the said Charter the trusteeship system may be applied to territories now held under mandate; and

Whereas on 17 December 1920 the Council of the League of Nations confirmed a mandate for the former German islands north of the equator to Japan, to be administered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

Whereas Japan, as a result of the Second World War, has ceased to exercise any authority in these islands;

Now therefore, the Security Council of the United Nations, having satisfied itself that the relevant Articles of the Charter have been complied with, hereby resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for the Pacific islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

ARTICLE 1. The territory of the Pacific islands, consisting of the islands formerly held by Japan under mandate in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is hereby designated as a strategic area and placed under the trusteeship system established in the Charter of the United Nations. The territory of the Pacific islands is hereinafter referred to as the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 2. The United States of America is designated as the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 3. The Administering Authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of this Agreement [as an integral part of the United States], and may apply to the Trust Territory, subject to any modifications which the Administering Authority may consider desirable, such of the laws of the United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and requirements.

ARTICLE 4. The Administering Authority, in discharging the obligations of trusteeship in the Trust Territory, shall act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of this Agreement, and shall, as specified in Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Charter, apply the objectives of the international trusteeship system, as set forth in Article 76 of the Charter, to the people of the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 5. In discharging its obligations under Article 76a and Article 84 of the Charter, the Administering Authority shall ensure that the Trust Territory shall play its part, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the Administering Authority shall be entitled:

1. To establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications in the Trust Territory;

2. To station and employ armed forces in the Territory; and

3. To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the Trust Territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the Administering Authority, as well as for the local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 6. In discharging its obligations under Article 76b of the Charter, the Administering Authority shall:

1. Foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory, and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end shall give to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the Territory; shall develop their participation in [local] government; shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the Territory; and shall take other appropriate measures towards these ends;

2. Promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture, and industries; protect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources; and improve the means of transportation and communication;

3. Promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population without discrimination; protect the health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in arms and ammunition, opium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other spirituous beverages; and institute such other regulations as may be necessary to protect the inhabitants against social abuses; and

4. Promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall take steps toward the establishment of a general system of elementary education; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population; and shall encourage qualified students to pursue higher education, including training on the professional level.

ARTICLE 7. [In discharging its obligations under Article 76c of the Charter, the Administering Authority, subject only to the requirements of public order and security, shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; freedom of conscience, of worship, and of religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.]

In discharging its obligations under Article 76c of the Charter, the Administering Authority shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory freedom of conscience, and, subject only to the requirements of public order and security, freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly; freedom of worship and of religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.

ARTICLE 8.-1. In discharging its obligations under Article 76d of the Charter, as defined by Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the Administering Authority, subject to the requirements of security and the obligation to promote the advancement of the inhabitants, shall accord to nationals of each Member of the United Nations and to companies and associations organized in conformity with the laws of such Members, treatment in the Trust Territory no less favourable than that accorded therein to nationals, companies and associations of any other United Nation except the Administering Authority.

2. The Administering Authority shall ensure equal treatment to the Members of the United Nations and their nationals in the administration of justice.

3. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to accord traffic rights to aircraft flying into and out of the Trust Territory. Such rights shall be subject to agreement between the Administering Authority and the State whose nationality such aircraft possesses.

4. The Administering Authority may negotiate and conclude commercial and other treaties and agreements with Members of the United Nations and other States, designed to attain for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory treatment by the Members of the United Nations and other States no less favourable than that granted by them to the nationals of other States. The Security Council may recommend, or invite other organs of the United Nations to consider and recommend, what rights the inhabitants of the Trust Territory should acquire in consideration of the rights obtained by Members of the United Nations in the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 9. The Administering Authority shall be entitled to constitute the Trust Territory into a customs, fiscal, or administrative union or federation with other territories under United States jurisdiction and to establish common services between such territories and the Trust Territory where such measures are not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system and with the terms of this agreement.

ARTICLE 10. The Administering Authority, acting under the provisions of Article 3 of this Agreement, may accept membership in any regional advisory commission, regional authority, or technical organization, or other voluntary association of States, may co-operate with specialized international bodies, public or private, and may engage in other forms of international co-operation.

ARTICLE 11.-1. The Administering Authority shall take the necessary steps to provide the status of citizenship of the Trust Territory for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

2. The Administering Authority shall afford diplomatic and consular protection to inhabitants of the Trust Territory when outside the territorial limits of the Trust Territory or of the Territory of the Administering Authority.

ARTICLE 12. The Administering Authority shall enact such legislation as may be necessary to place the provisions of this Agreement in effect in the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 13. The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter shall be applicable to the Trust Territory, provided that the Administering Authority may determine the extent of their applicability to any areas which may from time to time be specified by it as closed for security reasons.

ARTICLE 14. The Administering Authority undertakes to apply in the Trust Territory the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and which would be conducive to the achievement of the basic objectives of article 6 of this agreement.

ARTICLE 15. The terms of the present Agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority.

ARTICLE 16. The present Agreement shall come into force when approved by the Security Council of the United Nations and by the Government of the United States after due constitutional process.

APPENDIX P

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1949

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have today informed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that the drafts of organic legislation for Guam and American Samoa, prepared by the Department of the Interior, have my approval. The Department of the Interior will have the responsibility of presenting the measures to the Congress. I have asked the Secretary of the Navy to assist you and I enclose a copy of my letter to him.

I indicated in my letter of February 11, 1948, to the Secretaries of State, Army, Navy and the Interior, that it was my intention, upon approval of organic acts for the Pacific Islands, to designate the Department of the Interior as the civilian agency with general supervision over civil administration of these islands. While I state again that such a designation would be without prejudice to future consideration based upon further study of long-range plans for administration of United States territories and possessions, it is my desire that realistic planning be undertaken immediately to effectuate orderly transfer of the aforementioned islands from naval to civilian administration. Accordingly, I request that you take the lead, in cooperation with the Secretary of the Navy, in developing a specific time schedule within which the desired transfers may be effected, regardless of the status of pending legislation. Preferably, under such a schedule, the Island of Guam should be transferred to civilian administration within the next year, and American Samoa and the Trust Territories within the next two to three years. Plans devised under these time arrangements can then be integrated with whatever legislative proposals are ultimately enacted.

I further request that you advise me by September 1, 1949, of the plans recommended under the aforementioned procedure.

It is the announced aim of this Government to accord civil government and a full measure of civil rights to the inhabitants of its Pacific territories. The accomplishment of this objective will be furthered by the transfer of these territories to civilian administration and the enactment of organic legislation at the earliest practicable date.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry Truman

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Interior.

APPENDIX Q

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

1. The President should designate the future civilian High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. Interior's selection for civilian High Commissioner should be nominated by the Secretary of the Navy through the Secretary of Defense.

2. The civilian High Commissioner should assume office on or about July 1, 1950, and should be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy from the date he assumes office until the transfer date.

3. Responsibility for the Government of the Trust Territory should be transferred from Navy to Interior on July 1, 1951, and from that date forward the High Commissioner should be responsible to the Secretary of the Interior.

4. The civilian High Commissioner, with Interior's assistance, should immediately after his designation commence recuriting civilians to replace naval personnel. The Navy Department will process the appointments and arrange for the transportation of civilian replacements until the transfer date.

5. The Navy Department will, after consultation with the Department of the Interior, include in its 1951 budget estimates the amounts required to cover costs incidental to the transfer, including the salaries and transportation of civilian replacements.

6. Naval military personnel on duty with the Government of the Trust Territory on July 1, 1951, will, except as otherwise agreed upon in individual cases, be detached from that duty on the transfer date, or earlier if requested by the High Commissioner, provided that the foregoing shall not affect normal rotation of duty in individual cases. If any services are required to be performed by naval units to the Government of the Trust Territory after July 1, 1951, such services will be the subject of separate agreements.

7. Naval civilian personnel whom the High Commissioner does not wish to retain will, by July 1, 1951, be reassigned to other duty or dismissed, as the Navy determines.

8. Specific arrangements with respect to the transfer of property now owned by the United States and used by the Government of the Trust Territory will be the subject of separate agreements. These arrangements will be consistent with policies relating to property transfer set forth in the draft organic acts for Guam and American Samoa recommended by the Interior and Navy Departments to the 81st Congress.

9. The two Departments will cooperate closely with each other at each stage of the transfer process, making available to one another information, facilities, and personal and other services to the fullest extent practicable in order to ensure an orderly transfer.

10. The transfer date referred to in paragraph 3 above has been selected on the assumption that regular air and sea transportation services, other than naval, will be available after the transfer date to meet essential civilian and governmental requirements in the Trust Territory. The Navy and Interior Departments will commence immediately to work out, in cooperation with other interested agencies, arrangements for such services and will submit plans by May 1, 1950, for carrying out these arrangements to the President for approval.

August 31, 1949

APPENDIX R

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10265

TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FROM THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WHEREAS the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter referred to as the trust territory) was placed under the trusteeship system established by the Charter of the United Nations by means of a trusteeship agreement approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1957, and by the United States Government on July 18, 1947, after due constitutional process; and

WHEREAS the United States, under the terms of the trusteeship agreement, was designated as the administering authority of the trust territory, and has assumed obligations for the government thereof; and

WHEREAS Executive Order No. 9875 of July 18, 1947, delegated authority and responsibility for the civil administration of the trust territory to the Secretary of the Navy on an interim basis; and

WHEREAS a committee of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and the Interior recommended on June 18, 1947, that administrative responsibility for the trust territory be transferred to a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date; and

WHEREAS plans for the orderly transfer of administrative responsibility for the trust territory from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior are embodied in a memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior, approved by me on September 23, 1949, and it is the view of the two departments, as expressed in that memorandum, that such transfer should take effect on July 1, 1951; and

WHEREAS the transfer of administration of the trust territory from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, effective July 1, 1951, appears to be in the public interest:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The administration of the trust territory is hereby transferred from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, such transfer to become effective on July 1, 1951.

2. The Department of the Navy and the Department of Interior shall proceed with the plans for the transfer of administration of the trust territory as embodied in the above-mentioned memorandum of understanding between the two departments.

3. When the transfer of administration made by this order becomes effective, the Secretary of the Interior shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate, and in harmony with applicable law, for the administration of

civil government in the trust territory and shall, subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe and, when appropriate, in collaboration with other departments or agencies of the Government, carry out the obligations assumed by the United States as the administering authority of the trust territory under the terms of the trusteeship agreement approved by the United States on July 18, 1947, and under the Charter of the United Nations: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the authority to specify parts or all of the trust territory as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the President: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, that the Secretary of the Interior shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities in the trust territory affecting the foreign policy of the United States and shall consult the Secretary of State on questions of policy concerning the trust territory which relate to the foreign policy of the United States, and that all relations between departments or agencies of the Government and appropriate organs of the United Nations with respect to the trust territory shall be conducted through the Secretary of State.

4. The executive departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Departments of the Navy and Interior in the effectuation of the provisions of this order.

5. The said Executive Order No. 9875 of July 18, 1947, is revoked, effective July 1, 1951.

/S/ HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
June 29, 1951.

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